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Abstract
This thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by
David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as
well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then devel-
ops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it
proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the
power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those
drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are
essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and
the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament.
Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have
the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own
legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees
should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts
should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee com-
mittees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees
might be biased or corrupt.
The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this
thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for
the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and
equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than
democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the
progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a
result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power su ciently
more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from
political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes
that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence
and equality than democracy.
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Introduction
The principal question that this thesis will investigate is whether there exist
any political systems that are morally authoritative and legitimate. The
accepted wisdom of our times is, of course, that there exists such a system
and that it is called liberal democracy. In opposition, I shall endeavour
to argue that, at least within the epistemic framework of theorising about
legitimacy and moral authority, these ought to be reserved for a form of
moderately non-democratic system that I propose to call liberal trusteeship.
Below, I introduce the theoretical framework relevant to our question and
provide a brief taxonomy of the relevant literature (§I.1), and subsequently
provide an outline of the chapters that follow (§I.2).
I.1 Central problems, aims, and definitions
In what follows, I begin by stating the problem of disagreement and explain
how it poses a significant challenge for accounts of legitimacy and moral
authority (§I.1a). I then provide a formal definition of legitimacy and moral
authority (§I.1b), clarify how these two notions relate to justice, morality,
and politics (§I.1c), and provide a formal definition of what renders a po-
litical system liberal, egalitarian, or democratic (§I.1d). Lastly, I provide
a brief taxonomy of the main lines of argument that theories of legitimacy
and moral authority generally subscribe to (§I.1e) and state the major aims
of this thesis (§I.1f). The reader may skip subsections (§I.1b-d) for now, as
there will be reminders throughout the thesis of when it is useful to refer
back to them.
(I.1a) In order to understand why it is worth investigating whether there
exist any political systems that are morally authoritative and legitimate, it
is important to begin with the problem of disagreement.
1
2 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
We consider the moral demands of authoritative and legitimate govern-
ments to be universally binding, i.e., binding for all citizens. We expect
those subject to an authoritative and legitimate government to obey its de-
cisions as a matter of moral duty, and we recognize the moral right of such
governments to enforce their decisions, irrespective of whether citizens agree
with those decisions or not. In that regard, the primary task of non-relativist
political theories is to explain how a government can make moral demands
that are universally binding.1
During the Enlightenment, this task was entrusted in the exercise of
reason. It was hoped that rational agents “would converge on the same,
universalizable, moral code” that would provide the objective credentials
necessary to impose universally-binding demands on others.2 But as faith
in the universality of reason has waned in the post-Enlightenment era, the
challenge about justifying universally-binding demands has become more
pressing. If fully rational agents can reasonably diverge in their views—
despite the fact that everyone is adhering to the standards necessary for
rational discourse to take place—then it becomes very di cult to identify
which views, if any, are objectively true or correct. We can agree, therefore,
that a puzzle arises:
Each of us is committed to our political views, yet our arguments
for them seem inconclusive. How can each of us be justified in
embracing political views that ... are inadequately justified?3
And therein lies the problem of disagreement. It states that it is wrong
for governments to exercise coercion, at least not without the prior consent
of those a↵ected, since the moral reasoning underpinning their decisions
and the moral reasoning underpinning any argument for the authority and
legitimacy of the said governments cannot be justified in terms that all fully
rational agents will necessarily converge on.4
1Relativist theories need not do that, but I argue shortly below that we ought to
proceed on the hypothesis that there do exist universal moral truths, so relativist theories
will not concern us here.
2Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism, p. 4.
3Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, p. vii.
4Note that the problem of disagreement is also referred to as the problem of ultimate
commitment (e.g. Bartley, The Retreat to Commitment, p. 72) or as the problem of
legitimacy (e.g. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 40).
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There are two possible reasons that might cause the problem of disagree-
ment. The first reason might be that (I) although there exist objectively
right moral standards, our epistemic access to those standards is defective
or limited, such that it is very di cult (though not impossible) for rational
agents to identify them, let alone come to agree upon them.5 The second
reason might be that (II) the problem arises simply because there are no
objectively right moral standards, such that theories of justice and morality
cannot possibly be justified in non-relativist terms.
There is something attractive about this second explanation. It is tempt-
ing to think that insofar as moral standards are relative, this allows us to
justify the legitimacy of a liberal political system that promotes tolerance,
and that safeguards and is neutral towards di↵erent conceptions of moral-
ity and the good.6 But on reflection there is something unattractive too, as
relativism cuts both ways. Whereas the liberal might see it as an argument
for tolerance, it may also be deployed as an argument for intolerance. Carl
Schmitt, for example, has argued that insofar as there is no moral truth to
be had and insofar as morality is relative, then politics is simply a matter of
conviction and a power struggle between competing ideologies, where noth-
ing can be said about the objective rightness or wrongness of the winner’s
beliefs or methods.7 That view actually entails that nothing can be said
about the authority and legitimacy of a given political system a priori, in
which case this thesis will have nothing further to add.
In order to address or bypass the Schmittian challenge, we must either
show that (a) moral relativism properly understood leads to tolerance rather
than Schmitt’s intolerance, or we must show that (b) moral relativism is
false, or at least that (g) moral theorising should not take moral relativism
as a starting premise.
Strategies (a) and (b) would need to establish a concrete claim about
the soundness and implications of moral relativism. But insofar as fully
rational agents can diverge in their views, and indeed insofar as they have
historically disagreed about these questions, it is unlikely that strategies (a)
and (b) can succeed.
Strategy (g), meanwhile, is less ambitious in its scope. It merely needs
5See, e.g., Peter, “Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism”, pp. 610-611.
6For a review, see Gowans, “Moral Relativism”, sec. 8.
7Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 53↵. For a discussion of this point, see also
Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, pp. 11-12.
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to provide a good reason for moral theory to proceed on the assumption that
there exist moral truths, irrespective of whether moral relativism is actually
true or not.
The good reason we are looking for can be found in an incisive point
made by Cheryl Misak. She notes that, irrespective of what may divide us
and cause us to disagree, we all perceive moral inquiry to be aiming at the
truth:
when we make moral judgements ... we take ourselves to be
aiming at something objective — at the truth or at getting things
right, where ‘right’ does not mean merely ‘right by the lights of
my group’. ... We think that it is appropriate, or even required,
that we give reasons and arguments for our beliefs, that ‘rational’
persuasion, not brow-beating or force, is the appropriate means
of getting someone to agree with us.8
Elsewhere she notes:
wanting to get the truth is something which cuts across whatever
divides us from others. Luckily ... we are indeed hard pressed to
find opponents in our moral and political lives who do not assert
or believe or claim that their position is true, or best, or that
which [objectively] ought to be enforced.9
Insofar as we (qua moral agents) commonly understand moral inquiry to
be aiming at (a universal) truth, we act in a way that implicitly considers
moral relativism to be false. Of course this does not prove that relativism is
false; relativism might be true and we might simply be condemned to having
wrong intuitions about the universal scope of moral judgement. However,
because our intuitions on this matter seem so strong and uniform, they
do provide us with good reason to proceed theorising about morality on the
assumption that there do exist universal moral truths. And we should resign
to accepting relativism only once we have exhausted all attempts to uncover
universal moral truths.10
8Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p. 3.
9Ibid., p. 105.
10My circumvention of relativism here draws heavily on Misak’s work. The main di↵er-
ence is this. She argues that our implicit commitment to the truth of our beliefs ultimately
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Now, since we should proceed on the assumption that there exist moral
truths (and hence that moral relativism is false), we cannot assume that
the problem of disagreement is a symptom of moral relativism, as reason
(II) presupposes. Rather, disagreement should be assumed to be the conse-
quence of our defective or limited epistemic access to the truth, as reason
(I) presupposes.
Unlike reason (II), reason (I) does not pose an insurmountable obstacle
for theories of authority and legitimacy. Insofar as disagreement emerges
from our defective or limited access to the truth, then we can endeavour to
minimise the impact of disagreement and maximise the chances that govern-
ments will make good or correct decisions. As I explain shortly, this thesis
will work within the epistemic framework of theorising about legitimacy and
authority precisely because it constitutes a promising strategy for overcom-
ing disagreement. Before all of that, though, let us take a closer look at
some key notions.
(I.1b) According to David Estlund, a political system has moral authority
when governments have the moral power “to morally require or forbid ac-
tions ... through commands”, simply by virtue of issuing those commands
and irrespective of whether these are right or wrong. And he defines legit-
imacy as the “moral permissibility of the state’s issuing and enforcing its
commands”, simply by virtue of them being its commands and irrespective
of whether they are right or wrong.11 In other words, moral authority is
about the moral duty of citizens to abide by a government’s laws, while le-
gitimacy is about the moral right of a government to enforce its laws through
coercion.
While additional definitions of moral authority and legitimacy may be
proposed, the above will su ce for our purposes. For one, as I shortly ex-
plain in the chapter outline, this thesis will begin by engaging with Estlund’s
account of democratic authority and legitimacy, so it is helpful to adopt his
definitions. Subsequently, we will engage with the accounts of democratic
legitimacy put forward by Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne
justifies a pragmatist epistemology, from which she then concludes that moral relativism
is not a plausible starting premise. So, her approach is a variant of strategy (g) too, but
I refrain from subscribing to pragmatism so that my argument can have a broader episte-
mological appeal. For Misak’s position, see ibid., pp. 10-12, 105f. For a similar argument
against relativism, see Estlund, Democratic Authority, pp. 25-27.
11Ibid., p. 2.
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Peter, which are not incompatible with Estlund’s definitions.12 More im-
portantly, Estlund’s definitions are fairly uncontroversial.13
Some remarks:
Firstly, note that according to the above two definitions, moral author-
ity and legitimacy are weaker standards than justice (and moral rightness
more generally). This is because they do not render moral authority and
legitimacy dependent on the moral rightness of the individual commands
issued by the State. This reflects the fairly uncontroversial view, shared
by Estlund14 amongst others,15 that a State can remain morally authorita-
tive and legitimate even when it makes unjust or otherwise wrong decisions,
at least insofar as the combined wrongness of the State’s decisions remain
within certain minimum standards of moral rightness.
Secondly, there is a distinction to be made between what I propose to
call intrinsically and instrumentally authoritative and legitimate systems.
Intrinsically authoritative and legitimate systems are required by morality
in the absence of any countervailing considerations. Instrumentally author-
itative and legitimate systems are required only when the implementation
of the intrinsically-required systems would lead to (morally) unacceptable
consequences. For example, suppose that democracy is intrinsically legiti-
mate and that its implementation over some feudal society is likely to lead
to rampant corruption and the breakdown of social order. One could then
argue that feudalism is instrumentally required for that society until the
conditions are ripe for democratic reforms to take place. Indeed, she could
argue that the intrinsic justice of democracy creates a duty to help bring
those conditions about.
This thesis will only examine whether there exist political systems that
are intrinsically authoritative and legitimate. For this reason, the terms
“authoritative” and “legitimate” will be discussed only in this context, un-
12See sections (§3.1) and (§3.2).
13Identical or very similar definitions of moral authority and legitimacy can be found,
amongst others, in Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 136-138, 428; Dworkin, Law’s Empire,
p. 191; and Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p. 240.
14Cf. Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 110: “even unjust law is sometimes legitimate
and authoritative ... Still, there must obviously be limits to this. Some verdicts ... must
be too unjust or otherwise over the line beyond which legitimacy and/or authority falls
away”.
15See, e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 428: “At some point, the injustice of the
outcomes of a legitimate democratic procedure corrupts its legitimacy ... But before this
point [the outcomes] are legitimate whatever they are”.
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less stated otherwise.
Thirdly, note that I shall leave it open whether a morally authoritative
government can ever lack legitimacy, or whether a legitimate government can
ever lack moral authority. This question will not bear on our discussion.
Lastly, note that moral authority and legitimacy are not to be confused
with a State’s de facto political power. The fact that a government possesses
the means to coerce its citizens is clearly independent of whether these means
are morally justified. Given that political power is sometimes referred to as
“political authority” or even “authority” tout court, I should stress that any
unqualified uses of “authority” below will denote “moral authority”.
(I.1c) The above definitions compare authority and legitimacy against moral-
ity and justice. Given that the latter terms admit several definitions, it is
worth examining them in greater detail.
At the most abstract level, the realm of value includes a number of
spheres, such as aesthetics and morality. We may call the subset of morality
that demarcates the political realm as the subset of political morality.16 This
subset partly consists of the moral prescriptions that determine whether the
State morally ought to exist and that designate what is either rightful or
morally obligatory for the State to do. In addition, it partly consists of
the moral prescriptions that determine what is either rightful or morally
obligatory for individual citizens to do in their political lives, such as what
policies they ought to support or what obligations befall on them when the
State oversteps its rightful authority beyond what is tolerable. For example,
if the State is morally obliged to safeguard basic human rights and fails to
do so, then political morality could possibly require individual citizens to
help prevent flagrant violations of those rights, or could even require them
to revolt.
It is the task of political philosophy, and theories of political morality
in particular, to determine the contours and content of political morality.
We may also denote the part of morality that does not belong to political
morality as non-political morality. Hence, by definition, I take these two
spheres to be mutually exclusive.
Considering that we have set out to examine the authority and legiti-
16I borrow this term from Besson, The Morality of Conflict, p. 22. She uses it in exactly
the same sense.
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macy of political systems, the focus of our discussion will be on the part
of political morality that regards the State’s rights and obligations, and on
what constitutional structures follow from these. The political-moral duties
of individual citizens will not concern us.
Some remarks:
Firstly, to the extent that political morality determines what the State
morally ought to do or what is morally permissible for the State to do, it
may bear on policy questions that are ordinarily considered non-moral. In
that regard, every decision on (what are ordinarily considered to be) non-
moral policy questions ought to implement what political morality requires
or to be congruent with what it permits.
Such questions can be found in most policy areas, from economics to
medicine, and science to pedagogy. Suppose, for instance, that political
morality determined that a capitalist economic system is unjust without
qualification. The State would then be morally obliged to adjust its macroe-
conomic policies accordingly, even if macroeconomic theory shows that cap-
italism is preferable on purely economic terms.
Secondly, I leave it open whether justice exhausts political morality, as it
is not clear whether every moral prescription pertaining to politics can ever
be subsumed under justice. For instance, suppose that it is morally wrong
to conduct stem cell research. I doubt that a government’s failure to ban
it would constitute an injustice. Or, I doubt that the deeply religious, who
thinks that the State morally ought to enforce some code of sexual conduct,
could complain that a government’s failure to enforce the said conduct is
an injustice. Probably we can stretch the meaning of justice that far, but
it is perhaps more appropriate to say that one’s theory of political morality
(or one’s political philosophy) allows or requires the State to enforce various
moral prescriptions, some of which do not belong properly within the sphere
of justice. In any case, I shall leave this open. Instead, I will employ the
uncontroversial, if inelegant term, “political morality”.
Finally, irrespective of whether or not justice exhausts the whole of po-
litical morality, I assume that justice is wholly within political morality. It
is enticing to expand the meaning of justice to include things that have
nothing to do with politics, like the moral obligation not to lie to one’s
spouse (assuming that this is indeed a strictly private obligation). But I
think it is more appropriate to describe matters that have nothing to do
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with politics in terms of fairness, wrongness, or, indeed, in terms of “non-
political morality”. Even if this were to be denied, and justice were not to be
situated wholly within political morality, my definitions could be modified
accordingly without endangering the conclusions of this thesis.
(I.1d) Moving on, a political system will be described as liberal when it
provides citizens with a range of liberal rights and protections, such as a
right to free speech or a right to religious freedom. It is not necessary
for our purposes to specify what kind of liberal protections are or are not
required by political morality.
A political system will be described as egalitarian when it treats citizens
as political equals at some stage of the decision-making process, such that
all (or almost all) of political power is ultimately subordinate to that stage.
Conversely, a political system will be described as non-egalitarian when a
significant amount of political power is not ultimately subordinate to any
decision-making stage during which citizens are treated as political equals.
An egalitarian political system will be described as a democracy when
it ensures that decisions at some stage of the decision-making process are
made in a way that reflects the will of the majority, such that all (or almost
all) of political power is ultimately subordinate to the will of the majority.
I shall not examine what the will of the majority amounts to exactly; suf-
fice to assume for our purposes that it can be expressed through elections,
referenda, by selecting parliamentary representatives through lot, or similar
processes.
Some remarks:
Firstly, not all decision-making stages within an egalitarian system need
be governed by principles of political equality. For example, power in modern
democracies is ordinarily limited by judicial review, which is a distinctly non-
egalitarian element, considering that judges need not be representative of the
democratic body politic. This does not mean that modern democracies are
not egalitarian systems, as citizens can ultimately elect representatives who
will legislate to revise the law in a way that judicial objections are no longer
warranted, or even legislate to abolish judicial review altogether. Judicial
review may be a non-egalitarian element, but it is ultimately subordinate to
the will of the majority.
Secondly, while some theorists argue that egalitarian systems must ren-
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der all power ultimately subordinate to a stage in which citizens are treated
as political equals,17 others argue that some exceptions are admissible. For
example, several constitutions of modern democracies require legislative
supermajorities to be amended. Other constitutions even have “eternity
clauses” which forbid amendments to certain constitutional provisions alto-
gether.18 Hurdles like supermajorities and eternity clauses e↵ectively place
some State power outside the reach of democratic politics. Yet some the-
orists argue that they are (morally) justified as they simply demarcate the
legal conditions that are necessary for a system to be democratic.19 Still,
even if we accept that egalitarian systems need not render all power ulti-
mately subordinate to egalitarian processes, there are only so many limits
that can be imposed by eternity clauses and similar hurdles before a sys-
tem ceases to be egalitarian in any meaningful sense. There is definitely a
distinction to be made between egalitarian and non-egalitarian systems.
With regards to this thesis, my impression is that the system I will
be defending, liberal trusteeship, has su ciently expansive non-egalitarian
features to render it non-egalitarian overall. Even if one were to consider
liberal trusteeship to simply be a variant of democracy, then my thesis can
simply be recast as a defence of a particular variant of democracy. But I
would consider such an assessment amiss, and I later explain why,20 so I will
continue to describe liberal trusteeship as a non-egalitarian system.
Lastly, note that not all egalitarian systems need be democracies. Politi-
cal decision-making by fair yet random processes, such as randomly selecting
proposals fielded by citizens, also qualify as egalitarian since they treat cit-
izens as political equals too; each citizen has an equal chance of influencing
the outcome, but the decisions will not necessarily reflect the will of the
majority. Anarchies also treat citizens as political equals since they do not
grant political power to anyone.
(I.1e) Having looked at the problem of disagreement and how it bears on the
question of legitimacy and moral authority, we can now proceed to provide
a brief taxonomy of the main lines of argument that theories of authority
17See, e.g., Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review”, p. 1369f.
18E.g., in the Basic Law of Germany (Article 79 §3) and the Constitution of Greece
(Article 110 §1).
19See, e.g., Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p. 264f.
20See pp. 144, 153, 165.
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and legitimacy generally subscribe to. This exercise will help the reader to
situate this thesis within the broader relevant literature.
On a first level, we can distinguish between two groups of theories of
legitimacy and authority:
The first group consists of what I propose to call substantive-procedural
theories. These seek to ground authority and legitimacy at least partly
on the moral rightness of a political system’s decision-making mechanisms.
As such, they do not link authority and legitimacy to a system’s abil-
ity to make correct decisions (at least within limits). Rather, so long
as a system’s decision-making processes satisfy certain moral standards,
substantive-procedural theories are happy to reserve authority and legit-
imacy for that system even if its decisions are not right or at least not
overtly wrong.
Historically, this has been the principal line of argument that accounts
of legitimacy have pursued. One prominent recent example of this approach
can be found in Thomas Christiano’s Constitution of Equality, where Chris-
tiano starts from the substantive claim that a just society ought to ad-
vance the interests of all persons equally and then argues that only demo-
cratic processes can succeed at advancing citizens’ interests equally because
they respond to each citizen’s views fairly.21 Other examples of substantive-
procedural theories can be found in the works of John Rawls, Carol Gould,
and Jeremy Waldron.22
In that regard, substantive-procedural theories seek to overcome the
problem of disagreement by identifying a set of decision-making processes
that are acceptable to all rational moral agents, such that moral agents will
be willing to submit to decisions taken through those processes irrespective
of whether they agree or disagree with the content of the said decisions.
The di culty with this approach, of course, lies in identifying a set of
decision-making principles that all rational moral agents can accept in the
first place, especially considering that decision-making principles may ulti-
mately reflect specific political-moral views that rational moral agents can
reasonably disagree about. To take Christiano’s proposal, one could argue
that his justification of procedural fairness emphasises political equality over
religious principles of governance, or racist principles, or Marxist principles,
21See Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, p. 12↵.
22For a review, see Christiano, “Democracy”, sec. 2.2.
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and so on, in which case his account of democratic legitimacy will not be
justified in the eyes of those who adhere to those principles.
The second group of theories of legitimacy and authority consists of what
Estlund calls formal epistemic theories,23 or what I shall simply call epis-
temic theories. These seek to ground authority and legitimacy on a political
system’s e↵ectiveness at implementing political morality, whatever political
morality might consist in.
On account of the fact that epistemic theories aim to be neutral be-
tween di↵erent conceptions of political morality, they cannot rely on any
specific claims about what political morality consists in, unless these are
acceptable to all reasonable points of view. Otherwise, they would court
reasonable disagreement and would fail to remain neutral. Rather, their
central premise is that a system is authoritative and legitimate insofar as its
decision-making processes are epistemically beneficial in tracking the con-
tent of political morality better than the alternatives (whatever that content
might be). Thus, whereas substantive-procedural theories focus on the moral
rightness of a political system’s decision-making mechanisms, epistemic the-
ories emphasize the epistemic virtues of those mechanisms.
Epistemic theories can be distinguished further between veritistic epis-
temic and proceduralist epistemic theories.
Veritistic epistemic theories assert that there exist procedure-independent
standards of knowledge about what political morality requires or permits, as
well as of knowledge about how to implement it, and that a political system
is authoritative and legitimate insofar as it maximises the chances of gov-
ernment making decisions that satisfy those standards. (Where knowledge
is weakly understood as the totality of true beliefs or true statements about
something.)
More specifically, veritistic theories can be distinguished between strongly
veritistic and weakly veritistic. Strongly veritistic theories claim that a polit-
ical system is legitimate only insofar as government decisions are certainly or
almost certainly going to satisfy those standards. Meanwhile, weakly veritis-
tic theories claim that a political system is legitimate insofar as government
has better chances of satisfying those standards than the alternatives.24
23Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 169. Note that Estlund additionally mentions a
hypothetical, third group, which he terms substantive-epistemic. Given the absence of
literature to represent this group, I omit it.
24My definition of “knowledge” and “veritistic” are borrowed from Alvin Goldman; see
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Examples of strongly veritistic epistemic theories can be found in any
accounts of democracy that rely on the results of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
or its modern variants.25 Condorcet’s theorem states that when there are
exactly two policy alternatives, the likelihood of the majority’s decision be-
ing correct approaches near certainty as the number of voters becomes very
large, so long as voters have on average a better-than-chance probability of
deciding correctly. Insofar as this result is used to ground the legitimacy
of democracy, therefore, it considers legitimacy to arise from the ability of
democracy to almost always make the right decisions.
Examples of weakly veritistic epistemic theories can be found in the
works of David Estlund and Michael Fuerstein.26 For instance, Estlund ar-
gues that democracy is legitimate partly on the grounds that it is more likely
than the alternatives to make correct decisions. Unlike strongly veritistic
theories, his defence of democratic legitimacy is not conditional on democ-
racy’s ability to all but guarantee a correct outcome. A better-than-chance
probability of making correct decisions is adequate for legitimacy, insofar as
there aren’t any better alternatives.
Proceduralist epistemic theories, on the other hand, reject the notion of
procedure-independent standards of knowledge and consider decisions to be
epistemically valuable only insofar as they are the outcome of commendable
intellectual practices. On this view, a decision has maximal epistemic worth
when it is produced at the hypothetical end of an inquiry that fully adheres
to those practices. For this reason, proceduralist epistemic theories assert
that a political system is authoritative and legitimate insofar as its decision-
making processes adhere to, or replicate, those practices better than the
alternatives. (This remains in contradistinction to substantive-procedural
theories, which we saw consider political systems authoritative and legiti-
mate insofar as their decision-making processes satisfy certain moral, not
epistemic, standards.)
More specifically, proceduralist epistemic theories can be distinguished
betweenmonist and pluralist proceduralist theories, depending on their epis-
his Knowledge in a Social World, p. 5f. Fabienne Peter also borrows these terms from
him; see her “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”, p. 38. The terms “strongly” and “weakly”
veritistic are my own.
25For the theorem and some of its modern variants, see Grofman et al., “Thirteen
Theorems In Search of the Truth”.
26See Estlund, Democratic Authority, and Fuerstein, “Epistemic Democracy”.
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temological assumptions. Monists assume that fully rational enquirers who
adhere to commendable intellectual practices will arrive, at the hypotheti-
cal end of inquiry, at unanimously agreed upon answers that may be char-
acterised as being objectively true (although their notion of objectivity is
clearly di↵erent from that of the veritists, as it is procedure-dependent). On
the other hand, pluralists assume that objectively true answers may not be
found even at the hypothetical end of enquiry. The value of inquiry rather
lies in scrutinising the merits and drawbacks of di↵erent incommensurable
beliefs, as well as in helping us identify and reject false beliefs.27
Examples of monist proceduralist epistemic theories can be found in the
works of Cheryl Misak, John Dewey and R. B. Talisse.28 Meanwhile, a
recent example of a pluralist proceduralist epistemic theory can be found in
the work of Fabienne Peter.29
(I.1f) In light of the above distinctions, it is now possible to state the
principal aims of this thesis:
This thesis will seek to investigate the question of moral authority and
legitimacy from the perspective of epistemic theorising. To begin, it will
reconstruct some prominent epistemic defences of democracy and will then
examine their shortcomings. In response to those shortcomings, it will sub-
sequently endeavour to justify the authority and legitimacy of a moderately
non-democratic system, that I propose to call liberal trusteeship. In that
regard, my defence need not demonstrate that liberal trusteeship is epis-
temically perfect. Rather, it only needs to show that governments under
liberal trusteeship would be likely to exercise power more competently than
governments under democracy. (More accurately, it needs to show that
27The term “proceduralist” is also borrowed from Goldman; see his Knowledge in a
Social World, p. 75. Peter also borrows the same term from Goldman and she also
distinguishes between “monist” and “pluralist” theories, though she does not apply the
distinction to proceduralist theories directly; see her “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”, pp.
35-37f.
Also note that Goldman’s own distinction is between “veritistic consequentialist”, “prag-
matist consequentialist”, “consensus consequentialist”, and “proceduralist” social episte-
mologies, but his work on social epistemology was not developed with epistemic theorising
about legitimacy in mind. Below, I subsume pragmatist accounts under monist procedu-
ralist theories, because pragmatists reject procedure-independent standards of knowledge
too; see section (§3.2a). Even if my categorisation were to be rejected, my argument can
be revised without endangering the conclusions of this thesis.
28See Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality ; Dewey and Tufts, Ethics; Talisse, Democracy
after Liberalism, ch. 6.
29See her “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”.
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liberal trusteeship would be likely to exercise power su ciently more com-
petently than democracy to justify its deviation from political equality—we
will eventually come to this.)
This thesis does not aim to establish whether or not the epistemic
approach is better than the substantive-procedural; it simply works from
within the epistemic framework. To be sure, our earlier discussion on the
problem of disagreement provides strong reasons to prefer the epistemic
approach, as the substantive-procedural will necessarily stumble upon the
problem of disagreement. In addition, our subsequent analysis will o↵er
some further considerations in support of the epistemic approach.30 But
a thorough defence of the epistemic approach would require us to analyse
whether there can exist disagreement about the epistemic foundations of a
given epistemic theory, something that cannot be done in the space avail-
able here. Instead, the reasons cited in favour of the epistemic approach will
simply act to clarify the motivation for this thesis.
Finally, note that this thesis aims to be compatible with weakly veritistic
epistemic theories, as well as monist and pluralist proceduralist epistemic
theories. This means that although proponents of strongly veritistic theories
will reject my account straight from its foundations,31 much of my argument
will otherwise be grounded on premises that are broadly accepted in the
literature.
I.2 Chapter outline
In the first three chapters I engage with some prominent epistemic accounts
of democratic authority and legitimacy, while in the last two chapters I
develop my defence of liberal trusteeship.
Specifically, chapter 1 reconstructs the account of democratic authority
and legitimacy found in David Estlund’s Democratic Authority. Very briefly,
Estlund argues that legitimacy and authority ought to be reserved for a
political system that all “qualified” points of view can recognise as the best
available at making correct decisions. He then goes on to argue that non-
democratic systems would not be acceptable to all “qualified” viewpoints
because any criteria for justifying a deviation from political equality would
30See section (§1.3b).
31This is not a terrible loss, as strongly veritistic standards are unlikely to be fulfilled
in real life anyway.
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invariably court “qualified” disagreement. For these reasons, he concludes
that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for democracy.
Chapter 2 reconstructs an objection raised by Jason Brennan against Es-
tlund’s account.32 Brennan concedes that non-democratic systems are vul-
nerable to “qualified” objections but argues that incompetent governance
is vulnerable too, since it increases the probability that citizens will su↵er
the consequences of bad decisions. For Brennan, this means that whenever
political equality and competent governance are at odds, legitimacy and au-
thority ought to be reserved for the system that provides the best balance
between the two. In his view, this balance lies in mildly non-egalitarian
systems that grant the vote only to citizens who pass certain o cial “com-
petency tests”.
In response, I reject Brennan’s solution to disenfranchise part of the
citizenry on the grounds that it would not render government substantially
more competent than it is under democracy, so democracy would continue
to strike a better balance between competence and equality. Nevertheless,
I argue that Brennan is right to see incompetent governance as a source
of injustice, which means that a better balance between competence and
equality might well be found in other alternatives to democracy.
Chapter 3 examines three epistemic theories that ground legitimacy on
the idea that democracy is necessary for the maximally competent exercise
of political power. If true, this would forestall any attempt to look for non-
democratic alternatives that strike a better balance between competence
and equality, as democracy would always strike the best one.
Our focus will be on the accounts of democratic legitimacy put forward
by Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter.33 Very briefly,
although these authors di↵er in their epistemological assumptions, they oth-
erwise agree that the chances of government exercising power competently
can be maximised only through open and vigorous inquiry. In this respect,
they defend democracy on the grounds that it provides the best conditions
for open and vigorous inquiry to materialise.
In the remainder of this chapter, I identify a series of problems with the
claim that democracy provides the best conditions for open and vigorous
32Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”.
33Fuerstein, “Epistemic Democracy”; Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality ; Peter, “Pure
Epistemic Proceduralism”.
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inquiry to materialise. I focus on (a) how democracy leaves citizens to make
coarse-grained choices between imperfect party manifestos, which means
that governments can have a mandate to pursue policies that public debate
has shown to be wrong; on how (b) citizens cannot a↵ord the time to inquire
vigorously into political matters; and on how (g) citizens are ceteris paribus
likely to adopt inadequate epistemic attitudes during political discourse that
are incompatible with open and vigorous inquiry.
While these shortcomings do not su ce to establish that democracy can-
not maximise the chances of governing competently, they certainly provide
the motivation to look for non-democratic alternatives that might be less
vulnerable to those problems. This task is undertaken in the remaining two
chapters.
Chapter 4 develops the core elements of my epistemic justification of
liberal trusteeship. My starting assumption is that if someone has inquired
into a certain subject significantly more vigorously and more openly than
the average lay person, then she is correspondingly more likely to acquire an
epistemically privileged perspective on that subject relative to the average
lay person. I call such people trustees in their relevant fields of specialisation.
In the light of this, I propose that the power to draft laws in each pol-
icy area be granted exclusively to the relevant specialist (and unelected)
trustees, while the power to enact these drafts into law, or reject them, be
granted exclusively to a democratically elected parliament. I then argue that
trusteeship will be likely to exercise power more competently than democ-
racy by virtue of limiting parliament’s options down to the proposals that
trustees have deduced after vigorous inquiry into the matter. Subsequently,
the remainder of the chapter examines whether there should exist any ex-
ceptions that allow parliament to override trustees and directly pass its own
laws, as well as how the criteria for selecting trustees in a given field ought
to be decided in the first place.
Finally, chapter 5 seeks to complete my justification of liberal trustee-
ship. In particular, it examines what institutional safeguards can be put
in place to mitigate the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt, and
argues that, on balance, liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power suf-
ficiently more competently than democracy to justify the deviation from
political equality.

Chapter 1
Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism
We noted that the first three chapters will examine and evaluate some promi-
nent epistemic defences of democratic authority and legitimacy.1 The aim of
this chapter, in particular, will be to reconstruct David Estlund’s epistemic
defence of democracy, which he calls epistemic proceduralism.
Epistemic proceduralism endeavours to provide a near-comprehensive
defence of democracy, in that it starts from foundational principles and pro-
ceeds to consider a large number of objections before concluding in favour
of democracy. An advantage of focusing on this theory, then, is that it pro-
vides us with a developed philosophical framework to guide our subsequent
discussion. Indeed, my defence of liberal trusteeship will be partly based
on, and partly developed in response to some criticisms of, epistemic pro-
ceduralism. Given the theory’s size, our analysis will be limited to its core
elements and to what will be relevant for subsequent chapters.
According to epistemic proceduralism, the following two conditions are
necessary to establish the moral authority and legitimacy of a political sys-
tem:
(EP1) The said system must be the best at making correct decisions
from amongst those systems that are justifiable in terms acceptable to
all “qualified” points of view.
(EP2) The combined wrongness, if any, of the decisions and policies
currently enforced by the State must remain within certain minimum
standards of moral rightness.
1Epistemic theories seek to ground authority and legitimacy on a political system’s
e↵ectiveness at implementing political morality, whatever that might consist in; see p. 12.
For the definition of moral authority and legitimacy, see section (§I.1b). For the definition
of political morality, see p. 7.
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And the political system that meets these conditions, Estlund argues, is
democracy.2 In what follows, we will focus on Estlund’s justification of
condition (EP1) and why he thinks it points us to democracy. On the other
hand, there is little to be said about condition (EP2) as Estlund simply
assumes it to be true.3
The development of condition (EP1) is primarily grounded on the idea
that political systems ought to be justifiable to all “qualified” points of view,
which Estlund calls the qualified acceptability requirement. For this rea-
son, section (§1.1) examines how he understands this requirement and how
closely it compares to Rawls’s better known equivalent, the liberal principle
of legitimacy. Section (§1.2) then looks at how the qualified acceptability
requirement gives rise to three additional constraints, such as a requirement
that the justification of a system’s authority and legitimacy must not depend
on the superiority or inferiority of citizens’ competencies. And section (§1.3)
briefly examines how Estlund employs these constraints together with the
qualified acceptability requirement in order to reject substantive-procedural
and strongly veritistic epistemic accounts of authority and legitimacy.4
With the above theoretical background in place, the remaining sections
then turn to the main argument in defence of democracy. This takes place
in essentially three steps:
In the first step, which is reconstructed in section (§1.4), Estlund uses the
qualified acceptability requirement to initially restrict the candidates for au-
thoritative and legitimate government only to egalitarian political systems.
This step is important because it disqualifies some potent non-egalitarian
competitors to democracy, such as expert rule. Still, this step does not
2My reconstruction of epistemic proceduralism will be mainly based on Estlund’s
Democratic Authority, as he makes clear that it supersedes his earlier work where there
are di↵erences (Ibid., p. ix). Democratic Authority does omit, however, some elements of
his previous work purely for the sake of brevity (Ibid., p. ix), so occasional references to
previous work will be necessary.
It is also worth noting an ambiguity about condition (EP1). In most cases, as stated
above, Estlund claims that authoritative and legitimate systems must be the “best” avail-
able at making correct decisions from amongst those acceptable to qualified points of view.
See, e.g., Ibid., pp. 8, 42, 116, 160, 163 n. 1. At other times, however, he claims that
systems need not be the best, but only “nearly” or “close” to being the best. See, e.g.,
Ibid., pp. 98, 157, 228. The latter formulation raises a series of questions and yet Estlund
does not seem to provide reasons in its support. Nonetheless, I later argue that epistemic
proceduralism is plausible only on the former formulation (see p. 43) and, hence, will not
mention this ambiguity elsewhere.
3See Democratic Authority, pp. 110-111.
4To recall how these are defined, wait until (§1.3) or see (§I.1e).
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yet establish democracy’s authority and legitimacy over other egalitarian
systems.
In the second step, which is reconstructed in section (§1.5), Estlund
argues that a political system’s authority and legitimacy should not only
depend on its egalitarian attributes, but also on its epistemic credentials.
In particular, he claims that we have a moral obligation to contribute to
the resolution of humanitarian problems, and argues that this generates a
moral obligation to obey governments that are maximally e↵ective at making
correct decisions. From this, he then proceeds to argue that authority and
legitimacy ought to be accorded to those egalitarian systems that are the
best at making correct decisions.
And in the third step, which is reconstructed in section (§1.6), Estlund
concludes that democracy is (epistemically) the best egalitarian system. To
begin, he argues that democracy has the ability to avoid very bad states
of a↵airs, such as famine and genocide, at a rate that is far better than
random. And then he extrapolates from this that democracy also has the
ability to make correct decisions about other, less important, issues at a rate
that is at least better than random.5 Now, while this argument establishes
democracy’s superiority over systems that make decisions randomly (which,
we will see, count as egalitarian systems), it does not establish its superi-
ority against every egalitarian system conceivable. Instead of attempting
to establish that, Estlund simply states that epistemic proceduralism would
recommend an alternative to democracy if it were shown to have decisive
epistemic advantages over democracy. In other words, his defence of democ-
racy is ultimately an educated guess as to what epistemic proceduralism
entails.
1.1 The qualified acceptability requirement
We just noted that the qualified acceptability requirement is a crucial el-
ement of epistemic proceduralism. Below, I examine how Estlund under-
stands it and how it relates to Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy.
The qualified acceptability requirement states that a “necessary condition
on the legitimate exercise of political power [is] that it be justifiable in terms
5Estlund does not define “random”. He most likely means that each policy option
supported by at least one decision maker will have an equal probability of materialising.
For example, if parliamentarians are split between correct policy A and wrong policies B
and C, then a random rate of deciding correctly would yield policy A a third of the time.
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acceptable to all qualified points of view”.6
Note that although this definition does not make any direct reference to
moral authority, we will see later that moral authority is indirectly condi-
tional on qualified acceptability, as it is ultimately grounded on a system’s
ability to address humanitarian problems in a way that qualified points of
view can recognize as e↵ective.7 For simplicity, I will refer to qualified ac-
ceptability as if it were a condition for both authority and legitimacy by
definition, except where this distinction is necessary to understand specific
points in Estlund’s argument.
Also note that Estlund leaves it open whether there exist any additional
conditions for legitimacy. If there do exist additional conditions, he allows
that democracy might fail to satisfy them, in which case it would lack legit-
imacy.8 In the absence of an argument showing this, however, he proceeds
on the assumption that democracy will be legitimate insofar as it satisfies
conditions (EP1) and (EP2).
Now, with regards to what justifies the qualified acceptability require-
ment, Estlund is clear that he is not o↵ering a positive argument in its
support and that, despite its pivotal role, he instead employs it directly as
a starting premise.9 The reason for this is that he is not aiming to provide
a knock-down argument for epistemic proceduralism. Rather, his target
audience is limited to those who already believe that legitimacy must be
grounded, at least partly, in an ideal of acceptability.
The idea that government is legitimate only if it is acceptable to those
who are liable to its power is historically rooted in social contract theory
and in recent decades has gained further currency due to Rawls’s Political
Liberalism. In an oft-quoted passage, Rawls summarizes this idea as follows:
our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exer-
cised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common
human reason.10
6Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 41.
7See section (§1.5a).
8See Democratic Authority, p. 134.
9See, e.g., ibid., pp. 42-43, 49-52, 211.
10Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137.
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This is his famous liberal principle of legitimacy and it merits a longer anal-
ysis than is appropriate to provide here.11 Recall that a major challenge for
theories of authority and legitimacy is to provide a moral justification for
the exercise of State coercion in the context of pervasive disagreement about
political morality.12 Su ce for our purposes, then, to note that Rawls’s prin-
ciple of legitimacy has become influential precisely because it (endeavours
to) steer clear of metaphysical, moral, or other controversial notions. In-
stead, it grounds legitimate power on terms that free and equal citizens who
hold reasonable but incompatible views can accept. These views need not
even be true; they only need to be reasonable.13 That is, they only need to
be acceptable amongst agents committed to “fair terms of cooperation”.14
This emphasis on acceptability, Rawls hopes, creates room for an “overlap-
ping consensus” about what the proper constitutional structure of society
should be that is su cient to render State coercion (under such structures)
morally justified.15
Estlund explicitly states that his qualified acceptability requirement is
modelled after Rawls’s principle of legitimacy. However, there are two dif-
ferences to note:
Firstly, the notion of acceptability is more important in Rawls’s concep-
tion of legitimacy than it is in Estlund’s, since Estlund additionally renders
legitimacy conditional on a system’s ability to make good decisions.
Secondly, Estlund prefers to talk in terms of “qualified” rather than “rea-
sonable” points of view. This is because he wants to incorporate the idea of
acceptability in his theory, while at the same time avoiding any controversy
about what that idea might amount to. He believes that Rawls’s idea of rea-
sonableness relies on a particular understanding of acceptability, so he wants
to distance his theory from any existing “controversial associations”.16 (He
does not clarify which controversies he has in mind, but a common objection
to Rawls’s idea of reasonableness is that it embodies liberal cosmopolitan
11For some influential commentary on this principle see, e.g., Raz, “The Case of Epis-
temic Abstinence”, and Estlund, “The Insularity of the Reasonable”.
12See section (§I.1a).
13Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 116: “[Political liberalism] need not go beyond its
conception of a reasonable judgment and may leave the concept of a true moral judgment
to comprehensive doctrines”.
14Ibid., p. 49.
15Ibid., p. 140.
16Democratic Authority, p. 44.
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intuitions that are far from universally accepted.17) And he believes that
the term “qualified” demarcates the desired notion of acceptability with-
out bringing any preconceptions to mind about what that idea amounts to.
Whenever a specification of “qualified” is necessary for the progression of
his argument, instead of drawing on a grand definition of “qualified”, he
simply opts for what he considers most intuitively fitting in that context.
(Of course, one might worry here that insofar as a theory is grounded
on an ideal of acceptability, then the logical validity of its conclusions could
be contingent on one’s interpretation of what that ideal amounts to. In
that case, Estlund’s conclusions could become controversial once we tried
specifying what “qualified” means, just as Rawls’s liberal cosmopolitanism
courts controversy. This is a valid concern. And given that I later adopt
the qualified acceptability requirement as a premise in my argument, as well
as that I adopt his approach of leaving “qualified” undefined except when
it is necessary for the progression of my argument, it is a problem that my
defence of liberal trusteeship will inherit as well. Still, this problem should
not be exaggerated. For one, even if Estlund’s approach is ultimately no less
problematic than Rawls’s, it is unlikely to be more problematic. Secondly,
some theorists argue that public reason can be justified on purely epistemic
grounds, without having to rely on any particular intuitions about what
reasonableness amounts to.18 If such arguments are valid, and the content
of Estlund’s qualified acceptability were to be specified on the basis of such
arguments, then his approach could ultimately be less problematic than
Rawls’s.)
To summarize, Estlund shares the view that legitimacy must be grounded,
at least partly, in an ideal of acceptability. The qualified acceptability re-
quirement, which reflects Estlund’s commitment to that view, states that
legitimate government must be acceptable to all “qualified” points of view.
It is modelled after Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy and Estlund em-
ploys it directly as a starting premise in his theory—he does not provide
any positive reasons in its support. He also does not specify what counts as
“qualified”.
17See, e.g., Sandel, “The Procedural Republic”, or Bohman, “Public Reason and Cul-
tural Pluralism”.
18See, e.g., Peter, “Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism”, pp. 610-618.
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1.2 Three constraints on theories of legitimacy
Estlund identifies three problems that he considers to be challenging for
accounts of legitimacy. These are what he calls the problems of invidious
comparisons (§1.2a), of deference (§1.2b), and of demandingness (§1.2c). Be-
cause these figure at multiple points throughout this and subsequent chap-
ters, it will help to group them here for convenience.
(1.2a) Let us start with the problem of invidious comparisons. This states
that the qualified acceptability requirement would be violated if the struc-
ture of government and the distribution of political power in society were
sensitive to di↵erences in the “normative political wisdom” of a State’s cit-
izens.19 By implication, therefore, theories of legitimacy must not rely on
any criteria that di↵erentiate between citizens’ abilities to make the right
political decisions.
Estlund does not deny that some citizens are likely to be better judges of
political matters than others. What he argues is that this fact, when it is a
fact, should not be factored in the justification of a government’s legitimacy.
This is because the justification of legitimacy, as we saw in the last section,
must be acceptable to all “qualified” points of view. Even if citizens have
di↵erent political competencies, Estlund claims that any criteria for quanti-
fying those di↵erences in practice will be subject to qualified disagreement
and, hence, will be rejectable.20 As he puts it elsewhere, the “problem is
that any putative knower could be doubted by some reasonable people, and
so knowledge cannot give moral legitimacy to political power”.21 This is
an explicit assumption in his argument, not something that follows from a
definition of what can count as a “qualified” viewpoint.
The above already gives us strong hints about how the problem of in-
vidious comparisons can be used to disqualify non-democratic forms of gov-
ernment. But its role within Estlund’s theory goes beyond that, and it is at
times intertwined with that of the remaining two problems, so let us turn
to them first.
(1.2b) The next problem that concerns Estlund is that of deference. This
states that for any decision made by the government, it is quite probably
19See Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 36.
20Ibid., pp. 31-33.
21“Making Truth Safe for Democracy”, p. 94.
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wrong (but not clearly so) to require dissenting citizens to give up their
personal judgements and accept instead that the said decision is true or
correct or morally right.22 Therefore, Estlund argues that in order to avoid
the potential di culties associated with deference in judgement, it is prefer-
able that the legitimacy of a government’s decision is not justified in a way
that ultimately requires dissenters to recognize that decision as being true
or correct or morally right.
To repeat, Estlund believes that deference in judgement is quite probably
wrong but not clearly so. Let us modify an example he uses in order to
demonstrate his understanding of the problem at hand.23 Imagine a deck of
1,000 cards, one of which has a moral statement written on it that is false,
and the remaining 999 have moral statements that are true. This means that
a random card drawn from the deck will contain a statement that is almost
certainly true. Now, imagine a government that makes decisions by drawing
cards from such a reliable deck. The legitimacy of its decisions, one could
argue, rests on the fact that they will almost certainly be correct. But, then,
the very fact that the decisions are almost certainly going to be correct seems
to be a very strong reason for dissenters to give up their almost certainly
wrong antithetical views and defer instead to the government’s edicts.
And this is where Estlund is inclined to disagree. Even if we do not
doubt the odds of drawing a card containing a true statement, he thinks
that—at least in the case of moral statements—we are entitled to withhold
judgement about the correctness of the drawn card’s statement. In fact,
even if all 1,000 cards had true moral statements written on them, part of
him is still inclined to say that it is reasonable to refuse to endorse any
statement that is randomly selected from the deck, because “knowing that
the card we turn up is certain to be correct still does not give us any idea of
what is correct about it, any moral basis for [endorsing] the judgement”.24
And yet, immediately after saying this, he admits that it is probably not
a “sensible stance” to refuse to endorse something known to be certainly
or almost certainly true, even in the case of moral judgements. Estlund
does not elaborate on what pulls him in either direction, simply saying
that deference raises a “puzzle” that is worth bearing in mind. And since he
22See Democratic Authority, pp. 102-104.
23For his original example, see ibid., pp. 105-106.
24Ibid., p. 106.
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designs epistemic proceduralism to avoid any potential di culties associated
with that puzzle, he leaves the matter there.
(1.2c) The third problem that concerns Estlund is that of demandingness.
This states that legitimacy ought to not be entirely contingent on the right-
ness or correctness of government decisions, as this would set unacceptably
high standards for legitimacy that cannot be met in real life.25 Rather, as
already noted,26 Estlund holds that governments should remain legitimate
even when some of their decisions are wrong, at least to acceptable levels.
1.3 The failure of alternatives to epistemic proceduralism
In the introductory chapter we saw that pervasive disagreement about what
political morality requires or permits presents a major challenge for accounts
of legitimacy. And we saw that attempts to overcome the problem of dis-
agreement can be broadly categorised between substantive-procedural and
epistemic theories. Also, recall that the latter can be further categorised
into four groups: strongly veritistic, weakly veritistic, monist proceduralist
and pluralist proceduralist epistemic theories.27
By the end of this chapter we will see that Estlund’s epistemic proce-
duralism is a weakly veritistic epistemic theory.28 In this section, I briefly
look at Estlund’s reasons for rejecting substantive-procedural and strongly
veritistic epistemic accounts.29 While a thorough investigation of his rea-
sons would be outside the scope of this thesis, we should bear in mind that
Estlund develops epistemic proceduralism partly in response to his criti-
cisms of these two types of theories. So, a brief exposition of his reasons
will lend context and clarity to our discussion. I begin from his rejection of
strongly veritistic epistemic accounts (§1.3a) before turning to his rejection
of substantive-procedural ones (§1.3b).
25Although Estlund does mention the problem of demandingness in Democratic Author-
ity, he examines it more thoroughly in “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation”, pp. 187-189.
Also, note that the “problem of demandingness” is more often encountered in a moral,
rather than a political, context. For a thorough yet accessible discussion on how conse-
quentialist theories can be overly demanding, see Tim Mulgan’s The Demands of Con-
sequentialism. For a discussion on how contractualist theories can be so, see Elizabeth
Ashford’s “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism”.
26See p. 6.
27To recall all these definitions, see section (§I.1e).
28See section (§1.5e).
29Note that Estlund does not examine any monist or pluralist proceduralist arguments
in his work.
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(1.3a) Strongly veritistic epistemic theories, we have seen, claim that a po-
litical system is legitimate only insofar as government decisions are certainly
or almost certainly going to be correct.30 Correctness is both a necessary
and su cient condition for legitimacy.
The appeal of strongly veritistic accounts is that legitimacy does not
depend on the specific content of individual government decisions. So long
as it can be shown that governments under a particular political system are
certain to make correct decisions, then the specific content of those decisions
is irrelevant. This means that the problem of disagreement can be overcome,
as there is no need to engage in controversial arguments about the reasons
that render a particular decision correct or incorrect.
To revisit our previous example, if one claimed that a government us-
ing a reliable deck of cards as a decision-making mechanism is legitimate
because its decisions will almost certainly be correct, then he would be of-
fering a very simplistic strongly veritistic theory. More credible examples of
strongly veritistic theories are found in justifications of legitimacy that rely
on the results of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem or its modern variants. The
original Jury Theorem states that, when there are exactly two policy al-
ternatives, the likelihood of a democratic majority’s decisions being correct
approaches near certainty as the number of voters becomes very large, so
long as voters have on average a better-than-chance probability of deciding
correctly.31 Contemporary versions of this theorem have aimed to improve it
in various ways; for instance, it has been extended to apply for any number
of policy alternatives,32 or relaxed to guarantee a very high (instead of near
certain) probability of getting correct outcomes on most policy issues even
when voters have a significantly worse-than-chance probability of deciding
correctly with respect to a minority of policy issues.33 In that regard, a
strongly veritist democrat can directly employ these results to argue that
democracy is legitimate by virtue of it being almost certain to yield correct
decisions.
One typical di culty that the Jury Theorem and its correlative exten-
sions face is whether they constitute an accurate model of actual democratic
30Note that Estlund’s term for strongly veritistic theories is “correctness accounts”. See
Democratic Authority, pp. 99, 102.
31Grofman et al., “Thirteen Theorems In Search of the Truth”, p. 264.
32See Goodin and List, “Epistemic Democracy”, pp. 283-288.
33See Estlund, “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation”, p. 188, n. 24.
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processes. For instance, critics can reasonably object that it is not obvi-
ous that individual citizens have a better-than-chance probability of being
right.34 More importantly for Estlund, strongly veritistic theories violate
two of the aforementioned three constraints on legitimacy: Firstly, (a) all
strongly veritistic accounts, including those relying on the results of the Jury
Theorem and its variants, violate the constraint on demandingness, as they
render a government’s legitimacy conditional on its ability to make correct
decisions.35 Secondly, (b) it is also clear that all strongly veritistic accounts
violate the constraint on deference, since they claim that a government’s de-
cisions are almost certainly correct, hence providing dissenters with strong
reasons for giving up their personal judgements.36 (It is worth mentioning
that strongly veritistic theories relying on the results of the Jury Theorem
do not violate the constraint on invidious comparisons. This is because the
Jury Theorem is demographically neutral and does not discriminate between
individual citizens’ competencies.37)
(1.3b) Now, note that strongly veritistic accounts attach no value to proce-
dural fairness, since they justify legitimacy solely in terms of a government’s
ability to decide correctly. But we might think that the solution lies precisely
in fair procedures, as these can actually satisfy Estlund’s three constraints
on legitimacy. Fair procedures are not sensitive to an outcome’s correct-
ness, so they do not threaten to set unacceptably demanding standards of
legitimacy, or to require dissenters to defer in their judgement. And they
do not make any invidious comparisons between citizens, since fairness is
unconnected to merit.
This brings us to substantive-procedural theories. Recall that substantive-
procedural theories seek to ground legitimacy at least partly on the moral
rightness of a political system’s decision-making processes.
In the simplest version of substantive-procedural theories, which Estlund
34For a summary of this and other problems with the Jury Theorem see Estlund, Demo-
cratic Authority, ch. 12.
35Ibid., p. 106.
36Ibid., p. 105. Curiously, Estlund has a third worry about strongly veritistic epistemic
theories, namely that they need to rely on independent standards of justice in order to
evaluate whether a certain decision is correct or not, which he believes can lead to qualified
objections about those standards; see ibid., p. 99. But strongly veritistic theories like those
relying on the results of the Jury Theorem do not actually appeal to any independent
standards of political morality at all.
37Ibid., p. 12.
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calls Fair Proceduralism, a political system is legitimate insofar as it pro-
vides fair procedures for making decisions. On that account, Fair Proce-
duralism can be used to justify democracy because majority voting is one
such procedure—it treats all citizens fairly. But the problem, according to
Estlund, is that Fair Proceduralism cannot explain what makes democracy
any more legitimate than a political system in which decisions are made
randomly, such as by tossing coins. Random processes, Estlund points out,
would be as impartial towards citizens as majority voting. He concludes,
therefore, that democracy’s fairness does not su ce to explain its legiti-
macy.38
Estlund then goes on to criticize more sophisticated versions of this idea.
One of his targets is Ju¨rgen Habermas’s work on deep deliberative democracy.
Stripped down to its essentials, Habermas’s theory claims that democratic
decisions are legitimate insofar as they could have been the outcome of an
“ideal speech situation”, i.e., of a hypothetical deliberative process that sat-
isfied certain standards of rationality and fair terms of participation.39 Put
di↵erently, Habermas grounds legitimacy on a specific type of fair proce-
dure, and this seems to provide stronger reasons for explaining democracy’s
legitimacy over, say, that of coin tossing.
Estlund points out, however, that the “ideal speech situation” is a “way
of holding outcomes to a standard that is logically independent of their
actual procedural source”.40 That is, it is not the procedural aspect of the
“ideal speech situation” that explains democracy’s legitimacy, but the fact
that actual democratic decisions conform to the possible outcomes of ideal
deliberation. This means that Habermas’s theory e↵ectively has to rely
on independent standards of political morality in order to judge whether a
political system is legitimate or not. But such standards are vulnerable to
qualified disagreement; Estlund notes that some may reasonably object to
Habermas’s emphasis on rationality and fairness at the expense of religious
or other values. (He could have added that we may also reasonably disagree
about what the ideal speech situation entails in the first place.) Whatever
the merits of Habermas’s approach, according to Estlund, it does not succeed
in overcoming the problem of disagreement, as it has to rely on controversial
38Estlund, Democratic Authority, pp. 82-83.
39See, e.g., Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 103-104.
40Democratic Authority, p. 89.
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claims.41
The above two types of responses are characteristic of Estlund’s rejection
of the remaining substantive-procedural theories that he examines. He ei-
ther claims that substantive-procedural accounts fail to explain what makes
democratic procedures superior to other fair procedures,42 or that they fail
to provide an account of legitimacy that does not implicitly rely on contro-
versial political-moral standards.43
(1.3c) To summarize, Estlund thinks that strongly veritistic epistemic the-
ories of legitimacy are rejectable because they cannot escape the problems of
deference and demandingness. And while substantive-procedural accounts
can do so, they are rejectable because they fail to provide a convincing justifi-
cation of democratic legitimacy that does not implicitly rely on controversial
standards of political morality.
1.4 Democracy’s egalitarian alternatives
We have so far investigated Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement and
the three correlative requirements that theories of legitimacy avoid the prob-
lems of invidious comparisons, of deference, and of demandingness. More,
we have briefly looked at how these requirements weigh in Estlund’s rejection
of substantive-procedural and strongly veritistic epistemic accounts of legiti-
macy. With this background in mind, we can now turn to Estlund’s attempt
to justify democratic legitimacy without violating these requirements.
Recall that Estlund’s defence of democracy is principally dependent on
the ability of democracy to satisfy condition (EP1). This condition states
that a system is authoritative and legitimate only insofar as it is the best at
making correct decisions from amongst those systems that are justifiable in
terms acceptable to all qualified points of view. Estlund’s attempt to show
that democracy satisfies (EP1) can be reconstructed in three steps:
In the first step, he asks what political systems would constitute plausi-
ble candidates for authoritative and legitimate government in case we were
to ignore their relative epistemic benefits. His answer is that only egalitarian
systems would count as plausible candidates. In the second step, he argues
41Ibid., p. 90.
42E.g., see his rejection of Jeremy Waldron’s account of fairness, ibid., pp. 93-96.
43E.g., see his rejection of social choice theory and of Joshua Cohen’s account of deep
deliberative democracy, ibid., pp. 74-76 and 90-91 respectively.
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that, in addition to a system’s egalitarian attributes, accounts of author-
ity and legitimacy should also take into account the epistemic benefits of
those systems. In the third step, he argues that democracy is authoritative
and legitimate because it has greater epistemic benefits than its egalitarian
alternatives.
This section focuses on the first step. On the one hand, it investigates
how Estlund disqualifies non-egalitarian systems by arguing that their power
structures would be vulnerable to qualified objections (§1.4a). And, on the
other hand, it prepares the ground for the next step by pointing out that if
political equality were our only consideration, then anarchy would probably
be the only system that would be acceptable to all “qualified” points of view
(§1.4b).
(1.4a) If we reconstruct Estlund’s argument according to the three steps
just mentioned, we see that he initially restricts the potential candidates
for authoritative and legitimate government only to egalitarian systems.44
This is perhaps his most important move towards establishing the authority
and legitimacy of democracy, as it allows him to disqualify sophisticated
non-egalitarian alternatives, such as plural voting systems.
Let us begin with a less sophisticated alternative to democracy. A system
of absolute expert rule, which Estlund calls epistocracy, would claim that
those who know better should have absolute political authority over those
who know less.45 Armed with the constraint on invidious comparisons, how-
ever, Estlund can immediately rule this system out. An epistocracy would
have to di↵erentiate between citizens’ purported competencies, and in do-
ing so would unavoidably rely on criteria that are vulnerable to “qualified”
objections. In this respect, Estlund claims, epistocracies cannot constitute
plausible candidates for legitimate government.46
Still, Estlund recognizes that invidious comparisons are rejectable only
insofar as they are vulnerable to qualified objections. In this respect, he
recognizes that some may find it unreasonable to deny that a “well-educated
population will, other things equal, tend to rule more wisely”. He calls this
thesis the political value of education. And because of this, opponents of
democracy may reasonably object that legitimacy should depend at least
44See section (§I.1d) to recall our definition of an egalitarian system.
45Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 30.
46Ibid., p. 33.
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partly on citizens’ level of education. To the extent that absolute expert rule
is unacceptable, Estlund notes that opponents of democracy may therefore
wish to defend some variant of plural voting instead.47
Under plural voting citizens are allotted votes in proportion to their
level of education. For example, everyone may be given at least one vote
but university graduates may be given two.48 Thereby, the distribution of
political power under plural voting would be partly dependent on citizens’
competencies and, hence, would also violate the constraint on invidious com-
parisons.49 An opponent of democracy might hope, nevertheless, that plural
voting would be acceptable to all “qualified” points of view on account of
its emphasis on the political value of education.
Estlund concedes to his opponent that the political value of education
is beyond qualified disagreement. But he argues that rule by the educated,
even in the plural voting form, would still be vulnerable to qualified ob-
jections. For one, (a) access to education is often correlated with certain
socio-economic factors, hence the educated will be overrepresented in cer-
tain social groups. Even if we were to assume that the educated will be
conscientious and will endeavour to be impartial between the interests of
their own social groups and of those they do not belong into (which is a
very generous assumption), Estlund argues that their socio-economic back-
ground will inevitably a↵ect their judgement in subconscious ways. As such,
giving more votes to the educated may unjustly privilege some groups over
others, thus o↵setting the benefits of their education. In which case it will
indeed be “qualified” to object to plural voting. More, (b) plural voting
would remain objectionable even if these socio-economic distortions were
corrected. For example, members of underrepresented groups could be given
free access to education. In such cases, Estlund insists, it would still be qual-
ified to object to plural voting on the grounds that the educated may have
“empirically latent” biases. That is, despite corrective adjustment for socio-
economic distortions, the educated may remain biased in favour of certain
socio-economic demographics. They may be racists, or sexists, or elitists,
or they may disproportionately favour funding for academic research over
47Ibid., pp. 211-212.
48For a classical defence of plural voting, see Mill, “Considerations on Representative
Government”, p. 473↵. For a more recent defence, see Harwood, “More Votes for Ph.D.’s”.
49It would, however, satisfy the other two constraints, those on demandingness and on
deference, as legitimacy would not be dependent on a decision’s correctness.
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providing unemployment benefits to the poor, and so on. Furthermore, (g)
even as such biases cannot be empirically proven, since the educated can
claim not to be biased when asked, Estlund believes that it would still be
qualified to object against plural voting merely on “conjectural” grounds—
the mere belief that the educated might be racists, sexists, elitists, and so
on, would su ce.
Points (a)-(g) constitute what Estlund calls the demographic objection
against plural voting arrangements.50 Generally, it states that despite any
superior governing skills that individuals may acquire through education, a
system of government dominated by the educated may be reasonably sus-
pected of being epistemically worse than democracy, because the educated—
collectively as a social group—may exhibit “epistemically damaging fea-
tures” that o↵set the benefits that their education confers to them as indi-
viduals. As a result, plural voting is vulnerable to qualified objections. And
this fact, according to Estlund, is a very strong reason to presume that all
other types of invidious comparisons between citizens will also be rejectable
on qualified grounds, unequivocally.
Now, assuming that any respectable defence of non-egalitarian systems
will need to make some invidious comparisons between citizens, be it ex-
plicitly or implicitly, then Estlund’s unequivocal rejection of any system
that relies on invidious comparisons helps significantly with his argument’s
progression towards a democratic conclusion.
This is because the demographic objection’s rejection of invidious com-
parisons allows Estlund to disqualify non-egalitarian systems on non-epistemic
grounds, without having to ascertain whether there exist any non-egalitarian
systems that are likely to perform better or worse than democracy. Any such
comparative evaluation would likely be subject to qualified disagreement
and, thus, would render it very di cult for Estlund to ground democratic
legitimacy partly on democracy’s e↵ectiveness at making correct decisions.
Meanwhile, the demographic objection allows that non-egalitarian systems
could actually perform better than democracy, but it claims that mere con-
jectural worries about how they would perform are su cient to disqualify
them.
(1.4b) Now, we may ask whether the above line of argument is inadequate,
50Estlund, Democratic Authority, pp. 215-217.
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as it seems to favour egalitarian over non-egalitarian systems without check-
ing whether the former could also be subject to qualified objections. Estlund
entertains this question with respect to democracy only, asking whether we
might actually raise qualified objections against democratic rule.51 His nar-
row focus on democracy is not problematic once we bear in mind that he
argues later on that democracy is preferable to other egalitarian systems; if
so, then whether the demographic objection unduly favours all egalitarian
regimes can be left unanswered.
Estlund’s response to the charge that democracy is unduly favoured is
somewhat elusive. He claims that the qualified acceptability requirement
“places a special burden of justification on proposed relations of [moral] au-
thority or legitimate coercive power. When the burden is not discharged,
it asserts that the default condition is the absence of [moral] authority or
legitimate power”.52 This follows directly from the definition of the qualified
acceptability requirement, which states that a legitimate government must
be acceptable to all “qualified” points of view. In this respect, according to
Estlund, there is a morally relevant asymmetry between the power structure
of democracies and non-egalitarian governments. Both involve “some ruling
others”, but in democracies the rulers are those who happen to be temporar-
ily in the majority. Meanwhile, in non-egalitarian governments some citizens
are “formally and permanently subjected to the rule of certain others”.53
Non-egalitarian governments, that is, introduce an additional element of
power in comparison to democratic arrangements that warrants special jus-
tification. As a result, Estlund concludes rather hastily, democracy is the
system that the qualified acceptability requirement supports by default.
Strictly speaking, however, if the qualified acceptability requirement as-
serts as the default position the absence of authoritative and legitimate
power, then the default system should be anarchy, not democracy. Anar-
chical systems lack centralised decision-making mechanisms altogether and,
hence, epitomize the absence of power. In subsection (§1.5a) immediately
below we see that Estlund goes on to argue that, in fact, there exist stronger
qualified objections against anarchy than there exist against egalitarian
States with centralised power structures. But his argument there moves
51Ibid., pp. 36-38.
52Ibid., p. 37.
53Ibid.
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beyond considerations of equality; rather, it relies on epistemic considera-
tions, such as anarchy’s inability to avoid bad states of a↵airs. Generally,
epistemic proceduralism’s second and third steps (which are investigated in
the next sections) turn to epistemic considerations precisely because consid-
erations of political equality do not su ce to justify democracy’s authority
and legitimacy. Thereby, Estlund’s attempt to show that democracy enjoys
a default status on account of its power structure is not only misguided but
also unnecessary. Its failure is nevertheless instructive, as it highlights the
challenge that anarchy would pose to egalitarian systems, if we were to limit
ourselves to questions of political equality. More is needed, and we turn to
this next.
1.5 Taking an epistemic turn
Recall that we are progressing towards the following conclusion: democ-
racy, according to epistemic proceduralism, is authoritative and legitimate
because it is the best at making correct decisions from amongst the sys-
tems that are justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view.
The last section has endeavoured to show that only egalitarian systems can
be acceptable to all qualified viewpoints. This section investigates why we
should be concerned not only with a system’s qualified acceptability but also
with its epistemic features.
In particular, it investigates why we ought to be concerned with a sys-
tem’s epistemic credentials (§1.5a), and specifically why we ought to be
concerned solely with whether a system makes correct decisions at a better
than random rate, rather than any more ambitious target (§1.5b). Finally, it
investigates why authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the sys-
tem that is the best at making correct decisions (from amongst those that
are both justifiable to all qualified viewpoints and that can be identified as
being capable of making correct decisions at a better than random rate),
rather than simply for a system that is good enough (§1.5c).
(1.5a) Estlund’s demographic objection limits the candidates for authorita-
tive and legitimate government to egalitarian systems only. This certainly
helps with epistemic proceduralism’s progression towards a democratic con-
clusion, as it disqualifies any non-egalitarian systems that could seriously
challenge democracy’s epistemic superiority.
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But the demographic objection cannot explain why we should be con-
cerned with epistemic considerations in the first place. Instead of selecting
the egalitarian system with the best epistemic credentials, we might ask
whether authority and legitimacy should rather be reserved for anarchy,
i.e., for the political arrangement that lacks a government or a “public sys-
tem of judgment and enforcement”.54 For one, anarchy is immune to the
demographic objection, as it does not di↵erentiate between citizens’ com-
petencies. And, as I argued, it seemingly meets the qualified acceptability
requirement more successfully than any other political system, since it im-
poses no power relations between citizens.55
Estlund believes, however, that there exist even stronger qualified grounds
for rejecting anarchy, rather than endorsing it. He starts from the following
assumption:
[Individuals have] duties to contribute to the solution of great
humanitarian problems either by making a positive di↵erence or
at least by acting in such a way that if people generally acted
that way the problem would be significantly lessened or solved.56
He believes that no qualified point of view could deny this. In the light of
this, he argues that this “humanitarian duty” can be used to establish the
moral authority of non-anarchical systems. (Although, it should be noted,
it cannot be used to establish anything about legitimacy.)
Specifically, he notes that when governments are in a position to “signif-
icantly lessen or solve” a humanitarian problem, obeying them would fulfil
our humanitarian duty. However, he recognizes that there may exist quali-
fied doubts about a given government’s ability to do so. Therefore, to the
extent that citizens can be (morally) required to obey a government in order
to fulfil their humanitarian duties, he argues that they can only be required
to obey governments that are e↵ective at tackling humanitarian problems
and considered thus from all qualified points of view.57
Now, one could worry that the above argument does not establish a
duty to obey the government one happens to live under per se, but rather
54Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 146. More accurately, moral authority, not le-
gitimacy, should be reserved for anarchy, since anarchical arrangements cannot involve
coercion and, hence, cannot be characterised as legitimate or illegitimate.
55See section (§1.4b).
56Democratic Authority, p. 145.
57See ibid., p. 146.
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a more general duty to act in a way that will most e↵ectively fulfil one’s
humanitarian duties. Perhaps one should be required to immigrate and
live under the world’s best government, or alternatively to try and make a
positive di↵erence as an individual without being required to obey her local
government.
In response, Estlund claims that “the best solution [to humanitarian
problems] is a districted one”.58 Focused attempts to solve humanitarian
problems locally, he argues, are more likely to succeed than e↵orts to solve
all humanitarian problems globally at once. And because of that, even
as everyone’s humanitarian duties are global in scope, the world’s division
into States creates “localized” duties of obedience to one’s local government
(provided that no qualified points of view can deny that the said government
addresses humanitarian problems e↵ectively).
Still, even if a government constitutes an e↵ective local means of combat-
ting global humanitarian problems, it might make wrong decisions. Estlund
recognizes that his claim about “localized” duties does not su ce to establish
a government’s moral authority, as it cannot explain why we ought to obey
its decisions without qualification instead of only when it decides correctly.
(Similarly, we may add, one could object that small acts of disobedience do
not endanger a government’s ability to tackle humanitarian problems e↵ec-
tively and that citizens ought to obey only significant decisions that their
government makes.)
To establish a duty to obey without qualification, he invokes the notion of
“normative consent”. Normative consent, he explains, refers to the fact that
“consent [to a State’s moral authority] would have been morally required ...
if it had been solicited”.59 Such consent is applicable, Estlund believes,
because di↵erent people will have di↵erent ideas about what decisions are
correct or what actions are su ciently small enough as not to endanger a
government’s ability to tackle humanitarian problems e↵ectively. If every-
one was allowed to disobey whenever he thinks it is justified then mayhem
would prevail, and governments would be unable to combat humanitarian
problems as e↵ectively as they would have otherwise. Therefore, bearing
in mind that citizens ought to meet their humanitarian duties, they would
have been morally required to consent to State authority, if their consent
58Democratic Authority, p. 150.
59Ibid., pp. 151-152.
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had been solicited, else they would have been unable to meet their duties.
And this su ces to show that citizens are morally obligated to obey their
government’s decisions—i.e., it su ces to establish the moral authority of
their government (provided that no qualified points of view can deny that
the said government can address humanitarian problems e↵ectively).60
In conclusion, the qualified acceptability requirement does not support
anarchy over other egalitarian systems, because governments with centralised
power structures are necessary to address humanitarian problems e↵ectively.
The latter task is, according to Estlund, so pressing that it su ces to es-
tablish a government’s moral authority (provided that no qualified points of
view can deny that the said government can address humanitarian problems
e↵ectively). And the need to address problems e↵ectively means that we
ought to not only look at a system’s qualified acceptability, but also at its
epistemic virtues.
It is also worth stressing that while normative consent su ces to es-
tablish the moral authority of a government that is e↵ective at tackling
humanitarian problems (insofar as it is recognized so by all qualified points
of view), it does not su ce to establish the legitimacy of such a government.
With regards to legitimacy, all that can be said is that such a government is
not vulnerable to qualified objections and, as a result, it satisfies the qual-
ified acceptability requirement for legitimacy. But this is not su cient for
legitimacy because, as noted earlier, Estlund allows that there may exist
further conditions for legitimacy.61 This means that the said government
could potentially fail to satisfy the additional conditions and, thus, be ille-
gitimate. However, in the absence of an argument showing this, and insofar
as the said government satisfies the qualified acceptability requirement, we
can proceed on the assumption that it will be legitimate. Thus, for simplic-
ity, I will not repeat this distinction and will continue to talk of authority
and legitimacy on the same terms.
(1.5b) Epistemic considerations matter, we have just seen, because au-
thoritative and legitimate governments must be in a position to address
60See ibid., pp. 154-155. Do bear in mind that our discussion is always limited by the
qualified acceptability requirement, which makes it impossible for non-egalitarian systems
to be morally authoritative even if they are e↵ective at resolving humanitarian problems.
It is also always limited by condition (EP2), which means that a government will lose its
moral authority in case any of its decisions ever become unacceptably unjust.
61See p. 22.
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moral problems, and particularly humanitarian problems, e↵ectively. We
now ought to determine what kinds of considerations matter exactly.
Estlund firstly considers whether authority and legitimacy should be
made conditional on a government’s ability to make correct decisions with
near certain probability.62 He quickly notes, however, that this would take
us back to strongly veritistic accounts, which we have rejected because (a)
they would set too demanding standards for legitimacy, and because (b) they
would wrongly imply that dissenters ought to defer in their judgement.63
Another option, Estlund could have added, would be to make authority
and legitimacy conditional on a government’s ability to make correct deci-
sions at a very reliable, but not necessarily near-certain, rate. For example,
the target could be set for 80% of government decisions to be correct, and
that would still be more ambitious than a better-than-random target. How-
ever, even if we assume that this option could avoid the objections (a) and
(b), an attempt to determine whether X% of government decisions are cor-
rect would require us to evaluate them against specific standards of what
constitutes right or wrong. And this would generally give rise to qualified
objections against the criteria employed to justify a government’s legitimacy.
In this respect, to the extent that authority and legitimacy must depend
at least partly on a government’s epistemic virtues, Estlund proposes to
make them conditional on the ability of governments to make correct deci-
sions at a better than random rate.64 He proposes this for three reasons:
Firstly, if governments are unable to perform at a better than random
rate, it would be better to make decisions using a “roulette wheel”.65
Secondly, this target avoids the objections (a) and (b) above. If gov-
ernments are authoritative and legitimate partly because they make correct
decisions at a better than random rate, then they will remain authoritative
and legitimate even in cases where almost half of their decisions are wrong.
This is clearly not a demanding standard of legitimacy, and it hardly fol-
lows that dissenters would need to defer to the government’s edicts, as the
government may very plausibly be wrong.
Thirdly, according to Estlund, it is possible to determine whether a gov-
ernment performs at a better- or worse-than-random rate without it being
62Democratic Authority, pp. 99-106.
63See section (§1.3a).
64See Democratic Authority, p. 107.
65Ibid., p. 262.
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necessary to evaluate government decisions against controversial standards
of what constitutes right or wrong. So, this approach would not be vulner-
able to qualified objections about the criteria employed to justify a govern-
ment’s legitimacy.
He believes it is possible to determine this without relying on any con-
troversial standards of what constitutes right or wrong on the basis of the
following argument:
To begin, he concedes that the very notion of being “better than ran-
dom” may be vulnerable to qualified objections. For example, a political
system’s performance may be better than random on one issue, but worse
so on another. This would make it di cult to discern whether that system
performs at a better than random rate overall.
One strategy to overcome such di culties, Estlund argues, would be to
show beyond qualified doubt that a system performs better than random
on one set of issues and no worse than random on any remaining issues.66
In the context of epistemic proceduralism, one possibility could be to show
beyond qualified doubt that a system addresses humanitarian problems at
a better than random rate. But this would be surely unacceptable, Estlund
continues, because humanitarian problems are so important that govern-
ments must address them at a significantly better than random rate.67 For
this reason, one would need to show beyond qualified doubt that a system
performs far better than random with respect to humanitarian issues and
no worse than random with respect to all other issues.
Would this take us back to the question of how to evaluate a system’s
performance in terms that are acceptable to all qualified points of view?
Not really, Estlund believes, as there exist at least six states of a↵airs, or
six “primary bads”, that (a) every qualified point of view would recognize
as constituting humanitarian problems, and for which (b) there can be no
qualified disagreement about whether a society su↵ers from them or not; an
evaluation of that matter would be “empirically and theoretically tractable”
in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view.68
According to Estlund, these six primary bads are war, economic collapse,
political collapse, famine, epidemic, and genocide.69 All of these are beyond
66Ibid., pp. 115-116.
67Ibid., p. 160.
68Ibid., p. 162.
69Ibid., p. 163.
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qualified doubt some of the worst humanitarian problems that societies can
be faced with, although he does recognize that the former three may be
“necessary evils” in some circumstances. He also recognizes that there might
exist more problems that are of equal importance, and indeed that there
might exist more problems that qualified points of view may disagree about
how pressing they are. For example, the religious may recognize eternal
damnation as being extremely important whereas secularists may not do
so.70 He maintains, though, that there can be no qualified disagreement
about whether a society su↵ers from these six bads or not, and this is enough
to serve his argument in the next section.71
Now, notice that each primary bad threatens societies in di↵erent ways.
Governments that are successful at thwarting each of these threats will need
to meet di↵erent challenges that span across di↵erent policy areas. In this
respect, if a government can be shown to perform far better than random
with respect to such a varied and crucial set of issues, then Estlund believes
that we can infer (beyond qualified doubt) that the said government will
perform better than random with respect to most other issues as well.72
And this provides him with a strategy to argue beyond qualified doubt that
this government will have an ability to perform better than random overall.
In conclusion, it would certainly be desirable for a government to decide
correctly in as many cases as possible, but we can only make authority and
legitimacy conditional on the rather modest target of achieving a better-
than-random rate of making correct decisions. So long as a government is
shown to be far better than random at avoiding “primary bads”, then we
can safely assume that it can also perform at a better than random rate
overall.
(1.5c) Recall that we are reconstructing Estlund’s second step towards es-
tablishing the authority and legitimacy of democracy, in which he argues
that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for those egalitarian
systems that are the best at making correct decisions.73
70Estlund, Democratic Authority, p. 165.
71Estlund fails to acknowledge that there can exist qualified disagreement about whether
current circumstances render a war or any actions leading to economic or political collapse
necessary evils. Once we reach sections (§1.6a-b) it will become clear that this is not an
important omission.
72Democratic Authority, pp. 160-163.
73To recall the first and third steps, see p. 20.
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In the last two subsections, as part of this second step, we saw that
epistemic considerations matter and, in particular, that what matters is
a government’s ability to make correct decisions at a better than random
rate. One remaining question is whether authority and legitimacy should be
reserved solely for the (epistemically) best system or whether any egalitarian
system that makes correct decisions at a better than random rate would be
good enough.
Estlund does not directly address this question. In fact, as noted ear-
lier,74 while he generally says that democracy is authoritative and legitimate
by virtue of being the best egalitarian system available, he sometimes says
that democracy need only be “nearly” or “almost” the best. Unfortunately,
he does not appear to justify the di↵erence. Two possible explanations are
that he wishes to avoid the charge that (a) epistemic bestness is an unneces-
sarily demanding criterion, or the charge that (b) it would still be subject to
qualified objections because there is no single metric of epistemic bestness.
Charge (a) would be misguided. The alternative to epistemic bestness
would be to adopt a satisficing criterion, such that any egalitarian system
that made correct decisions above a certain rate would be good enough for
authority and legitimacy. However, this kind of satisficing rationale is not
appropriate in the case of epistemic proceduralism, even if it is elsewhere.
This is due to the following two reasons:
Firstly, the moral demands of epistemic proceduralism are bounded by
the qualified acceptability requirement. This requirement ensures that any
criteria of epistemic bestness cannot entail unreasonable implementation
costs, as they would otherwise be vulnerable to qualified objections.
Secondly, epistemic proceduralism ties State authority and legitimacy to
our moral duty to contribute to the resolution of humanitarian problems.
Recall that these problems are very pressing and can only be resolved ef-
fectively through government action. But the kind of government action
that is morally permissible is already bounded by the qualified acceptability
requirement.
If a satisficing criterion were adopted at this point, it would entail that
governments have no moral obligation to shoulder the maximum amount
of costs that are deemed reasonable (and which are necessary to address
humanitarian problems), despite the fact that humanitarian problems are
74See p. 20, n. 2.
44 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
very pressing. This seems implausible. If humanitarian problems are very
pressing, then burdening the State with the maximum amount of reasonable
costs necessary to tackle those problems is surely morally required. In the
light of this, epistemic proceduralism ought to reserve authority and legiti-
macy for the best system available (from amongst those that are justifiable
to all qualified points of view).
Charge (b) would be valid in case “nearly the best” is understood to
indicate that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for every system
that qualified viewpoints recognize as being roughly equally good and for
which they disagree about which one is actually the “best” one. Estlund does
not argue that epistemic proceduralism reserves authority and legitimacy
for, and only for, democracy. This means that so long as democracy will
be amongst the systems that qualified viewpoints recognize as “nearly the
best”, then epistemic proceduralism would simply reserve authority and
legitimacy for other systems in addition to democracy. This charge does
not constitute a fatal objection. (On the other hand, if “nearly the best” is
understood to indicate that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved
for a system that is not the best but merely good enough, then charge (b)
would be just a di↵erent way of formulating charge (a) and it would be
rejectable for the same reasons.)
To summarize, epistemic proceduralism ought to reserve authority and
legitimacy for the best system available (from amongst those that are justi-
fiable to all qualified points of view), or for all those systems that qualified
viewpoints recognize as being roughly equally plausibly the best. For sim-
plicity, I will omit the latter qualification below unless it is necessary to
understand the argument at hand.
(1.5e) This completes epistemic proceduralism’s second step. The only
acceptable candidates for authoritative and legitimate government are those
egalitarian systems that every qualified point of view would accept as being
epistemically the best, where the epistemic minimum is a system’s ability
to make correct decisions at a better than random rate.
We can also see at this point how epistemic proceduralism constitutes
a weakly veritistic epistemic theory: it makes authority and legitimacy de-
pendent on the government’s general ability to make correct decisions, but
not on the correctness of each and every individual decision. Even though
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it rejects non-egalitarian systems without examining how likely they are to
make correct decisions, this is acceptable as the rejection is grounded in
terms that all qualified points of view can accept.
1.6 Democracy’s epistemic superiority
We have been following a three-step reconstruction of epistemic procedural-
ism. In the first step Estlund restricts the plausible candidates for legitimate
government only to non-anarchical egalitarian systems. In the second step
he derives epistemic proceduralism’s condition (EP1), which states that sys-
tems can be authoritative and legitimate only insofar as they are the best at
making correct decisions from amongst those systems that are justifiable in
terms acceptable to all qualified points of view. This section examines the
third step, in which Estlund conjectures that democracy is indeed the best
such system.
Recall that a political system, according to Estlund, can be shown to
perform at a better than random rate overall if it can be shown to avoid
“primary bads” at a rate that is far better than random. In this respect, Es-
tlund’s third step proceeds as follows: First, he argues that “primary bads”
would be reliably avoided under ideal democratic circumstances (§1.6a).
Then, he argues that ideal democracies are su ciently similar to the kind
of real-world democracies that political morality requires, such that the lat-
ter can also be shown to reliably avoid these bads. As a result, real-world
democracies can be shown to have an overall performance that is better than
random (§1.6b). As for democracies being the best systems relative to their
egalitarian alternatives, Estlund simply assumes this to be the case (§1.6c).
(1.6a) Estlund’s strategy is to show that ideal and real-world democracies
are su ciently alike, such that if we show that ideal democracies would
make correct decisions at a better-than-random rate, then this would help
us to establish that real-world systems will do so too. Here we examine the
antecedent of this conditional.
An ideal democracy, according to Estlund, would call a vote on a given
issue only once citizens would conclude debating that issue under ideal delib-
erative circumstances.75 Thereby, in order to show that an ideal democracy
would make correct decisions at a better than random rate, Estlund must
75Democratic Authority, p. 174.
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show that a process of ideal deliberation would ensure that. He argues that
this can be shown if we employ a model of ideal deliberation that would grant
every citizen “full and equal access to the forum”, such that no factors would
influence the outcome of democratic deliberation but the “rational merits”
of the arguments put forward.76
According to Estlund, there might exist numerous ways of implementing
such a deliberative forum, but they would have to at least involve the follow-
ing eight provisos: (P1) if someone decided to put forward an argument, she
would be as likely as anyone else to fail or succeed in persuading others of
her views.77 More, (P2) every citizen would have as much time to speak as
they wish, and (P3) would participate in the forum with as much bargaining
power as anyone else, such that no one would fear retribution for advocating
their views. Also, (P4) everyone would take into serious consideration all
of the arguments put forward by their fellow deliberators, and (P5) would
additionally strive to address the “devil’s advocate” in order to avoid the
risk of failing to pursue good options simply because no one happened to
take them seriously at the beginning. Furthermore, (P6) every citizen who
could be adversely a↵ected by a given decision, or su↵er an injustice as a
result of it, would have to attend the deliberations relevant to that deci-
sion, or at least have someone represent him instead. This would ensure
that the process of deliberation would account for all relevant arguments
and information. What is more, (P7) deliberators would not resort to ma-
nipulative behaviour and would instead engage in honest discussion with
others as to why their viewpoint is better than the alternatives. In his own
words, people would “only say things that [would] help others to appreciate
the reasons to hold one view or another”.78 Finally, (P8) Estlund assumes
that there exist such things as “good reasons” for political action and that
participants in ideal deliberation would tend to recognize them when pre-
sented with them.79 Estlund conjectures that a model satisfying the above
76Democratic Authority, p. 175.
77Ibid., p. 175: “whatever causes some to participate more than others, none of these
causes biases the forum for or against any of the issues in question”.
78Ibid., p. 175. Note that Estlund is careful not to equate manipulative behaviour with
making emotional appeals, but rather recognizes that “cold” logic may lend itself to abuse
as well.
79Ibid., p. 176. Note that Estlund considers this to be “self-explanatory”. Some the-
orists, however, think that there are no “good” or “bad” reasons, merely normative and
explanatory ones. See, e.g., Alvarez, “Reasons for Action”. For our purposes these dis-
tinctions will be the same.
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eight provisos would ensure that ideal democracies perform at a better than
random rate, due to the benefits of “thinking together”.
Unfortunately, he does not spell out exactly how “thinking together”
would ensure that, and it is worth proposing one way on his behalf:
Let us assume that participants in ideal deliberation would either be mo-
tivated to promote specific interests, such as (what they believe to be) their
personal self-interest and the interests of social groups they favour, or to
promote (their understanding of) society’s common good. Given Estlund’s
claim that there exist such things as good reasons for political action, let
us additionally assume that these reasons need not necessarily favour the
promotion of society’s common good, but might as well support action in
favour of specific interests at the expense of society’s common good. Con-
sequently, it is possible that some good reasons may favour one thing and
other, equally good, reasons another.
Notice, nevertheless, that primary bads ought to be avoided anywhere
and anytime and that it would be unqualified to claim otherwise. This
has two key implications: (P9) With regards to primary bads, a political
decision is supported by good reasons only insofar as it will lead to the
avoidance of primary bads—this means that one cannot have a good reason
to support policies that will further his self-interest if this would subject
others to primary bads. In addition, (P10) the significance of those bads
means that everyone will desire that they do not fall victims of those bads
themselves.
As a result of (P10) and proviso (P6), every citizen who could be a↵ected
by primary bads would be directly involved or represented in the relevant
deliberations. And because of proviso (P7), every such citizen or their rep-
resentative would advance reasons for political action that they think would
shield them from the e↵ects of primary bads. To be sure, participants might
unintentionally conflate political actions that would protect them from pri-
mary bads with actions that would simply protect their privileges or other
interests unrelated to primary bads. But, due to implication (P9) and pro-
viso (P8), their fellow deliberators would recognize which of those reasons
would truly shield them from primary bads and which wouldn’t. In addi-
tion, proviso (P5) ensures that deliberators might also come to identify good
reasons that no one thought of initially.
Once the above process of advancing and identifying good reasons is
48 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
iterated for every participant, ideal deliberation would lead participants to
identify (and thence vote for) a mutually agreeable course of action that
would be very likely to shield every one of them from the e↵ects of primary
bads. In other words, ideal democracies would avoid primary bads at a rate
that is far better than random and, as a result of our previous assumption,80
they would also deliver better than random results overall when all other
issues are taken into account.
(1.6b) Estlund claims that ideal democracies would avoid primary bads at
a far better than random rate, and I have endeavoured to clarify one way in
which his argument leads us to this conclusion. His next claim is that ideal
democracies are su ciently similar to the kind of real-world democracies
that political morality requires, such that the latter can be expected (beyond
qualified doubt) to track the results of the former and, hence, reliably avoid
primary bads and perform better-than-random overall too.
As already noted, Estlund’s theory of democratic legitimacy and author-
ity is fairly abstract and does not delve into questions of institutional design
too deeply. One question that it does address, however, is whether real-world
democracies should seek to approximate the ideal models of deliberation or
not. Estlund claims that they should not seek that. Such a “mirroring”
approach would be justified, he says, to the extent that it would ensure
that real-world democracies would track the performance of ideal ones with
su cient accuracy.81
The problem is that the “mirroring” approach would fail to achieve that.
Estlund argues that the performance of ideal democracies can only be em-
ulated in the real world when everyone or almost everyone adheres to the
ideal norms of communication. But whenever some of those norms are vio-
lated, a real-world system that continues to adhere to the remaining norms
(thus remaining as close to the ideal system as possible) will perform worse
than another real-world system that purposely deviates even further from
the ideal in order to countervail the negative e↵ects of the norms originally
violated. As he puts it, “a situation that departs even further from the orig-
inal list of desiderata may be better than one that more closely conforms to
them”.82
80See p. 42.
81Democratic Authority, p. 190.
82Ibid.
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Such further deviations are necessary, according to Estlund, because
the realm of real-world democratic politics is divided into a formal and an
informal sphere. The formal political sphere consists of the institutions that
are o cially charged with enacting laws and policies on behalf of the State,
such as the courts and parliament. Meanwhile, the informal political sphere
consists of institutions and social activities that play a (lesser or greater)
role in democratic politics, such as protests, campaign donations, or the
expression of political views in the media.83 If it were possible for both of
these spheres to have very similar structures to an ideal democratic process,
then that would be desirable and would ensure that real-world democracies
would track the performance of ideal ones.
But Estlund argues that such levels of similarity are practically impossi-
ble to attain. Consider the informal sphere first. Although it is conceivable
that a society’s informal sphere can come close to the standards of ideal
deliberation, it is unreasonable to expect that it would. Assuming that real-
world democracies will provide citizens with a number of liberal protections,
governments will have limited legal options to, say, force people not to use
manipulative language. It will befall on individual citizens to voluntarily ad-
here to ideal deliberative norms in order to ensure that the informal political
sphere will resemble an ideal deliberative process. This is all but guaranteed
not to happen. Some citizens’ behaviour is bound to deviate from the ideal,
and Estlund thinks that the best response to such deviations is to counter-
vail them with further deviations.84 This, he adds, is not to say that any
countervailing deviation would be acceptable, as there likely exist principles
(that he nevertheless does not explore) that could determine what kind of
countervailing responses are appropriate in each case.85
For example, let us suppose that a certain country has only one newspa-
per and that its owner chooses to use his position to cover up the scandals
of his allies in government, thus violating the proviso that deliberators must
not resort to manipulative tactics. If those who find out about this do noth-
ing, then the public debate will likely favour the media mogul’s agenda, and
unjustly so. But if they engage in a protest outside the newspaper’s head-
quarters, then that will likely balance the public debate nearer the point
83Ibid., pp. 189-190.
84Ibid., pp. 190-191.
85Ibid., p. 191.
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where it would have been had everyone adhered to the ideal norms of delib-
eration in the first place. On the other hand, it might not be appropriate for
protesters to torch down the newspaper, as that would not only violate the
mogul’s freedom of expression but could also risk destabilizing the debate
even further from the ideal equilibrium.
Turning to the formal political sphere, Estlund argues that it too will
almost certainly deviate from the ideal standards of deliberation.86 Parlia-
mentarians are quite likely to engage in backroom deals, succumb to external
pressure such as lobbying and protests, and so on. To be sure, the formal
sphere can be designed to partially mirror the structure of an ideal delib-
erative process. For example, parliamentarians could be impeached if they
blackmail colleagues, or reprimanded if they fail to respect their colleagues’
allotted speaking time. Estlund believes that rules mirroring ideal norms of
deliberation are highly desirable in the formal sphere, because any devia-
tion from those norms can be countervailed in the informal sphere—it is not
necessary to subject the formal sphere to disruptive politics.87 For example,
if a parliamentarian reneges on a campaign promise in order to satisfy the
demands of his wealthy donors, other lawmakers do not need to jeer at him
inside parliament, as the public at large is likely to protest and vote him out
in the next election.
To summarize, it is impossible to legally guarantee that deliberation in
real-world democracies will meet the standards of ideal systems. In the face
of legislative impotence, individual citizens cannot be morally required to
adhere unconditionally to ideal standards either, as the appropriate (i.e., the
epistemically best) response to others’ non-adherence may be to deviate even
further from ideal standards, in order to countervail the e↵ects of their non-
adherence. That is, real-world democracies that purposely deviate from the
ideal standards of deliberation, such as those that involve lobbying, strikes,
and protests, are likely to perform better than those that are as structurally
similar as possible to ideal models.
As a result, authority and legitimacy should be reserved for real-world
democracies that allow deviations from ideal standards of deliberation.
The question remains, then, whether the performance of such democra-
cies will track the performance of ideal systems with su cient accuracy.
86Democratic Authority, p. 202.
87Ibid., pp. 202-203.
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I have argued that Estlund’s model of ideal democracy would avoid pri-
mary bads at a far better than random rate thanks to a deliberative process
of advancing and identifying good reasons for action. But my argument
crucially relied on two hypotheses about participants in ideal deliberation,
namely that they would be motivated to avoid primary bads out of self-
interest (this was implication P10), and that they would tend to recognize
good reasons when presented with them (this was proviso P8). And since
reasons for action that prevents primary bads are good beyond qualified
doubt (this was implication P9), I concluded that they would most likely
decide in favour of policies that protect every participant from the e↵ects of
primary bads.
We might worry, however, that an appeal to people’s self-interest would
be insu cient in real-world circumstances. For example, Estlund recognizes
that voters might not have adequate views about matters that do not a↵ect
them directly, in which case they might support policies that “impose costs
on others irresponsibly”.88 He also recognizes the obvious risk that people
might act out of disregard for the common good and still support decisions
that unfairly burden others.89 In the light of this, real-world democracies
might not actually have a far-better-than-random chance of shielding all
their citizens from the e↵ects of primary bads, or at least they might not
actually have a better-than-random rate of making correct decisions with
respect to all other issues.
In response, Estlund claims that although there is some truth to these
worries, they should not be exaggerated since practice shows that people
are su ciently concerned about the common good. “It would be absurd
to deny”, he says, “that people put substantial e↵ort into forming their
views about how adequately justice, rights, freedom, and other values are
being realized in the larger world” over and above that of their narrow
self-interest.90 Despite voters’ defects, Estlund argues that people generally
recognize the State’s obligation to shield everyone from the e↵ects of primary
bads (such that real-world democracies will avoid those bads at a far-better-
than-random rate), as well as that people are generally su ciently motivated
by broader considerations of justice (such that real-world democracies will
88Ibid., p. 178.
89Ibid., p. 268.
90Ibid., p. 178. Although there is some intuitive pull to this, I later argue that it is
unduly optimistic; see p. 116.
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generally make correct decisions at a better-than-random rate overall).
(As a closing remark, it is helpful to clarify how Estlund’s compari-
son between ideal and real-world democracies di↵ers from Habermas’s deep
deliberative democracy. We saw that Habermas considers a democratic gov-
ernment to be legitimate insofar as its decisions conform to the possible out-
comes of ideal deliberation, and we argued that this approach is rejectable
because it has to rely on specific standards of moral rightness and wrong-
ness that are likely to attract qualified objections.91 By contrast, Estlund
does not make legitimacy contingent on the ability of real-world democra-
cies to track the decisions of ideal democracies. Ideal democracies are only
employed as a gauge, to help us estimate how well real-world democracies
are likely to perform, irrespective of what counts as right or wrong.)
(1.6c) Estlund’s very final claim, that democracies are authoritative and
legitimate because they are the best egalitarian systems available, is sur-
prisingly short. He simply assumes this to be the case, merely noting that
epistemic proceduralism would recommend other systems if they were shown
(beyond qualified doubt) to have decisive epistemic advantages over democ-
racy.92 In other words, democracy is Estlund’s best guess as to what epis-
temic proceduralism entails.
Taking stock
I have endeavoured to reconstruct the core elements of Estlund’s epistemic
proceduralism, emphasising those that will be relevant to our subsequent
discussion. Epistemic proceduralism states that as long as a democratic
government’s decisions are not unacceptably wrong, it remains morally au-
thoritative and legitimate by virtue of the fact that democracies are the best
systems at making correct decisions from amongst those that are acceptable
to all qualified points of view.
91See p. 30.
92Democratic Authority, p. 182.
Chapter 2
The injustice of incompetent governance
The last chapter examined the core elements of Estlund’s theory of demo-
cratic authority and legitimacy, which he calls epistemic proceduralism. This
chapter will endeavour to refute one of epistemic proceduralism’s key claims,
namely the idea that non-egalitarian systems are rejectable, irrespective of
whether they would exercise political power more or less competently than
democracy, simply because an unequal distribution of political power would
be subject to qualified objections.
Recall that Estlund grounds this claim in three premises:
His first premise is his qualified acceptability requirement, which states
that a necessary condition for authority and legitimacy is that a political
system be justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view.1
His second premise is that any non-egalitarian distribution of political
power would have to rely on criteria that di↵erentiate between the unequal
political wisdom of di↵erent citizens. Such criteria would be subject to
qualified disagreement and, thus, rejectable.2
His third premise is his demographic objection. This states that, even
if we were to identify criteria for di↵erentiating between citizens’ political
wisdom that would be acceptable to all qualified points of view, a non-
egalitarian distribution of political power that favours the competent would
still be rejectable. This is because one could reasonably fear that the com-
petent might possess “latent” biases that might lead them to make worse
decisions than a democratic government would make. For example, the com-
petent might systematically undermine the interests of those excluded from
power. Such conjectural worries, Estlund argues, are qualified and su cient
1See section (§1.1).
2See section (§1.2a).
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to reject non-egalitarian systems.3
Section (§2.1) reconstructs an objection put forward by Jason Brennan
against the above argument. Brennan accepts the qualified acceptability
requirement and grants that non-egalitarian systems are unjust insofar as
they violate it. Nevertheless, he argues that democracy is also vulnerable to
qualified objections because it unjustly places one’s welfare and life prospects
in the hands of her incompetent fellow citizens. To that extent, authority
and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the system that is the least unjust,
or the one that strikes the best balance between competence and political
equality. And on Brennan’s view, the lesser injustice lies in mildly non-
egalitarian systems that would reserve the vote only for those who passed
certain “competence exams”.
In section (§2.2), I argue that Brennan’s proposal for a limited franchise
should be rejected because it would not yield su ciently greater epistemic
benefits over democracy to justify its deviation from political equality, espe-
cially in light of the risk that the interests of the disenfranchised might be
unfairly undermined.
Despite rejecting his proposal, in section (§2.3) I argue that Brennan is
nevertheless right to regard incompetence as a source of injustice. Specifi-
cally, I point out that Brennan defends this claim by relying on some po-
tentially controversial intuitions about whether or not it is acceptable to
subject someone to the verdicts of her incompetent fellow citizens. In order
to pre-empt any qualified disagreement on this, I argue instead that incom-
petent governance is unjust because it allows or causes more wrongs than
would have otherwise occurred.
We can now see how this chapter fits within the thesis overall. As noted,
insofar as incompetent governance is a source of injustice, authority and le-
gitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that is the least unjust,
or the one that strikes the best balance between competence and political
equality. This means that democracy might not necessarily be preferable
over any and all non-egalitarian systems, and it provides the motivation to
explore whether there do exist better alternatives to democracy. In that
regard, establishing the injustice of incompetent governance is a necessary
step towards motivating and justifying my development of liberal trusteeship
in later chapters.
3See section (§1.4a).
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It is also worth noting here that Brennan’s work stands out in contempo-
rary literature as a rare attack on democracy. Despite my criticism of it, it
is worth examining because it lays the groundwork for challenging Estlund’s
non-egalitarian conclusions, as well as because its failings will prove instruc-
tive in designing liberal trusteeship in a way that protects the interests of
all citizens equally.
2.1 The case for restricted su↵rage
This section examines an objection that Jason Brennan raises against Es-
tlund’s wholesale rejection of non-egalitarian systems. Brennan accepts that
the qualified acceptability requirement is a necessary condition for authority
and legitimacy, and grants that non-egalitarian systems are unjust insofar
as they violate it. Nevertheless, he argues that qualified viewpoints can also
advocate a (moral) right not to have one’s life subjected to incompetent
governance. He calls this the competence principle.
In the light of this, he argues that insofar as democracy subjects people
to the incompetent rule of their fellow citizens, it is unjust too. Thus, to
the extent that both non-egalitarian systems and democracy are unjust,
he claims that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the least
unjust system, or for the system that strikes the best balance between the
qualified demands of the competence principle and any qualified demands
in favour of political equality. And he concludes that the lesser injustice lies
with “restricted su↵rage”, a mildly non-egalitarian system in which the vote
is reserved only for those who pass certain basic “competence exams”.
Below, I reconstruct Brennan’s justification of the competence princi-
ple (§2.1a) and subsequently examine the reasons for which he thinks that
“restricted su↵rage” would be less unjust than democracy (§2.1b).
(2.1a) Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement states that a necessary
condition for authority and legitimacy is that a political system be justi-
fiable to all qualified points of view. Brennan draws an analogy between
jury trials and government decisions in order to argue that authority and
legitimacy must additionally be conditional on a government’s ability to rule
competently. This competence principle, as he calls it, states that:
it is unjust to deprive citizens of life, liberty or property ... as
a result of decisions made by an incompetent or morally unrea-
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sonable deliberative body, or as a result of decisions made in an
incompetent and morally unreasonable way.4
Note the distinction between an incompetent deliberative body and an in-
competent way of making decisions. The competence principle aims to pre-
vent citizens from being subjected to incompetent decision-making. An
incompetent deliberative body will normally act incompetently, but Bren-
nan recognizes that it might act competently in certain cases (or, we may
add, even in whole policy areas). Conversely, a competent deliberative body
might occasionally act incompetently. The distinction is thus necessary to
capture the sources of incompetent decision-making.
Now, Brennan is careful not to define what competence might amount
to, as any specification would attract unnecessary controversy. Rather, es-
pecially with regards to jury trials, he limits himself to the generic claim
that incompetence can manifest through (a) an ignorant jury that delivers
a guilty verdict even though there is not enough evidence to support ei-
ther a guilty or a not guilty verdict, (b) an irrational jury that delivers a
guilty verdict without properly assessing or being able to properly assess
the available evidence in favour or against the prosecution’s charges, or (g)
a morally unreasonable jury that delivers a guilty verdict simply on account
of the defendant’s religion, race, or other irrelevant characteristics.5
More generally, for our purposes, I shall consider competence to be a
technical term of art broadly denoting a capacity to draw logically valid
conclusions about a given question, in light of the available information and
within the time frame demanded by a given task. This broad characteri-
sation is compatible with Brennan’s understanding of the term. (It is also
compatible with a pluralist epistemology, as it allows that there might exist
several valid yet mutually exclusive conclusions that can be drawn from the
available information.)
Brennan finds it intuitively undeniable that an ignorant, irrational, or
morally unreasonable jury would lack moral authority. Defendants would
have no moral obligation to abide by the verdicts of such juries, and gov-
ernments would have a duty not to enforce their verdicts, even when the
defendants happen to actually be guilty. Defendants would have a moral
4Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, p. 704.
5Ibid., p. 703.
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right to retrial.6
Conversely, Brennan also finds it intuitively undeniable that defendants
and governments do have such obligations when verdicts are delivered by
competent juries (i.e., by juries that made a genuine e↵ort to analyse the
evidence in a rational manner and judge the defendant based on that evi-
dence alone) even in light of the risk that the verdicts could be wrong and
justice could be miscarried.7 (Of course, a miscarriage of justice remains
unjust irrespective of whether the jury was competent or incompetent. As
Brennan points out, if it becomes known that a jury verdict was wrong, then
in modern judicial practice this can be “legal ground” for a retrial.8)
One may wish to question Brennan’s intuitions,9 but let us presently ac-
cept them for the sake of argument. Brennan claims that these demonstrate
a moral right to trial by competent jury. In other words, they demonstrate
that the competence principle applies in the case of jury trials.
It remains to be shown whether it also applies in the case of government.
To that e↵ect, Brennan points out that government decisions are morally
similar to those of jury trials. Both (a) are imposed on those subject to
the law involuntarily, and both (b) can deprive those subject to the law of
“property, liberty, and life” and alter their life prospects significantly. And if
these two facts are central to the defence of the competence principle in the
case of jury trials, Brennan concludes that they must extend the principle’s
scope into the realm of government as well. We must recognize, that is, that
people have a moral “right” not to be subjected to incompetent government
rule.10
In the case of democracy, electorates are directly or indirectly tasked
with a substantial part of their society’s governance. Despite the compli-
cated layers of command across the civil service and government, voters are
granted significant political power and that power can—and does—translate
into significant changes in policy. This means, according to Brennan, that
electorates of lower “epistemic and moral quality” will tend to elect worse
governments, either because citizens will tend to make bad choices in refer-
6Ibid., p. 704. Note that Brennan uses the same definitions of moral authority and
legitimacy that we adopted in section (§I.1b); see ibid., p. 703.
7Ibid., p. 705.
8Ibid., p. 706.
9I explain how in p. 75.
10Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, pp. 706-707.
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enda and elections, or because the candidates standing for public o ce will
themselves tend to be of lower quality.11 Just like juries, electorates can be
ignorant, irrational, or morally unreasonable, or act in such ways. Therefore,
it would be unjust to subject someone to the power of such electorates.
In that regard, insofar as the competence principle requires that people
are not subjected to the power of incompetent electorates, Brennan suggests
that screening out incompetent voters could be one way of achieving that.12
(2.1b) Brennan proposes that incompetent voters could be screened out
through certain basic “competence exams”, and proposes to call a system
that did so “restricted su↵rage”.
To the extent that restricted su↵rage would manage to shield people
from the power of incompetent electorates, it would satisfy the competence
principle. However, in the light of the qualified acceptability requirement,
Brennan admits that reasonable people could object against restricted suf-
frage for the same reasons that Estlund objects against all non-egalitarian
systems: Firstly, (i) reasonable people could object against the exam cri-
teria that would be used to di↵erentiate between the competent and the
incompetent, or (ii) they could invoke the demographic objection and op-
pose restricted su↵rage simply on the grounds that the enfranchised might
possess “latent” biases that might damage, not benefit, the government’s
ability to make correct decisions.13
Conversely, Brennan notes that democracy avoids objections (i) and (ii),
but violates the competence principle insofar as it subjects people to the
power of incompetent electorates.
Restricted su↵rage is unjust, therefore, because it violates the qualified
acceptability requirement, while democracy is also unjust because it violates
the competence principle.14 In fact, Brennan insightfully adds, democracy’s
violation of the competence principle ultimately amounts to a violation of the
qualified acceptability requirement as well, since the competence principle
is something that reasonable people can believe in.15
This means that both restricted su↵rage and democracy are prima facie
11“The Right to a Competent Electorate”, pp. 707-708.
12Ibid., p. 710.
13Ibid., p. 715. To recall the objections see (§1.2a) and (§1.4a) respectively.
14Ibid., pp. 710-711.
15Ibid., p. 721.
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unjust. Hence, legitimacy and authority ought to be reserved for the system
that is the least unjust, or that o↵ers the best balance between the qualified
demands of the competence principle and any qualified demands in favour
of political equality.16
Brennan thinks that restricted su↵rage has two advantages over democ-
racy:
The first advantage is that it violates qualified demands in favour of
political equality in a way that is intrinsically less unjust than the way
democracy violates the competence principle.
To demonstrate this, Brennan draws a second analogy between compe-
tence exams under restricted su↵rage and voting age laws under democracy.
On the one hand, restricted su↵rage will be vulnerable to objections (i)-(ii)
above. On the other hand, Brennan notes that we already accept a discrim-
inatory piece of legislation—voting age laws—that is intended to improve
the competence of the democratic electorate, despite the fact that it is also
vulnerable to objections (i)-(ii). Reasonable people can object to voting age
thresholds as a criterion for demarcating the competent from the incom-
petent, as one could argue that it unjustly disenfranchises child prodigies
while unjustly enfranchising adult racists. Alternatively, one could invoke
the demographic objection and argue that an electorate that excludes chil-
dren might unjustly discount their long-term interests and as a result make
worse choices than one that includes children.17
Yet, Brennan notes that we accept voting age laws because their injustice
is not that horrible. For one, non-adults will eventually gain the vote by
growing older. More importantly, their injustice is worth bearing because
voting age laws do an imperfect but “decent job” at disenfranchising those
who are not mature enough to vote competently.18
By analogy, Brennan argues that if (a) competence exams were designed
to not permanently exclude any aspiring citizens from the franchise, and if
16As an aside, it is worth noting an inconsistency here. Brennan argues that incompetent
juries would undeniably lack legitimacy, and by analogy he concludes that this constitutes
a prima facie reason against democracy. Strictly speaking, however, the jury analogy
should lead us to the conclusion that democracy is also undeniably illegitimate, not that
it is prima facie unjust. In section (§2.3a) I defend the injustice of incompetent governance
without relying on the jury analogy, so this inconsistency does not ultimately a↵ect my
argument and we can ignore it.
17Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, pp. 718-719.
18Ibid., p. 719.
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(b) they were designed to do an imperfect but decent job at identifying those
who are su ciently knowledgeable about key political matters from those
who are not, then they would only be about as unjust as voting age laws:
A properly administered voting examination system ... would
attempt to track [competence], but would do so imperfectly, in
a way which not all reasonable people could accept ... [but]
would not permanently exclude any individuals from holding
power (except perhaps for the severely mentally disabled). In
general, anyone could qualify to be a voter, if prepared to put in
su cient e↵ort.19
Note that Brennan does not delve into what criteria would be needed for
exams to do a “decent” job at tracking competence, as this would attract
unnecessary controversy. But insofar as the criteria would be considered
imperfect by qualified points of view, objections against them would be
mitigated by the fact that anyone could pass the exams if prepared to put
in “su cient e↵ort”.
Now, Brennan recognizes that competence exams would not be perfectly
analogous to voting age laws. He recognizes that people from disadvantaged
social backgrounds would probably be more likely to fail the exams or even
not bother to sit them at all. As a result, restricted electorates would likely
not be socio-economically representative of the whole citizenry. Voting age
laws do not result in such socio-economic distortions.
Brennan admits that this would surely be an important injustice, but
he thinks that restricted su↵rage would not be to blame. The roots of such
injustices are rather historical, and the fact that restricted su↵rage would
inherit it is not su cient reason to bestow the incompetent with the power
to deprive their fellow citizens of “life, liberty, or property”. Besides, he
points out that people from disadvantaged social backgrounds are also less
likely to attend medical school, yet this is no reason to relax the standards
for qualifying someone as a doctor.20 (Admittedly, his point could have been
better served here if he mandated that restricted su↵rage ought to tackle
political underrepresentation through equal opportunity schemes that would
help disadvantaged groups fare better in competence exams.)
19Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, p. 719.
20Ibid., p. 720.
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Thus, Brennan insists that competence exams would be about as unjust
as voting age laws. This means that although restricted su↵rage would
violate the qualified acceptability requirement, it would not amount to a
horrible injustice.
On the contrary, democracy brazenly violates the competence principle
by enfranchising every adult citizen without exception, which is something
roughly as unjust as a “blanket policy of enforcing jury decisions, even when
... the jurors were incompetent or made their decisions incompetently”.21
This, according to Brennan, demonstrates that democracy’s violation of
the competence principle is a far more serious injustice than the injustice
caused by competence exams. Thus, to repeat, the first advantage of re-
stricted su↵rage is that it violates qualified demands in favour of political
equality in a way that is intrinsically less unjust than the way democracy
violates the competence principle.
The second advantage of restricted su↵rage is that it is likely to produce
better policies than democracy.
Brennan concedes that it might be more important to produce just out-
comes, than to ensure they are produced through an intrinsically less unjust
process. This means that democracy might still be ultima facie less unjust
if it were shown to perform better than restricted su↵rage.
Brennan admits that we currently do not know how well restricted suf-
frage would perform. Elites might seek to abuse the examinations to screen
out dissent as well as incompetence. Or, such worries could turn out to
be exaggerations. On the other hand, democracies are not immune to ma-
nipulation and abusive politics either. And it is reasonable to expect that
universal su↵rage will generally perform worse than an electorate consisting
solely of voters who, at the very least, mastered the material of a political
exam. For these reasons, Brennan concludes that restricted su↵rage can be
expected to perform better than democracies, but since we cannot foretell
this with certainty, we ought to test its e cacy on a small scale first. If
satisfied with the results, then we can advocate restricted su↵rage for whole
countries too.22
(2.1c) To summarize, whereas Estlund considered democracy to be perfectly
21Ibid.
22Ibid., pp. 721-723.
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just, Brennan argues that both democracy and restricted su↵rage are un-
just, as the former violates the competence principle and the latter violates
qualified demands in favour of political equality. Nevertheless, restricted
su↵rage would be about as unjust as voting age laws, while democracy is as
unjust as trial by incompetent jury. This makes restricted su↵rage intrinsi-
cally less unjust than democracy. Moreover, restricted su↵rage is likely to
perform better than democracy, though we do not know this for sure. These
two facts mean, according to Brennan, that restricted su↵rage is likely to
be the least unjust system overall. Its authority and legitimacy will be
firmly established once we verify in practice that it does perform better
than democracy.
2.2 Against restricted su↵rage
Brennan’s defence of restricted su↵rage is partly grounded on the following
two claims. First, (1) competence exams would be about as unjust as voting
age laws, insofar as anyone could pass them if prepared to put in “su cient
e↵ort”. Second, (2) restricted electorates would be su ciently more compe-
tent than democratic electorates (or act su ciently more competently), such
that the injustice of competence exams would be justified.23 The aim of this
section will be to examine the soundness of the second claim, especially in
light of the first.
Brennan is careful to avoid unnecessary controversy and does not elab-
orate on what format the exams would need to have in order for anyone
willing to put in “su cient e↵ort” to be able to pass them. But without
a rough idea of what the exams would be like, it is impossible to assess
whether claim (2) is justified.
It is safe to assume that competence exams would have to be transparent,
in the sense that their curriculum would have to be clearly defined in an
o cial preparation handbook or similar, and the exam questions would have
to test only on what is covered in the said curriculum. If exams were not
to have a transparent curriculum, then passing them would not be a simple
matter of putting in “su cient e↵ort”. Those who would disagree with
what the exams consider the “correct” answer would be less likely to pass
23See section (§2.1b). Also recall that “competence” for our purposes broadly denotes a
capacity to draw logically valid conclusions about a given question, in light of the available
information and within the time frame demanded by a given task; see p. 56.
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them than those who would already agree with it—and this would render the
exams substantially more problematic than claim (1) implies. A transparent
curriculum would be necessary.
Insofar as the exam curriculum would be transparent, it is also safe to
assume that it could cover any number of topics without violating the spirit
of claim (1). In order to test for political competence e↵ectively, it would be
reasonable for the examination curriculum to test for a range of questions,
from simple facts to more contentious questions, such as whether racism is
morally permissible or whether free trade deals deliver economic benefits
for all citizens. People could reasonably disagree with the content of the
curriculum but, as noted earlier, this would be mitigated by the fact that
the exams would be transparent and anyone could pass them if prepared to
put in “su cient e↵ort”.
The question, then, is what “su cient e↵ort” would amount to. Let us
consider two alternatives:
On a fairly strong interpretation, exams should be so di cult, such that
citizens with below-average political competence would require the equiva-
lent of one or two years of full-time study to master them, and such that cit-
izens with above-average political competence would still require the equiv-
alent of several months of full-time study. Let us call these di cult ex-
aminations. The purpose of such high standards would be to ensure that
voters in restricted su↵rage would be significantly more competent than in
democracy. On the flip side, such high standards would e↵ectively ensure
that a large minority or perhaps even a majority of citizens would fail the
exams, or never bother to sit them, even though nominally no one would be
excluded permanently from the franchise.
On a fairly weak interpretation, exams should be su ciently accessi-
ble, such that citizens with below-average political competence should be
able to pass them within a few months of studying towards them during
weekend afternoons. Let us call these accessible examinations. (Accessible
exams should probably not be any easier than that, for otherwise practically
no e↵ort would be required to pass them and restricted su↵rage would be
indistinguishable from democracy.)
I suspect that Brennan had something like the weak interpretation in
mind, so I will focus on that mostly.24 Specifically, in what follows I argue
24Although, in his latest book (Against Democracy ; Aug. 2016) he comes closer to
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that restricted electorates selected through accessible examinations might in
fact be less competent than democratic ones (§2.2a). Even when they would
be more competent, I argue that they would not generally be su ciently
more competent to justify the deviation from political equality (§2.2b), and
that governments elected by such electorates would not generally act suf-
ficiently more competently either (§2.2c). Lastly, turning to the strong in-
terpretation, I argue that di cult examinations would not strengthen the
case for restricted su↵rage because the risks highlighted by the demographic
objection would become very high (§2.2d).
For these reasons, I conclude that restricted su↵rage cannot be expected
to yield su ciently greater epistemic benefits over democracy, such that
some degree of political inequality would be justified. It ought to be rejected.
(2.2a) Suppose that restricted electorates were chosen through accessible
examinations, i.e. through examinations that are accessible to the citizen of
below-average political competence who would be willing to dedicate a few
months worth of weekend afternoons to master them.
We can agree that restricted su↵rage with accessible examinations would
remain vulnerable to the qualified objections discussed earlier: one could (i)
object against the exams criteria that would be used to di↵erentiate between
those deemed adequately competent to be enfranchised and those deemed
incompetent enough not to, or (ii) invoke Estlunds demographic objection
and argue that the enfranchised might possess “latent biases that could
damage the governments ability to make correct decisions, quite likely at
the expense of the disenfranchised.
In addition, we must generally allow that one could (iii) object to re-
stricted su↵rage on a number of intrinsic or instrumental grounds. For
example, suppose that competence exams will test for a range of questions
and that the criteria employed to determine the “correct” answers for some
of those questions will be contentious. Without becoming distracted with
the details of this, it is conceivable that an exam question could ask citi-
zens, say, whether pulling o↵ from a trade bloc creates on balance more or
less economic opportunities, and that the “correct” answer according to the
exam will be that it creates less opportunities (and this will be clearly stated
the strong interpretation, suggesting that up to two thirds of the electorate could be
permissibly disenfranchised. Given the book’s publication date, there is no time to delve
into this here.
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in the exam preparation handbook published by the government). Even if
one agreed that there will be fewer economic opportunities, he could argue
that it is morally problematic to leave no choice to those who disagree with
this answer except to lie about their beliefs, which they would need to do in
order to answer this question correctly in the eyes of the exam.
The hope is that an accessible system of examinations would help miti-
gate the above kind of objections while demarcating a restricted electorate
that would rule more competently than a democratic one.
The question, then, is whether accessible examinations would ensure that
voters and government o cials under restricted su↵rage would be (a) suf-
ficiently more competent than their democratic counterparts, and whether
they would (b) act su ciently more competently than their democratic coun-
terparts, such that the political inequality introduced by restricted su↵rage
would be justified.25
There are reasons to doubt that accessible examinations would succeed
in these tasks:
Firstly, accessible examinations would not always improve the average
competence of individual voters.
Accessible examinations would only filter out those lacking the motiva-
tion to master the relevant exam material. To be sure, there is likely a high
degree of correlation between incompetent voters and those who lack the
motivation to inform themselves about politics, and in turn the latter will
likely include most of those who lack the motivation to master the exam
material.
But some of the most incompetent voters also tend to be amongst the
most determined in furthering their political objectives, and they can be
expected to put in the e↵ort necessary to pass the exams. Let us call them
the militant incompetents.
And let us also call those who would pass the exams but are not militant
incompetents the at-least-mildly competent. We can accept that, whatever
they might be, they will generally be epistemically superior to either of the
militant incompetents, those who would fail the exams, or those who would
not even attempt to sit the exams.
Now, (i) if the at-least-mildly competent outnumber the militant incom-
25To recall why the distinction between being competent and acting competently is
important, see p. 56.
66 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
petents, then voters in a restricted electorate will clearly be on average less
incompetent, and possibly more competent, than voters in a democracy.
Things become more nuanced if the militant incompetents outnumber
the at-least-mildly competent. For instance, (ii) restricted electorates can
still be an improvement over democratic ones, if militant incompetents dom-
inate them but with a smaller majority margin than they would dominate
democratic electorates. This can happen when the disenfranchised would
habitually support policies that are similar to those propounded by militant
incompetents. Voters in restricted su↵rage will then tend to be somewhat
less incompetent than voters in democracy, but not by much.
Then again, (iii) some of the disenfranchised might be politically closer
to the at-least-mildly competent rather than the militant incompetents. Let
us call these the decent incompetents. Let us also frame our example, for
simplicity, in terms of a society that consists only of militant incompetents,
decent incompetents, and at-least-mildly competent voters. By definition,
the decent incompetents will habitually support policies propounded by the
at-least-mildly competent, or at least policies that are less objectionable than
those of the militant incompetents. This means that whenever the militant
incompetents will be fewer than the at-least-mildly competent and decent
incompetent combined (but, remember, more numerous than the at-least-
mildly competent alone), then the voters in democracy will be on average
less incompetent, if not more competent, than voters in restricted su↵rage.
Brennan claims that restricted su↵rage is intrinsically less unjust than
democracy partly because voters in a restricted electorate would be on
average more competent than voters in democracy. Point (i) verifies this
possibility. But point (ii) shows that restricted su↵rage can be almost as
objectionable as democracy, and point (iii) shows that it can, in fact, be in-
trinsically more unjust than democracy. It all depends on the demographic
distribution of competence in society.
(2.2b) But suppose we can be sure that voters in restricted electorates
would always be on average more competent than voters in democracy. Or
suppose that we could identify which societies would benefit from more
competent voters under restricted su↵rage, and then use that to defend
restricted su↵rage for those societies only.26
26I do not see, however, how they could be identified without appealing to specific
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Even then, it is very unlikely that a restricted electorate (that is selected
through accessible examinations) will be su ciently more competent than
a democratic electorate, or that it will make decisions in a su ciently more
competent manner, such that some degree of political inequality would be
justified.
Governments have a daunting task before them. At best, they must
make decisions that require knowledge of a single field of expertise. More
often, political decisions require knowledge of several fields of expertise at
once, and it can be di cult or impossible to identify those who are experts
on all the relevant fields and subfields involved, or even those who would
know how to coordinate the experts on each individual field. Less often,
government o cials find that there are no established fields of expertise at
all for the decisions they have to make.
Thus, political decision-making is an extremely complex task.27 And
electorates under representative government—be it democratic electorates
or restricted ones—have to play a crucial part in that process, either because
they elect the government, or because they sometimes have the power to
directly decide government policy, such as during referenda. Hence, to the
extent that we are concerned with an electoral systems epistemic benefits, we
ought to be concerned, amongst other things, with (a) its ability to ensure
that elected governments will make decisions in a competent manner, as
well as with (b) its ability to ensure that voters will exercise their direct
policy-making powers competently.
Beginning from (a), there are obviously several factors that can deter-
mine whether elected governments will act competently or not. Nevertheless,
it is safe to assume that this will be, to a great extent, determined by the
ability of voters to identify which candidates would be competent at po-
litical decision-making. And voters have three ways of assessing whether
politicians are likely to be competent political decision-makers. They can
examine (i) the correctness of politicians campaign manifestos, as well as
standards of political morality. Recall that epistemic theories aim not to rely on such
standards (see p. 12) and, hence, this way of defending restricted su↵rage would fall
outside the scope of this thesis (see p. 15).
27Some democrats argue that it is, in fact, so complex that putative experts cannot know
nearly enough about what ought to be done. Rather, they argue that government can be
maximally competent at political decision-making only when it draws on the dispersed
knowledge of all citizens, and this is why democracy is essential. Let us put this line of
argument aside for the moment. It will be our focus in the next chapter.
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(ii) the correctness of their past decisions, including whether or not any de-
partures from their previous manifesto promises were justified. Moreover,
considering that competent individuals can make mistakes, voters can also
assess politicians future potential by examining (iii) their past and current
epistemic attitudes, such as their ability to carefully analyse new legislative
proposals, their determination to seek advice from the right experts, their
determination to heed such advice when appropriate and contrary to any
preconceptions they might have, their determination to ignore such advice
when experts are wrong or when “non-experts hold better views, and so on.
Alas, none of (i)-(iii) is any less complicated than the political decision-
making challenges faced by government:
If voters wish to estimate whether a politician would be a competent
decision-maker by examining the correctness of his campaign manifestos
and past political decisions, as (i) and (ii) suggest, then they must know
how to judge the correctness of those manifestos and decisions in the first
place.
If voters wish to estimate whether a politician would be a competent
decision-maker by examining his past and current epistemic attitudes, as
(iii) suggests, then they must know what epistemic attitudes one should
adopt in a diverse range of policy questions, then examine whether the said
politicians epistemic attitudes vis-a`-vis those questions were appropriate by
comparison, and then extrapolate on the basis of those comparisons how
likely the said politician is to act competently in the future.
For instance, one would need to check who the experts are on a given
policy question and then check whether a politician has a record of heeding
their advice on that question. This is no small task. At best, it is time
consuming. More worryingly, it might be genuinely di cult to identify the
relevant experts on a given question. At worse, voters might have false
preconceptions about who the relevant experts are.
As noted above, political decisions are often at the intersection of several
fields of expertise, and sometimes there are no established fields of expertise
at all that political decision-making can draw upon. This makes it di cult to
determine which experts from what field should be relied upon more heavily
and which ones less so, indeed which “non-experts should be relied upon
and when, and consequently it makes it di cult to identify what epistemic
attitude would be most appropriate.
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Turning to (b), we are faced with the same challenges. Voters will be able
to exercise their direct policy-making powers competently only if they know
the right answer to a given policy question, or if they know what epistemic
attitude to adopt when addressing that question.28
On account of those challenges, it is highly unlikely that a restricted
electorate (that has been selected through accessible examinations) would
be su ciently more competent than a democratic body politic at making
decisions or at electing competent representatives, such that the degree of
political inequality introduced by restricted su↵rage would be justified.
To demonstrate this, let us suppose unrealistically that a restricted elec-
torate would only include at-least-mildly competent voters, i.e., that it would
not include any militant incompetents. It is safe to assume that the at-least-
mildly competent will generally be more aware of the major political issues
than the disenfranchised, in virtue of having studied and passed the exams.
Also, they will generally have a better understanding of those issues than
the militant incompetents and the disenfranchised. Many will actively seek
to inform themselves about those issues, primarily by following the news,
and might even have a basic understanding of the potential implications of
di↵erent policies; the militant incompetents and the disenfranchised will be
less informed and will usually lack such an understanding. And as we move
progressively towards the intellectual top end of the at-least-mildly compe-
tent, we will eventually find some that are highly informed individuals, well
read, and capable of analysing complex arguments.
The above list of advantages can be improved and expanded. For all the
worth of those advantages, it is unreasonable to expect an electorate of at-
least-mildly competent voters to be materially more competent than demo-
cratic electorates at meeting the challenges of political decision-making.
Most of the at-least-mildly competent will have no expertise to make com-
petent decisions on any given issue, and will also not have the time or
willingness to investigate but a few expert opinions on only some of the key
issues. Even the few who will be competent on some issues will eventually
come across policy areas that are outside their sphere of competence.
Things are muddled further once we admit that “restricted” electorates
28Indeed, these challenges will apply to systems of direct electoral government, where
most or all political decisions are left to the electorate. They are not unique to represen-
tative systems that hold direct-ballot initiatives only occasionally.
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will include militant incompetents, who can be relied upon to vote incom-
petently and, hence, decrease the chance that “restricted” electorates will
be materially more competent than democratic ones. Moreover, voter ob-
jectives under restricted su↵rage will remain as confused as in democracy.
Some may vote strategically and others out of conviction, some may support
a party for its correct policies on one particular issue despite the fact that it
will pursue wrong policies on a range of other important issues, some may
be guided by bias on a particular policy question rather than a dispassionate
assessment of the facts, and so on.
Therefore, “restricted” electorates that have been selected through ac-
cessible exams will face hurdles to exercising their power competently that
are very similar to those faced by democratic electorates. There is little
reason to think that a slight increase in the average competence of the elec-
torate (of the kind that accessible examinations can deliver) will result in a
su ciently more competent exercise of political power to justify some degree
of political inequality.
Still, restricted su↵rage with accessible exams will have some epistemic
advantages over universal su↵rage. It is implausible to assume that there
will not be any improvements over democracy whatsoever. Consequently,
some may consider these advantages to present su cient reason to favour re-
stricted su↵rage. They might point out that moderate epistemic advantages
in political decision-making could result in morally significant improvements
in government, because the stakes in politics can be very high. For instance,
suppose that restricted su↵rage would get its welfare policy right whereas
democracy would not, but would otherwise make exactly the same decisions
as democracy. In the grand scheme of things this would constitute only a
moderate improvement over democracy, but one could nevertheless insist
that it can justify the costs of restricted su↵rage.
In order to see whether the chance to outperform democracy in a few
important policy areas can outweigh any qualified objections against re-
stricted su↵rage, it is important to recall these objections: one could (i) ob-
ject against the exams criteria that would be used to di↵erentiate between
those deemed adequately competent to be enfranchised and those deemed
incompetent enough not to; or (ii) invoke the demographic objection and ar-
gue that the enfranchised might possess “latent” biases that might damage,
not benefit, the government’s ability to make correct decisions, quite likely
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at the expense of the disenfranchised; or more generally (iii) object against
restricted su↵rage on a number of other intrinsic or instrumental grounds.
The force of objection (i) can probably be blunted if it can be shown that
restricted su↵rage would outperform democracy in a few important policy
areas. It is less clear whether moderate epistemic benefits can outweigh any
intrinsic or instrumental reasons for political equality. Perhaps they can,
but some will disagree even if they accept that greater epistemic benefits
might eventually outweigh those reasons.
In any case, the demographic objection is di cult to dismiss. Even if
we accept that restricted su↵rage could outperform democracy in a few im-
portant policy areas, it is likely that it would result in injustices against the
disenfranchised that could have been avoided or mitigated under democracy.
Suppose, contra Estlund, that the risk of undermining the interests of the
disenfranchised decreases as the competence of decision makers increases,
until it is rendered negligible under highly competent decision makers.29
The problem is that accessible examinations would not su ce to render that
risk negligible, because by definition they would be accessible to citizens of
below-average political competence.30 The resultant restricted electorate
will not be terrifically competent.
Brennan expects that restricted su↵rage would overcome the demographic
objection if exams were designed to be roughly as unjust as voting age laws,
but he does not elaborate further and it is di cult to share his view.
There is a clear risk that a restricted electorate would undermine the
interests of the disenfranchised, whereas the corresponding risk in the case
of voting age laws is negligible. Firstly, most adult voters have deep parental
interests to secure a good future for their children, or at least share such
parental a↵ections about the future of new generations. Secondly, non-
adolescent children and younger adolescents are generally unable to articu-
late their own interests.31 By contrast, the adults who would be disenfran-
chised under restricted su↵rage might be comparatively incompetent relative
to those who would be enfranchised, but are generally able to articulate their
29Recall that Estlund considers this risk non-negligible even under highly competent
rulers; see p. 33.
30See p. 63.
31I leave it open whether or not older adolescents can articulate their interests about
as imperfectly as adults. If they do, then this would constitute a (prima facie) reason for
enfranchising anyone above, say, 15 years old.
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interests. They also cannot count on widespread public concern about their
interests, the same way non-adults can. So the analogy between restricted
su↵rage and voting age laws comes apart at some key points.
In conclusion, even if accessible examinations ensured that voters in
restricted electorates would be on average more competent than in demo-
cratic ones, restricted electorates would be unlikely to exercise their power
su ciently more competently (than voters in a democracy) to justify the
deviation from political equality. In fact, while restricted electorates could
perform better than democratic ones on some issues, there is a real risk
that they could perform worse on others, as those who would be enfran-
chised under an accessible system of examinations could fail to give full
and fair consideration to the interests of the disenfranchised. An attempt
to implement restricted su↵rage through accessible examinations would not
overcome Estlund’s demographic objection.
(2.2c) Now, one could argue that my focus on the ability of restricted elec-
torates to exercise political power competently is beside the point. Brennan
rightly thinks that insofar as individual voters would be on average more
competent than voters in democracy, then the candidates elected into o ce
would also be on average more competent than those in democracy. This is
not because restricted electorates would be competent at electing competent
o cials (I have argued that they would not be), but rather because the pool
of candidates would be better in the first place (assuming, that is, that a
condition for running for o ce will be to pass the competence exams, so
electorates would e↵ectively be forced to choose from a better pool than in
democracy).
Thus, to the extent that o cials in restricted su↵rage would be on av-
erage more competent than in democracy, one could then argue that they
would likely govern su ciently more competently to justify the deviation
from political equality.
The problem with this argument is that the pool of candidates in re-
stricted su↵rage under accessible examinations will not be terrifically more
competent than the pool of candidates in democracy, because by definition
the exams will be accessible to citizens with below-average political compe-
tence.32 There is little reason to think that elected o cials in restricted suf-
32See p. 63.
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frage (under accessible examinations) would govern any more competently
than their counterparts in democracy:
In general, elected o cials will exercise their powers competently when
(a) they know what ought to be done themselves, or when (b) their decision-
making is guided by the right epistemic attitude, such as knowing what kind
of power to delegate to bureaucrats, when to heed expert advice, when to
ignore expert advice in case it is wrong or in case “non-experts” hold better
views, when to hold referenda, and so on.
Just like restricted electorates, elected o cials in restricted su↵rage will
generally not know what ought to be done. Even the best o cials will
be competent in at most a handful of policy areas. This means that their
ability to make competent decisions will be very strongly correlated with
their ability to adopt the right epistemic attitude.
It is safe to assume that three principal reasons for which elected o cials
in democracy fail to adopt the right epistemic attitude are that: (i) they
are not competent enough to identify the relevant experts in the first place,
especially when political decision-making needs to draw on several fields
of expertise at once; (ii) they are ideologically committed to beliefs that
conflict with the advice of experts; or (iii) they have electoral incentives to
disregard the advice of experts, such as when their constituents or campaign
contributors are opposed to the said advice.
Considering that elected o cials in restricted su↵rage would not be ter-
rifically more competent than their counterparts in democracy, then they
would be likely to adopt the wrong epistemic attitude about as often as
their counterparts in democracy, for the same reasons. Especially in light
of the demographic objection, possibility (iii) becomes more objectionable
under restricted su↵rage, as the risk that o cials might be biased in favour
of certain groups to the detriment of others, especially the disenfranchised,
would increase.
Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that elected o cials in restricted
su↵rage (under accessible examinations) would be su ciently more compe-
tent to justify the deviation from political equality.
(2.2d) Now, to the extent that a system of accessible examinations would
not yield su ciently greater epistemic benefits to justify a deviation from
political equality, we should examine whether di cult examinations would
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do so. Recall that on our current definition, di cult examinations would
be so di cult, such that citizens with below-average political competence
would require the equivalent of one or two years of full-time study to master
them.
Let us accept that the resultant restricted electorate would be distinctly
more competent relative to restricted electorates under accessible examina-
tions, let alone relative to democratic electorates (which is likely, but should
not be taken for granted). It is important to realise that this would likely
come at the cost of disenfranchising a significant minority or perhaps even
a majority of citizens, though nominally no one would be permanently ex-
cluded from the franchise. This is because ordinary citizens would either
fail the exams or, more likely, would not a↵ord the time or be willing to
dedicate the time to master the exams.
The fact that di cult examinations would restrict the electorate sig-
nificantly (relative to democracy) means that the risks highlighted by the
demographic objection would become more pronounced. The worry that
the enfranchised or their representatives in government may possess “la-
tent” biases that could lead them to unfairly undermine the interests of
the disenfranchised, or otherwise lead them to govern less competently than
democratic governments, would become more justified. As a result, the de-
mographic objection would present weightier reasons against deviating from
political equality.
As a consequence, restricted su↵rage under di cult examinations cannot
be expected to yield su ciently greater epistemic benefits over democracy
to justify the deviation from political equality. It ought to be rejected.
(More generally, to the extent that the demographic objection presents a
conclusive reason against restricted su↵rage under both accessible and di -
cult examinations, it follows that there is no optimal examination di culty
that would enable restricted su↵rage to overcome this objection.)
(2.2e) To summarize, voters and elected o cials in restricted su↵rage would
be about as ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of governance as their
democratic counterparts. More importantly, there is a material risk that
governments in restricted su↵rage would fail to serve the interests of the
disenfranchised as well as democracies would manage to. For these reasons,
restricted su↵rage would be unlikely to deliver su ciently greater epistemic
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benefits over democracy, such that some degree of political inequality would
be justified. It should be rejected.
2.3 In defence of the competence principle
Despite my rejection of restricted su↵rage, I think that Brennan is right to
regard incompetent governance as a source of injustice. He is also right to
claim that it is qualified to regard it so, thus paving the way to challenge
Estlund’s wholesale rejection of non-egalitarian systems. The aim of this
section will be to strengthen the case for the competence principle.
To repeat, the competence principle states that it is prima facie unjust
to subject someone to the decisions of an incompetent deliberative body,
or to decisions made incompetently.33 Also recall that Estlund rejects non-
egalitarian systems on the grounds that they would be subject to qualified
objections.34 To this, Brennan responds that democracy is also subject to
qualified objections because it violates the competence principle.35
Therefore, insofar as both democracy and non-egalitarian systems are
prima facie unjust, authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the
least unjust system, or the one that strikes the best balance between the
qualified demands of the competence principle and any qualified demands
in favour of political equality. This means that democracy might not nec-
essarily be preferable over any and all non-egalitarian systems, and it pro-
vides the motivation to explore whether there do exist better alternatives to
democracy.
Now, Brennan grounds his competence principle on an intuition: that it
is unjust to subject someone to the decisions of an incompetent government,
in the same way that it is unjust to subject someone to the verdict of in-
competent juries.36 This is problematic. If anything, the process of vetting
jurors in current judicial practice is quite basic; it focuses on the juror’s
criminal record and on whether they have any personal connections to those
involved in the trial.37 This means that incompetent jurors are probably
33Where “competence” broadly denotes a capacity to draw logically valid conclusions
about a given question, in light of the available information and within the time frame
demanded by a given task; see p. 56. For the competence principle, see p. 55.
34See p. 53.
35See section (§2.1b).
36See section (§2.1a).
37See, e.g., Crown Prosecution Service, “Jury Vetting: Challenging Jurors”.
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quite prevalent,38 yet our judicial traditions do not see this as undermining
the legitimacy of jury verdicts. Su ce to say that there is no verified con-
sensus about the validity of Brennan’s intuitions and that it is potentially
vulnerable to counter-intuitions and counterexamples.
In what follows, I endeavour to provide an alternative justification of
the competence principle that is independent of Brennan’s intuitions. In
particular, I argue that incompetent governance is prima facie unjust be-
cause it allows or causes more (political-moral) wrongs than would have
occurred otherwise (§2.3a). Subsequently, I endeavour to pre-empt two pos-
sible strategies that a democrat could pursue to render the competence prin-
ciple irrelevant. The first strategy would appeal to communal values, like
equality or fairness (§2.3b), and the second would appeal to the demographic
objection (§2.3c).
(2.3a) The injustice of incompetent governance can be deduced from the
moral burdens of government. Recall that political morality partly consists
of the moral prescriptions that designate what is either rightful or obligatory
for the State to do.39 Although the task of determining the contours and
content of political morality is a theoretical exercise, the burden of imple-
menting what is obligatory for the State to do, and the burden of ensuring
that laws are compatible with what is rightful for the State to do, primarily
falls on government.
To be sure, the probability that a government will manage to implement
what political morality requires (or to otherwise ensure that none of its
decisions are morally impermissible) depends on several factors. It is safe
to assume, however, that (A1) a government’s ability to implement what
political morality requires or permits will strongly depend on its ability to
exercise its powers competently. It is also safe to assume that (A2) a govern-
ment’s ability to exercise its powers competently will strongly depend on a
political system’s e↵ectiveness in elevating competent people to appropriate
positions of power.40
38For some evidence on how racial, socio-economic, and other demographic factors in-
fluence jury decisions, see Cohen and Smith, “The Racial Geography of the Federal Death
Penalty”, pp. 427-432, or Lloyd-Bostock, “The Jury in the United Kingdom”, pp. 355-358.
39See p. 7.
40Note that, in light of my broad interpretation of “competence”, these assumptions are
compatible with a monist as much as a pluralist epistemology. Next chapter, we will see
that competent governance in a pluralist context amounts to making decisions that the
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Specifically, assumption (A2) is safe insofar as it can also be assumed
that (A3) with regards to each di↵erent field of knowledge, it is possible
(though not necessary) that some may know better than others, at least to
some degree, what political morality requires or permits vis-a`-vis that par-
ticular field, and it is possible that some—not necessarily the same people—
may know better than others what policies are necessary to implement the
requirements that apply to that particular field (or to adhere to what is
permitted with regards to that field); that (A4) there exists such a thing
as knowledge about what political morality requires or permits and about
how to implement it in the first place; that (A5) someone’s ability to be a
competent decision-maker vis-a`-vis a given issue will strongly depend on his
knowledge of that issue or at least on his ability to identify those who are
knowledgeable on that issue and heed their advice (or delegate power to them
altogether); and that (A6) the constitutional and institutional structure of a
political system can have a material impact on whether the competent will
be elevated to appropriate positions of power.
Proposition (A4) is a restatement of what I have assumed to be the
case in the introductory chapter. There, I argued that insofar as we (qua
moral agents) commonly understand moral inquiry to be aiming at truth,
we implicitly dismiss moral relativism. In the light of this, I argued that
we should proceed to theorise about morality on the assumption that there
exist such things as moral truths. In the context of politics, then, we should
proceed on the assumption that there exists such a thing as knowledge about
what political morality requires or permits.41 And to the extent that such
knowledge exists, there will also exist knowledge about what policies are
necessary to implement political morality as successfully as possible.
In the light of proposition (A4), proposition (A3) is a serviceable as-
sumption to make. To be sure, one could reject (A3) on the grounds that
there is no expertise to be had at all. Those who subscribe to this criticism
typically cite ethics as an example of a field of knowledge that no one can
become an expert on, no matter how persistently one studies it. And since
there is a moral dimension in most policy questions, then the objection can
be pushed further to deny expertise tout court. This objection does merit
majority would have endorsed had it inquired into the matter in epistemically the best
manner available; see sections (§3.2b-c).
41To recall the full argument, see p. 4.
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further discussion, but I shall address it later.42 For our present purposes,
we can accept that insofar as there exists such a thing as knowledge about
political morality and how to implement it (this is proposition A4), then it
is possible that di↵erent people may know di↵erent subsets of that body of
knowledge better than others.
Proposition (A5) can be safely assumed to be true. To be sure, knowledge
is not su cient for competence. For instance people may act incompetently
and make a bad decision out of bias, even when they know what the right
answer is. Or they may be blinded by bias and fail to apply their knowledge
when the circumstances demand it. In general, however, it is unreasonable
to deny that knowledge is the key ingredient to competence.
Once propositions (A3)-(A5) are granted, it is unreasonable to deny
proposition (A6). Political systems that rely on good criteria for identifying
and elevating competent individuals into appropriate positions of power will
surely be more successful at doing so than those that rely on bad or no
criteria at all. To be sure, there can exist reasonable disagreement about
what counts as a good or bad criterion, but this renders the constitutional
and institutional structure of a political system all the more important, as
these criteria will have to be debated, decided, and amended, in accordance
with the legal framework of each political system. A good constitutional and
institutional structure will be more e↵ective than a bad one at identifying
good criteria for elevating the competent to power.
From (A1)-(A6), it follows that (A7) insofar as a political system is not
e↵ective at elevating the competent to appropriate positions of power, it
is correspondingly less likely that a government will manage to implement
what political morality requires (or to otherwise ensure that none of its
decisions are impermissible).
Now, we can accept that (A8) amongst the things that are prima facie
unjust, are those non-optimal laws and non-optimal political institutions
that decrease the probability of government implementing what political
morality requires (or of otherwise avoiding what is impermissible), relative to
the probability that would have been observed under optimally designed laws
and institutions and under stable political circumstances. This is because, in
42See section (§4.3b). Roughly, my response is that insofar as there is no argument
proving or disproving beyond qualified doubt the existence of moral experts, then polit-
ical systems ought to be designed in a way that accommodates the conclusions of both
arguments. This ultimately makes (A3) unproblematic.
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the long run, non-optimal laws and institutions will cause or allow injustices
(or, generally, political-moral wrongs), some of which would have otherwise
been avoided or mitigated under optimal laws and institutions.
To clarify, (a) by “optimally designed laws and institutions under stable
political circumstances” I mean the laws and institutions that would max-
imise the likelihood that government will implement what political morality
requires (or otherwise avoid what is impermissible), insofar as citizens would
be willing to comply with those laws and institutions. In that sense, (b) sta-
ble political circumstances do not refer to a utopian ideal but rather to
the best that is humanly possible. Neither (g) do they refer to the best
that is presently possible, as current political circumstances might mean
that citizens are unwilling to comply with optimally designed laws and in-
stitutions, thus undermining the ability of government to implement what
political morality requires or permits. This is why (d) non-optimal laws
and institutions are prima facie rather than ultima facie unjust. Current
political circumstances might mean that non-optimal laws and institutions
could make government more likely to implement what political morality
requires (or to otherwise avoid what is impermissible), relative to the like-
lihood that would be observed under optimal laws and institutions, such
that non-optimal laws and institutions could be presently preferable. Still,
this should not distract us from the fact that non-optimal laws and institu-
tions decrease the probability that government will implement what political
morality requires (or otherwise avoid what is impermissible), relative to the
probability that would have been observed under optimal laws and institu-
tions, and that this will cause or allow injustices (or political-moral wrongs),
some of which would have otherwise been avoided or mitigated under opti-
mal laws and institutions. To that extent, non-optimal laws and institutions
remain a source of injustice even when they are ultima facie just.
To repeat (A8), insofar as laws and institutions decrease the probability
of government implementing what political morality requires (or of otherwise
avoiding what is impermissible), relative to the probability that would have
been observed under optimal laws and institutions and under stable political
circumstances, they are to that extent prima facie unjust. Let us call the
said probability a system’s real-performance probability.
From (A7), it follows that a system’s real-performance probability will
decrease when (i) institutions are not as e↵ective as possible at elevating the
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competent to appropriate positions of power. In this case, government will
likely have a higher proportion of incompetent o cials who will be collec-
tively less likely (than their counterparts in optimally designed institutions)
to make decisions that implement what political morality requires or that
otherwise avoid what is impermissible.
Furthermore, even when institutions are maximally e↵ective at elevating
the competent to power, the laws and policies of the State will still decrease
its real-performance probability when (ii) competent o cials make mistakes
and act incompetently on isolated instances, or when (iii) the constitutional
and institutional structure of the State prevents o cials from implementing
what political morality requires (or from otherwise avoiding what it forbids).
For instance, government o cials in a democracy might be prevented from
implementing a good policy because an incompetent electorate voted against
it in a referendum. Similarly, competent o cials might be limited in what
they can do by ill-conceived constitutional provisions.
Cases (i)-(iii) exhaust the reasons for which political power may be ex-
ercised incompetently. They also exhaust the reasons for which a system’s
real-performance probability can decrease below optimal levels. But, by as-
sumption (A8), a decrease in a system’s real-performance probability below
optimal levels means that the said system is prima facie unjust. Therefore,
insofar as cases (i)-(iii) are sources of injustice, it follows that incompetent
governance constitutes a source of injustice as well.
This concludes my defence of the claim that it is prima facie unjust
to subject someone to incompetent governance. In a nutshell, incompetent
governance is prima facie unjust because it results in more political-moral
wrongs than would have otherwise occurred.
It is worth noting here that my defence of the competence principle is
justified in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, as it would be
unreasonable to deny assumptions (A1)-(A8). This means that insofar as
the qualified demands of the competence principle are incompatible with any
qualified demands in favour of political equality, authority and legitimacy
ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance
between the two.
(2.3b) Now, one could seek to render the competence principle ultimately
irrelevant to the justification of authority and legitimacy.
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One strategy could be this: Democracy, it could be argued, is necessarily
more just (or at least less unjust) than any and all non-egalitarian systems,
irrespective of whether it satisfies the competence principle, because demo-
cratic processes embody certain communal values, like equality, fairness, or
collective autonomy, that non-egalitarian processes do not. On this view,
communal values present a conclusive reason in favour of democracy.
The problem with this line of argument is that it would need to rely
on specific standards of political morality that identify communal values as
being more important than the epistemic considerations emphasised by the
competence principle.
Recall that epistemic theories seek to ground authority and legitimacy on
a political system’s e↵ectiveness at implementing political morality, whatever
political morality might consist in. And recall that they cannot rely on any
specific claims about what political morality consists in, unless these are
acceptable to all qualified points of view.43
Clearly, an argument identifying communal values as being more impor-
tant than epistemic considerations would be subject to qualified disagree-
ment. This means that such an argument would not be admissible in the
context of epistemic theorising, and we can reject it for our purposes. (To
clarify, I do not claim that such an argument is objectively wrong; it may
be, or it may not. It just falls outside the scope of this thesis.44)
(2.3c) Another strategy for rendering the competence principle irrelevant
would be to invoke the demographic objection.
The demographic objection’s principal point is that rulers who are not
representative of the whole citizenry, and who are not accountable to the
whole citizenry, no matter how competent, might possess “latent” biases
that could lead them to make worse decisions than a democratically elected
government.45 For example, they might fail to adequately protect and serve
the interests of some citizens. Or, they might fail to take into account
some relevant information, appreciate the importance of certain experiences,
certain arguments, certain values, and so on. These risks are so significant,
one could claim, that they will always outweigh any epistemic benefits o↵ered
by non-egalitarian systems, thus conclusively demonstrating that democracy
43See p. 12.
44See p. 15.
45See section (§1.4a).
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is ultima facie less unjust than any non-egalitarian system.
The crucial premise here, broadly speaking, is that (1) a State is ul-
tima facie rejectable when there is a material risk that the interests of some
citizens could be systematically and unfairly undermined. (This is the cru-
cial premise because the remaining risks posed by rulers’ “latent” biases are
probably not significant enough to always outweigh whatever benefits can
be o↵ered by non-egalitarian governments.) Another key premise is that (2)
only democracies possess the necessary decision-making processes to miti-
gate the risks highlighted by the demographic objection down to acceptable
levels.
I accept premise (1). Earlier, I argued that the inability of restricted suf-
frage to ensure that the interests of the disenfranchised would be adequately
served means that the demographic objection presented very strong reasons
against it. More generally, we can accept that a duty to serve the interests
of all citizens equally is amongst the fundamental duties of the State. It
would be highly contentious, and thus highly objectionable, to claim that
political morality reserves no special place for a duty like this.
I also accept that granting citizens a share in political power is necessary
to ensure that the interests of all citizens will be adequately served, or in
any case it is necessary to mitigate the risk that they will not be adequately
served down to acceptable levels. I accept, that is, part of the rationale
against non-egalitarianism. I agree that when the actors involved in political
decision-making are not representative of the whole citizenry, then there is a
material risk that the interests of certain social groups or citizens might not
be adequately served or protected. Or that there is a material risk that the
said actors will fail to take into account all the relevant information, or that
they will erroneously dismiss the importance of certain experiences, certain
values, certain forms of reasoning, and so on. Put di↵erently, I agree that
rulers who are not representative of the whole citizenry, and who are not
accountable to the whole citizenry, might possess “latent” biases that might
lead them to make worse decisions than a democratic body politic.
What I reject is premise (2). It is not obvious that democracy is the
only system that can adequately protect and serve the interests of all citi-
zens, even in light of the risks highlighted by the demographic objection. For
instance, it is not obviously impossible that minimally adequate, equally ad-
equate, or perhaps even better, results cannot be attained by non-egalitarian
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systems that (a) vest unelected o cials with significant legislative and ex-
ecutive powers that are not ultimately subordinate or accountable to the
will of the majority, all while (b) ensuring that an elected legislature retains
some pivotal powers that enable it to adequately protect the interests of all
citizens.46
Those who invoke the demographic objection in order to defend democ-
racy must show that non-egalitarian systems that bestow such alternative
powers would still present unacceptable risks, or at least that they would
not yield su ciently greater epistemic benefits to justify a deviation from
political equality. Likewise, proponents of non-egalitarianism must show the
contrary. Any “latent” biases that rulers might possess do not necessarily
entail that non-egalitarian governments are ultima facie more unjust than
democracies. Rather, it is necessary to evaluate which system, be it an egal-
itarian or non-egalitarian one, strikes the best balance between the demands
of the competence principle and those risks.
Taking stock
I accept that non-egalitarian government is prima facie unjust, for the rea-
sons that Estlund puts forward. Firstly, any criteria for di↵erentiating be-
tween the unequal political competence of di↵erent citizens, in order to
determine how political power ought to be distributed unequally, would be
subject to qualified objections. Secondly, the demographic objection high-
lights the risk that non-egalitarian systems could fail to serve the interests
of all citizens equally, or otherwise fail to make decisions competently.
Nevertheless, I have also argued, in terms acceptable to all qualified
points of view, that incompetent governance is a source of injustice too, be-
cause it undermines the probability that government will manage to imple-
ment what political morality requires (or to otherwise avoid what it forbids).
This means that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the polit-
ical system that is the least unjust, or the one that strikes the best balance
between the qualified demands of the competence principle and any qualified
demands in favour of political equality. Although I argued that Brennan’s
restricted su↵rage would not strike that balance better than democracy, it
46Recall that on the definitions adopted earlier, democracy requires that all political
power be ultimately subordinate to the will of the majority; see p. 9. Such a system
would not be a variant of democracy.
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remains possible that there exist better alternatives to democracy. For this
reason, it should be concluded that Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism does
not warrant its democratic conclusions. Further argument is required.
Chapter 3
Democracy as maximally competent governance
The last chapter argued that Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism does not
warrant its democratic conclusions, because it claims that non-egalitarian
systems are rejectable irrespective of whether they would exercise politi-
cal power more competently than democracy. This chapter will investigate
some epistemic defences of democracy that are grounded on the idea that
democracy is necessary for the competent, or at least the maximally com-
petent, exercise of political power. As such, these theories are better placed
to reject non-egalitarianism and forestall the case for liberal trusteeship.
It will help to recapitulate some earlier points:
Recall that Estlund rejects non-egalitarian systems on the grounds that
they would violate the qualified acceptability requirement, which states that a
system’s authority and legitimacy ought to be justifiable in terms acceptable
to all qualified points of view. Also recall that I partly agree. I concede that
non-egalitarian systems would be subject to qualified objections, for the
reasons that Estlund advances,1 and that they are to that extent prima
facie unjust.
Nevertheless, I argued that Estlund’s wholesale rejection of non-egalitarian
government is methodologically deficient because it fails to account for the
injustice of incompetent governance. In order to account for that injustice,
I argued that a system’s authority and legitimacy ought to be additionally
conditional on Brennan’s competence principle, which states that it is prima
facie unjust to subject someone to the decisions of an incompetent delib-
erative body, or to decisions made incompetently.2 On account of that, I
1For a summary of his argument, see p. 53. For his full argument, see sections (§1.1),
(§1.2a) and (§1.4a). For our definition of “authority” and “legitimacy”, see (§I.1b).
2Where “competence” broadly denotes a capacity to draw logically valid conclusions
about a given question, in light of the available information and within the time frame
demanded by a given task; see p. 56. For the competence principle, see p. 55. For my
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agreed with Brennan that democracy violates the competence principle and
is prima facie unjust too, by virtue of vesting incompetent citizens with po-
litical power. Indeed, I agreed that a violation of the competence principle
ultimately amounts to a violation of the qualified acceptability requirement
as well, since the competence principle is something that reasonable people
can believe in.
Therefore, insofar as both democracy and non-egalitarian systems are
prima facie unjust, moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for
the least unjust system, or the one that strikes the best balance between the
qualified demands of the competence principle and any qualified demands
in favour of political equality. This means that democracy might not neces-
sarily be preferable over any and all non-egalitarian systems, as some might
exercise political power su ciently more competently than democracy, such
that some degree of political inequality would be justified. And this pro-
vides the motivation to explore whether there do exist better alternatives to
democracy.
Unless, that is, it can be shown that democracy is necessary for the
competent, or at least the maximally competent, exercise of power. In that
case, democracy would always strike the best balance between competence
and political equality.
This brings us to the ways in which the epistemic superiority of democ-
racy may be established. I will examine what form these may take, be it
from a veritistic or a proceduralist perspective.
Recall that veritistic epistemic theories assert that there exist procedure-
independent standards of knowledge about what political morality requires
or permits, as well as of knowledge about how to implement it, and that po-
litical systems are authoritative and legitimate insofar as they maximise the
chances of government making decisions that satisfy those standards.3 On
the contrary, proceduralist epistemic theories reject the notion of procedure-
independent standards and consider decisions to be epistemically valuable
insofar as they are the outcome of commendable intellectual practices. For
proceduralist epistemic theorists, therefore, political systems are legitimate
insofar as their decision-making processes adhere to, or replicate, those prac-
defence of the competence principle, see section (§2.3a).
3Recall that political morality (partly) consists of the moral prescriptions that designate
what is either rightful or obligatory for the State to do; see p. 7. For our discussion of
veritistic theories, see p. 12.
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tices better than the alternatives.4
The aims of this chapter will be to (1) reconstruct three epistemic de-
fences of democracy that are representative of veritistic and proceduralist
attempts to establish the epistemic superiority of democracy; to (2) point
out some vulnerabilities of democracy that should make us doubt whether
their inference to democracy’s epistemic superiority is warranted; and to
do so (3) while remaining neutral between the veritistic and proceduralist
epistemologies that they are based upon.
In particular, section (§3.1) reconstructs a veritistic defence of democracy
put forward by Michael Fuerstein. He argues that the knowledge necessary
to exercise political power competently is so complex that, to the extent
it is available, it is unevenly dispersed across smaller or larger parts of the
citizenry. In this respect, he argues that democracy is epistemically supe-
rior by virtue of being able to pool and capitalise on that knowledge more
e↵ectively than other systems.
Section (§3.2) reconstructs two proceduralist defences of democracy put
forward by Cheryl Misak and Fabienne Peter. Both argue that democracy
is likely to exercise power more competently than other systems because
it enables citizens to inquire as fruitfully as possible into political-moral
and broader policy questions. They di↵er in that Misak is a monist who
argues that democratic inquiry can ultimately uncover “objective” truths
about what ought to be done,5 whereas Peter is a pluralist who argues that
democratic inquiry allows citizens with incommensurable views to decide on
what ought to be done in a fair yet epistemically productive manner.
Section (§3.3) examines certain aspects of the democratic political pro-
cess, from the way citizens interact with one another to the way political
priorities are decided, that should cast doubt on the idea that democracy
enables citizens to inquire as fruitfully as possible into political questions.
On account of those aspects, I conclude that democracy’s epistemic superi-
ority should not be taken for granted. The task to determine whether there
exist better alternatives is left for the following chapters.
4For our discussion of proceduralist theories, see p. 13.
5Recall that this proceduralist understanding of objectivity is di↵erent from the veri-
tistic one. It simply denotes what will be unanimously agreed upon at the hypothetical
end of inquiry; see p. 13.
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3.1 The veritistic strategy
The aim of this section will be to examine how the epistemic superiority of
democracy can be defended from a veritistic perspective.
Earlier, I assumed that a government’s ability to exercise its powers
competently will strongly depend on the political system’s e↵ectiveness in
elevating competent people to appropriate positions of power.6 This im-
mediately raises questions about the ability of democracy to exercise power
competently, as the people who are entrusted with electing the government
or directly participating in decision-making are generally not competent, let
alone experts, on the issues at stake. As Michael Fuerstein puts it:
how can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve ad-
equate political knowledge when they turn over their [political]
authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever?7
(By political knowledge Fuerstein refers to the total knowledge available
across society which is necessary to exercise political power as competently
as that knowledge currently allows.)
Fuerstein provides a response to this challenge. In particular, he argues
that political knowledge is so complex, even with regards to well-defined
policy areas, that no one is likely to master it su ciently well. To the extent
that this knowledge is available, it is fragmented and unevenly dispersed
across smaller or larger parts of the citizenry. In that regard, a government’s
ability to exercise its powers competently will not only depend on its ability
to elevate the competent to power, but also on the political system’s ability
to pool and capitalise on that knowledge e↵ectively. Thus, even if there
exist non-egalitarian systems that are better than democracy at elevating
the competent to appropriate positions of power, democracy will still be
epistemically superior if it can capitalise on the available political knowledge
su ciently better than those systems. Fuerstein thinks that it does so.
In what follows, I reconstruct the core of his argument (§3.1a), and then
summarize the principal ideas behind it (§3.1b).
It should be noted that Fuerstein does not explicitly address how demo-
cratic authority and legitimacy can be justified. Rather, he takes it for
granted and seeks to address any worries about democracy’s ability to rule
6This was assumption (A2); see p. 76.
7Fuerstein, “Epistemic Democracy”, p. 74.
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competently. Regardless, his conclusion remains that democracy is neces-
sary for the maximally competent exercise of political power.
(3.1a) Fuerstein is a veritist. He accepts that there exist procedure-independent
standards of knowledge by reference to which government decisions can be
evaluated. And he accepts that some people can know better than others
what this knowledge consists in, at least to some degree and with respect to
some parts of that body of knowledge.8 He argues, however, that the epis-
temic adequacy of democracy can be questioned only if we fail to appreciate
“the social character of political knowledge”.9
Fuerstein thinks that the social character of political knowledge can be
exposed as soon as we realise that it does not demarcate a single discipline,
but rather extends over numerous ones. It comprises of knowledge of justice
and morality (i.e., what I call knowledge of what political morality requires
or permits), knowledge of institutional rules and regulations, knowledge of
the sciences relevant to each policy area, knowledge of how policies in one do-
main might a↵ect policies in another, knowledge of how people’s perceptions
about the e↵ectiveness of a given policy might a↵ect its actual e↵ectiveness,
and more.10 The complexity and vastness of these domains of knowledge
makes it evident that no one is ever likely to become an absolute authority
in political-moral and broader policy matters. We should recognise that po-
litical knowledge is “diversely distributed across the political community”,
such that anyone can be in possession of various bits of it.11
In this respect, the attainment of political knowledge is not “just a mat-
ter of producing greater proportions of knowledgeable people; it is a matter,
in addition, of coordinating [the citizenry’s dispersed] cognitive labor e↵ec-
tively”.12 Or, as I put it above, competent governance requires that we pool
and capitalise on the available political knowledge that is dispersed across
the whole citizenry.
This immediately illuminates the need for a competent “executive”,
which will ensure that all this knowledge is indeed pooled and capitalised on
e↵ectively. Fuerstein argues that this “executive” role is more likely to be
8See ibid., pp. 74, 80.
9Ibid., p. 74.
10Ibid., pp. 76-77.
11Ibid., p. 78.
12Ibid., p. 80.
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performed competently by the body politic of elective liberal democracies
than a class of unelected rulers.
This is because liberal democracies are uniquely placed to benefit from
the epistemic contributions of civil society. Civil society is constituted of
various individuals and non-governmental organisations, such as charities,
experts in di↵erent fields, and political activists, whose work and interven-
tions in public debate ensure that the electorate is informed about current
political problems, the di↵erent solutions that these problems can accommo-
date, and the advantages and disadvantages of those solutions. Then, insofar
as citizens will tend over time to support the better solutions, democracies
are more likely than non-egalitarian systems to capitalise on the work of
civil society, as they empower citizens to elect candidates that will imple-
ment those solutions.
Fuerstein helps visualise how democracies benefit from the work of civil
society by way of an example: Suppose, he asks, that some fishermen be-
come concerned about falling fish stocks in their waters and report the mat-
ter to their local representatives. The representatives then commission a
nearby university to investigate the matter. Gradually, and in collaboration
with other universities, scientists come to the conclusion that the falling fish
stocks are yet another consequence of climate change. The global scientific
community, in collaboration with economists, also starts to come up with
policy proposals to address climate change, while environmental activists
begin fierce campaigns to highlight the problem and persuade the public to
demand the implementation of those policies. This process motivates the
public to exert pressure on their representatives (or, we may add, to vote for
other candidates in future elections), which eventually leads to parliament
backing and passing those policies into law.13
This simple example illuminates, according to Fuerstein, four aspects of
elective liberal democracies that enable them, and are necessary for them,
to exercise political power competently:
First, it demonstrates the importance of “vigorous” and “inclusive” de-
liberation.14 This not only makes it possible to pool bits of political knowl-
edge from as unlikely sources as anxious fishermen, but also to subject that
aggregated knowledge to public scrutiny and then to identify which issues
13Fuerstein, “Epistemic Democracy”, p. 83.
14Ibid.
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constitute genuine political problems and what solutions they might accom-
modate.
Second, it demonstrates how universal su↵rage allows democracies to
capitalise on the outcome of vigorous and inclusive deliberation in order to
set a good legislative agenda. This is ensured by the fact that electoral
majorities will bring to power candidates whose views are congruent with
the conclusions of public deliberation.15 (An implicit premise here, we may
add, is that democracies are more likely than non-egalitarian systems to set
a good agenda, because unelected rulers would be less likely than elected
representatives to react to the conclusions of public deliberation, or at least
less likely to react as fast, since the political future of unelected rulers would
not depend on their ability to do so.)
Third, the climate change example draws our attention to the epistemic
role of periodic elections. These allow the electorate to reconsider and re-
vise its past decisions, which is necessary when vigorous and inclusive public
deliberation has brought new evidence to light since the last election, or
when the public had previously failed to appreciate the evidence that was
already available. In e↵ect, periodic elections “diminish the epistemic bur-
den on the voting population by a↵ording continuous opportunities ... to
get things right”.16 And on the assumption that the quality of conclusions
reached through public deliberation will tend to increase over time, democ-
racies are likely to govern more competently than non-egalitarian systems
because their legislative agenda will be revised in light of the public’s in-
creased knowledge over time. Conversely, non-egalitarian systems are likely
to rule less competently because unelected rulers would be less likely than
elected representatives to revise their views over time, by virtue of being
allowed to isolate themselves from the process and outcomes of public de-
liberation.17
Fourth, the climate change example demonstrates how the implemen-
tation of complex policies can be delegated to expert communities, thus
rendering the competence (or lack thereof) of the average voter tangential.
To be sure, the relevant experts must be “identified, hired, and assessed
within the political system”, and this raises the question of whether voters
15Ibid., p. 85.
16Ibid., pp. 86-87.
17Ibid., p. 87: “A system that responds to the tendency of individuals’ competence to
improve over time will (ceteris paribus) produce more knowledge than one that does not”.
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and politicians can do so competently.18 For instance, if elected politicians
were to entrust policy implementation only to experts that shared their
narrow ideological commitments, then this could hurt the public interest
in case those spurned by the government were to propose better policies.
But Fuerstein thinks that this does not pose insurmountable problems for
elective democracies. One solution, he fleetingly suggests, could be to limit
the executive powers of democratic governments and empower professional
communities to appoint policy makers in their fields of expertise.19
In the light of these four aspects, Fuerstein concludes that elective lib-
eral democracy is not vulnerable to criticisms that question its ability to
govern as competently as non-egalitarian systems. Any epistemic disadvan-
tages that result from vesting political power with incompetent citizens are
o↵set by its greater ability to capitalise on the citizenry’s dispersed political
knowledge.
We can also see at this point that Fuerstein’s defence of democracy is
weakly veritistic, as it appeals to the general ability of democratic gov-
ernments to make correct decisions, without requiring that each and every
decision be correct.20
(3.1b) Fuerstein’s defence is representative of epistemic theories that appeal
to the social character of political knowledge in order to establish the epis-
temic superiority of democracy.21 In preparation of our ensuing analysis, it
will help to reframe the principal ideas behind his argument.
Note that intellectual processes consist of two stages. The first stage is
the stage of inquiry, during which the members of an intellectual community
exchange reasons for or against certain positions, in accordance with the
18Fuerstein, “Epistemic Democracy”, p. 87.
19Ibid., pp. 87-88. This is tricky though. Fuerstein does not clarify whether the power of
such policy makers would be ultimately subordinate to democratic processes, or whether
constitutional “eternity clauses” would empower them to override those processes. If it
would be subordinate, it would not constitute a fail-safe solution. And if it would not be
subordinate, it would constitute a significant non-egalitarian element that is quite likely
incompatible with democracy. In any case, Fuerstein could have argued that unelected
rulers can also entrust policy to those who share their narrow ideological commitments,
so this is not a problem for democracy only.
20To recall the distinction between weakly and strongly veritistic theories, see p. 12.
21For another defence, see Ober, Democracy and Knowledge. Ober defends a variant of
the Athenian model of democracy, in which representatives are selected through lot rather
than elected into o ce. There is no space to reconstruct his theory here, although I later
note some parallels between my defence of liberal trusteeship and his argument; see p.
138 n. 28.
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community’s internal rules of deliberation. And the second is the stage of
verdict delivery, during which the members of an intellectual community
determine, in accordance with the community’s internal decision-making
rules, what position appears to be epistemically the most meritorious given
the inquiry up to that moment.
In the light of this distinction, we can see that Fuerstein is essentially
arguing the following: The chances of determining correctly what ought
to be done on a given question are maximised under (1) a stage of open
and vigorous inquiry, or what he calls “inclusive and vigorous deliberation”,
that allows each and every citizen to freely engage in public debate and
consequently improve and revise their beliefs over time;22 and under (2) a
democratic stage of verdict delivery, during which every citizen’s views are
weighed equally when determining what position appears to be epistemically
the most meritorious given the inquiry so far. To the extent that experts
or government o cials are empowered to make policy decisions, their power
generally ought to be subordinate to democratic processes.
The rights and powers granted to citizens under tenets (1) and (2) de-
marcate a liberal democratic framework, and this leads Fuerstein to argue
that democracy is necessary for the maximally competent exercise of polit-
ical power.
3.2 The proceduralist strategy
The aim of this section will be to examine how the epistemic superiority of
democracy can be defended from a proceduralist perspective.
Recall that proceduralist epistemic theories consider political systems
to be authoritative and legitimate insofar as their decision-making mecha-
nisms adhere to, or replicate, commendable intellectual practices. In that
regard, a proceduralist critic could argue that democracy is necessary for
the maximally competent exercise of political power on the grounds that
its decision-making processes are more commendable than those of non-
egalitarian systems.
Also, recall that proceduralist epistemic theories can be divided into
22It is worth noting that, unsurprisingly, empirical research confirms the idea that those
who inquire into a matter openly and vigorously, and who are responsive to novel ar-
guments and evidence, are ultimately more likely to arrive at correct conclusions than
those who don’t. See, e.g., Winquist and Larson, “Information Pooling: When It Impacts
Group Decision Making”.
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monist and pluralist ones. Monists assume that an inquiry conducted in
accordance with commendable intellectual practices will eventually uncover
unanimously agreed upon answers, whereas pluralists allow that such com-
mon answers may not be found even at the hypothetical end of inquiry.23
In what follows, I reconstruct a monist proceduralist defence of democ-
racy’s epistemic superiority put forward by Cheryl Misak (§3.2a), as well as
a pluralist defence put forward by Fabienne Peter (§3.2b). I then summarise
the principal ideas behind both of them (§3.2c).
It should be noted that while Misak and Peter employ the epistemic su-
periority of democracy to explicitly justify its legitimacy, they do not address
how its moral authority may be established. This does not a↵ect the overall
progression of our discussion. They also do not provide a formal definition
of legitimacy, but there is nothing to suggest that their understanding of the
term is incompatible with the definition we adopted earlier.24
(3.2a) Misak develops a pragmatist account of truth, from which she then
seeks to establish that democracy is necessary for the maximally competent
exercise of political power.
Like most pragmatists, she holds that a true belief is “one which would
be agreed upon at the hypothetical or ideal end of inquiry”,25 or one that
“would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on
the matter ... [one that] would not be overturned by recalcitrant experi-
ence and argument”.26 This places her squarely on the monist proceduralist
camp.27
In that regard, she argues that those who seek the truth ought to be
committed to inquiry, to taking evidence and experience seriously, and to
defending their beliefs with reasons that survive scrutiny. Also, no inquiry
ought to be declared final because we can never know that we have in-
quired into a given question as fruitfully as we could have.28 Truth-seekers,
therefore, ought to be modest and adopt a fallibilist attitude towards their
beliefs:
23See p. 13.
24See section (§I.1b).
25Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p. 1.
26Ibid., p. 49.
27See this thesis, p. 14 n. 27.
28Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, pp. 102-104.
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[One] must assume that there is a right answer to the question
at hand, but not to assume that he has the right answer in hand.
... he ought to treat the experience of others as having, at least
in the first instance, as much weight as his own experience.29
Moreover, Misak points out that we (qua moral agents) are committed to
the universal truth of our moral views:
when we make [political-]moral judgements ... we take ourselves
to be aiming at something objective — at the truth or at getting
things right, where ‘right’ does not mean merely ‘right by the
lights of my group’. ... We think that it is appropriate, or even
required, that we give reasons and arguments for our [political-
moral] beliefs, that ‘rational’ persuasion, not brow-beating or
force, is the appropriate means of getting someone to agree with
us.30
Insofar as moral inquiry aims at truth, and in light of the pragmatist con-
ception of truth, Misak argues that moral agents can deduce true beliefs
about a given moral question, or at least maximise the chances of deduc-
ing true beliefs, only if they inquire persistently and vigorously into that
question. They ought to subject their views to sustained criticism, and
make them continually “responsive” to new arguments, evidence, and ex-
periences.31 Crucially, the requirement for “responsiveness” does not apply
only to arguments, experiences, and evidence, that one personally considers
as worthy of investigation, but rather applies to those of all citizens. Inso-
far as true beliefs are those that would be agreed upon at the hypothetical
end of inquiry, then they would have to be agreed upon by all inquirers
collectively—collective e↵ort is by definition at the heart of pragmatist epis-
temology.
With regards to the principles and methods of inquiry, Misak stresses
that we ought not to specify which are the correct ones, lest we violate the
fallibilist requirement not to profess knowing something before the hypo-
thetical end of inquiry. After all, the methods that are currently considered
29Ibid., pp. 155-156.
30Ibid., p. 3.
31Ibid., p. 104.
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to be the best available might be superseded by di↵erent methods in the
future.32
In this respect, “rational persuasion” in the passage quoted above refers
only to the process of providing reasons—any reasons—for one’s beliefs. It
does not refer to the Enlightenment conception of rationality; someone who
grounds his beliefs, say, on revelations made by a soothsayer is in that sense
aiming at rational persuasion as much as someone who grounds his beliefs
on scientific experiment. Neither can be characterised as the right or wrong
approach.
The same holds for other parameters relevant to inquiry. We ought not
to assert that the correct method of inquiry imposes restrictions on who can
participate on the basis of skin colour, religion, philosophical worldview, and
so on.33
On account of that, Misak limits herself to the minimal claim that a good
inquiry is one that continually “takes experience seriously”, i.e., one in which
inquirers are continually “responsive” to each other’s experience, evidence,
and arguments. While we may seek to persuade others by appealing to all
sorts of reasons, we ought not to impose our mode of reasoning upon others.
Next, Misak argues that liberal democratic institutions are necessary to
maximise the likelihood that correct policy decisions will be made:
Firstly, a framework of liberal rights is necessary to maximise the like-
lihood that moral inquiry will be continually responsive to experience and
reasons. Misak notes that an inquiry cannot proceed as far as it could
without making it possible for someone to acquire new experiences, develop
new arguments, and subsequently to defend those arguments and convey
those experiences accurately to their fellow citizens. And people can do
these things more e↵ectively when they enjoy liberal freedoms and speak for
themselves. As she puts it, “if we are to take seriously the experiences of all,
we must let [di↵erent] ways of life flourish so that they can be articulated
and we must let people articulate them for themselves”.34
In order to achieve this, governments ought to bestow all their citizens
with liberal rights that preserve their autonomy and freedom of conscience
and expression. Conversely, illiberal legislative frameworks would limit cit-
32Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, pp. 78-84, 107-108.
33Ibid., pp. 78, 82, 104.
34Ibid., p. 115.
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izens’ freedoms to articulate di↵erent arguments and, thus, ought to be
rejected. As she puts it, those who have illiberal views and wish to limit
people’s freedoms can be criticised for “failing to aim at truth properly”.
Therefore, even though we cannot say which method of inquiry is the “cor-
rect” one, pragmatism is by definition incompatible with any method of
inquiry that fails to take everyone’s experience seriously. On those grounds,
the intolerant can be excluded from the group of genuine inquirers and their
proposals can be ignored.35
Secondly, a democratic decision-making framework is necessary to im-
plement the current outcome of the citizenry’s ongoing collective inquiry
into what policies are best. If decisions were not made in a democratic way,
then this would amount to a failure to take seriously the experiences and
arguments of each citizen, or it would amount to a failure to inquire into
policy questions in the manner described above.36 (There is a simpler way of
putting this. Recall that Misak defines true belief as one that would be unan-
imously agreed upon at the hypothetical end of inquiry. In that regard, she
could have argued that the policy proposals that garner the greatest support
amongst citizens are more likely to be correct than those that do not, which
means that democratic processes are necessary to maximise the chances of
making correct decisions.)
This completes the core of Misak’s argument. Liberal democracy is le-
gitimate by virtue of embodying the intellectual practices that are likely to
yield the greatest epistemic benefits.
For the purposes of a final remark, note that Misak is careful not to
defend a particular kind of liberal democracy. If she did so, she would
be implying that we have exhausted and resolved all possible arguments
regarding what democratic institutional arrangements are best. But she
recognises that this claim would have been unwarranted, since there exist
several interpretations of liberal democracy.37
(3.2b) Fabienne Peter finds fault with the fact that pragmatist defences
35Ibid., pp. 104, 148. This is tricky though. On the one hand, pragmatism stipulates
that truth seekers ought to take everyone’s experiences seriously. Illiberal policies would
prevent that and this is what leads Misak to reject them. On the other hand, one could
object that illiberal policies also reflect a form of experience and, hence, that dismissing
them is epistemically unwarranted. We can set this problem aside here.
36Ibid., p. 94.
37Ibid., p. 156.
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of democracy are monist. Misak, for instance, presupposes that there exist
“objective” truths, in the sense that they would be unanimously agreed
upon at the hypothetical end of inquiry. Peter’s own example of a monist
pragmatist defence of democracy is that of John Dewey.38
According to Peter, the problem with monist epistemologies is that the
human condition is characterised by an “irreducible pluralism of values, [so]
the possibility must be acknowledged that there are no shared goals” to be
found at the hypothetical end of inquiry, and hence that inquirers might
never agree on how to address their common concerns.39 Pragmatists like
Misak or Dewey fail to account for that fact and, as a result, their defence of
democratic legitimacy is epistemologically deficient. This led Peter to search
for a pluralist proceduralist epistemic criterion of democratic legitimacy.
In order to design such a criterion, she adopts Helen Longino’s epis-
temological framework as a point of reference.40 Longino’s framework is
proceduralist, as it considers knowledge to be the outcome of social intellec-
tual processes.41 And it is pluralist, as it allows that di↵erent but equally
valid intellectual processes can yield di↵erent but equally valid knowledge
statements about a given question.42
On Longino’s framework, a belief statement can count as knowledge only
if it has “survived criticism from multiple points of view”.43 This means that
knowledge is “provisional”, as it may be revised in light of new criticisms
in the future. In this respect, an intellectual process can yield epistemi-
cally valuable results only insofar as it provides the conditions for e↵ective
criticism to take place.
Longino identifies four such conditions:44
First, an intellectual process must provide “publicly recognized forums
38For Dewey’s own position, see his Ethics, p. 385f., or his “Creative Democracy”,
pp. 229-230. For Peter’s summary of Dewey, see her “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”,
pp. 42-45.
39Peter, “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”, p. 44. For the locus classicus of such a
pluralist starting point, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 63f.
40For Peter’s summary of Longino’s work, see “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”, pp. 45-
49.
41E.g., Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, p. 129: “Critical discursive interactions are so-
cial processes of knowledge production. They determine what gets to remain in the public
pool of information that counts as knowledge. Thus a normative account of knowledge
must rest on norms governing such interactions”.
42See, e.g., ibid., pp. 207-208.
43Ibid., p. 129.
44Ibid., pp. 129-133.
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for the criticism of evidence, of methods, and of assumptions and reason-
ing”, as such criticism is necessary (though not su cient) for intellectual
communities to innovate and revise their current mainstream views.
Second, there must be “uptake of criticism”, such that the members
of an intellectual community will respond to each other’s criticisms in a
meaningful way. As Longino puts it, a “community must not merely tolerate
dissent”, which is ensured by the first condition, but “its beliefs and theories
must [also] change over time in response to the critical discourse taking place
within it”. In e↵ect, the uptake of criticism is another necessary condition
for intellectual communities to innovate and uncover errors in the views
currently held by the majority.
Third, a commendable intellectual process must have “publicly recog-
nized standards by reference to which theories, hypotheses, and observa-
tional practices are evaluated”. Longino argues that without a formal method-
ological framework, a community of inquirers might find it hard to conduct
its research in a coordinated manner, or even to agree on whether its re-
search objectives have been met or not. Thus, public standards of reference
are necessary (though not su cient) to enable intellectual communities to
reap the greatest benefits possible from deliberation.
Fourth, a commendable intellectual process must be open or, as Longino
puts it, must be characterised by “equality of intellectual authority”. An
intellectual community must not grant undue influence to some of its mem-
bers, let alone exclude aspiring members, on the basis of social, economic,
or political considerations. When this happens, she argues that a com-
munity’s potential to scrutinise its theories as far as it could will likely be
compromised, since a “diversity of perspectives is necessary for vigorous and
epistemically e↵ective critical discourse”. For this reason, a commendable
intellectual process ought to bestow roughly equal epistemic authority to all
its members, as well as ensure that everyone can become a member (at least
so long as they adhere to the community’s public standards of evaluation45),
such that each one’s viewpoints and criticisms will be evaluated on the basis
of their independent merits.
45Ibid., pp. 132-133:“While the [fourth] criterion imposes duties of inclusion and at-
tention, it does not require that each individual, no matter what their past record or
state of training, should be granted equal authority on every matter. The public stan-
dards [stipulated in the third criterion] are intended partly to protect inquiry from such
cacophony”.
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Note that (a) Longino does not attempt to determine the precise content
of the above four conditions. For instance, she does not specify what kind
of public fora are appropriate, or what standards of evaluation are correct.
Like Misak, she thinks that these questions are open to debate and that each
community of inquirers needs to make its own determinations over time.46
Also, note that (b) the second and fourth conditions are quite similar; both
emphasise the need for members of an intellectual community to respond to
one another’s criticisms. The di↵erence is that the fourth condition specifi-
cally stresses that all criticisms ought to be evaluated on their independent
merits, rather than on who was their originator. Furthermore, note that
(g) while the third condition allows that members be excluded from an in-
tellectual community if they do not adhere to its public standards, nothing
in Longino’s framework prevents those excluded from setting up a separate
community.
In light of the above four conditions, Peter notes that in Longino’s episte-
mological framework “there is nothing beyond critically engaging with each
other in transparent and non-authoritarian ways”.47
Next, she proceeds to o↵er a pluralist proceduralist epistemic criterion
of legitimacy, which she calls pure epistemic proceduralism: On this crite-
rion, a political system is legitimate insofar as its decisions are the result
of deliberation that adheres to Longino’s four conditions of “political and
epistemic fairness”.48
In contradistinction to the monists, this criterion decouples legitimacy
from the potential of a political system to implement what is “objectively”
correct (in the sense that it would be unanimously agreed upon at the hy-
pothetical end of inquiry). Rather, it makes legitimacy conditional on a sys-
tem’s ability to implement policies that the majority has endorsed through
epistemically commendable decision-making processes, even as those policies
might not be objectively correct. It allows that they could simply reflect
one valid position from within a set of contradictory and incommensurable
points of view about what ought to be done in politics.
Peter does not specify how her criterion justifies democracy, but we can
deduce this from Longino’s fourth condition. To repeat, the fourth condition
46E.g., Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, p. 131: “standards [of evaluation] are not a
static set but may themselves be criticised and transformed”.
47“Pure Epistemic Proceduralism”, p. 47.
48Ibid., p. 51.
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stipulates that inquirers be accorded equal epistemic authority throughout
the decision-making process. Non-egalitarian systems would invariably vio-
late this condition, as the disenfranchised would be accorded less epistemic
authority than the enfranchised. This directly justifies democracy.
Furthermore, we can see that her criterion does not justify any form
of democracy, but rather specifically liberal democracy. This is due to
Longino’s second and fourth conditions, which stipulate that dissent be tol-
erated and that inquirers be allowed to pursue non-mainstream paths of
investigation. As we saw earlier,49 people can dissent and pursue new lines
of investigation more e↵ectively when they benefit from liberal protections.
In that regard, a legal framework of liberal rights is necessary to ensure that
Longino’s conditions are observed in practice.50
To summarize, on Peter’s criterion, liberal democracy is legitimate be-
cause it enables citizens to inquire into the merits and drawbacks of di↵er-
ent policy proposals in (epistemically) the best manner available and then
to make decisions in a politically fair manner, by enacting policies that the
majority views as having the highest degree of epistemic worth.
For the purposes of a final remark, note that Longino intended her epis-
temological framework to apply primarily in science. This is why her third
condition permits that whoever does not follow an intellectual community’s
public standards of evaluation be excluded from the community. In the con-
text of politics, if we assume that the body politic is indivisible and that it
does not arise voluntarily in the manner of a private members’ association,
then this condition is irrelevant. However, if we assume that the body politic
need not be indivisible, then this condition can have unwanted implications,
as it can allow the disenfranchisement of minorities that do not subscribe to
the standards of the majority. We can set this di culty aside here.
(3.2c) Despite the fact that Misak and Peter employ di↵erent epistemolo-
gies, both e↵ectively ground their defences of democracy on the epistemic
value of deliberation. In preparation of our ensuing analysis, it will help to
reframe the principal ideas behind their arguments.
49See p. 96.
50This raises a similar problem to Misak’s rejection of illiberal views (see p. 97 n. 35).
It could be argued that illiberal policies can reflect valid criticisms of the type of inquiry
that Longino defends and, hence, that rejecting them is epistemically unwarranted. Again,
we can set this aside here.
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As noted earlier, intellectual processes consist of two stages. The first
stage is the stage of inquiry, during which the members of an intellectual
community exchange reasons for or against certain positions, in accordance
with the community’s internal rules of deliberation. And the second is the
stage of verdict delivery, during which the members of an intellectual com-
munity determine, in accordance with the community’s internal decision-
making rules, what position appears to be epistemically the most meritori-
ous given the inquiry up to that moment.
In the light of this distinction, we can see that Misak and Peter are
arguing for essentially the same position as Fuerstein’s:51 The chances of
government exercising power competently are maximised under (1) a stage of
open and vigorous inquiry that allows each and every citizen to freely engage
in public debate and pursue new lines of argument and investigation in search
of (what he personally sees as) the truth;52 and under (2) a democratic stage
of verdict delivery, during which every citizen’s views are weighed equally
when determining what ought to be done given the inquiry so far. To the
extent that o cials are empowered to make policy decisions, their power
ought to be subordinate to democratic processes.
The rights and powers granted to citizens under tenets (1) and (2) demar-
cate a liberal democratic framework and this directly leads Misak and Peter
to their conclusions. The di↵erence primarily lies in their understanding
of competence. For Misak, competent governance is equivalent to making
correct decisions, whilst for Peter it is equivalent to making decisions in a
politically fair manner once citizens have deliberated in (epistemically) the
best manner possible.
3.3 Questioning the inference to democracy
The aim of this section will be to cast doubt on the democratic conclusions
of Fuerstein, Misak, and Peter, and to do so in a way that remains neutral
between their epistemological commitments.
As noted earlier, intellectual processes consist of two stages. The first is
the stage of inquiry, during which the members of an intellectual community
exchange reasons for or against certain positions, in accordance with the
51Cf. section (§3.1c).
52It is worth noting again that empirical research confirms the idea that open and
vigorous inquiry is necessary to maximise epistemic value. See, e.g., Winquist and Larson,
“Information Pooling: When It Impacts Group Decision Making”.
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community’s internal rules of deliberation. And the second is the stage of
verdict delivery, during which the members of an intellectual community
determine, in accordance with the community’s internal decision-making
rules, what position appears to be epistemically the most meritorious given
the inquiry up to that moment.
I have argued that Fuerstein, Misak, and Peter, are essentially defending
the same position. Namely, that for some political-moral or broader policy
question, the probability of drawing correct conclusions about what ought
to be done53 can be maximised only through an intellectual process that
includes, firstly:
(T1) A stage of open and vigorous inquiry that (T1.a) admits deliber-
ative contributions of all kinds, including persistent dissent and sus-
tained criticism of established ideas; (T1.b) imposes no restriction on
what premises participants may employ or what conclusions they may
draw for themselves; (T1.g) requires that arguments that do not stand
to scrutiny be revised or discarded; (T1.d) allows each and every citizen
to participate, irrespective of whether they succeed at revising their
beliefs in response to valid criticism; and that (T1.e) grants liberal
protections to all participants so that such deliberative contributions
can be made without fear of retribution.
and, secondly:
(T2) A democratic stage of verdict delivery, during which every par-
ticipant in the stage of inquiry—that is, every citizen—will have his
views weighed equally when determining what position appears to be
epistemically the most meritorious given the inquiry so far. Deviations
from this equality in decision-making power are admissible only if they
have been, and continue to be, sanctioned by democratic processes.54
53Or, in Peter’s pluralist interpretation, of drawing conclusions that the majority would
have endorsed had it inquired into the merits and drawbacks of di↵erent proposals in
epistemically the best manner available; see section (§3.2b). For simplicity, I will omit
this qualification below.
Also, the “ought” here does not regard only what political morality requires, but also
what it permits. Insofar as several policy proposals are equally permissible, “what ought to
be done” simply designates what ought to be done in the face of those equally permissible
options. For instance, one could argue that, as a matter of fairness, the government
(morally) ought to enforce the most popular option.
54Recall that democratic processes may admit small degrees of political inequality, such
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The rights and powers granted to citizens under tenets (T1) and (T2) de-
marcate a liberal democratic framework and this leads Fuerstein, Misak,
and Peter, to argue that democracy is necessary for the maximally com-
petent exercise of political power. In order to challenge their inference to
democracy, we must thus seek to deny (T1) or (T2).
Tenet (T1) is not my target, at least not here. I broadly accept that open
and vigorous inquiry is the best method of inquiry into political matters,
and I do so broadly for the reasons already examined. (Obviously, some of
these reasons are mutually exclusive given that Fuerstein, Misak, and Peter,
employ di↵erent epistemologies. This need not detain us here.)
My attack on democracy will rather concentrate on (T2). While the
larger task of determining what (T2) should be replaced with is left for the
next chapters, below I point out certain shortcomings of democracy that
should make us doubt whether democratic decision-making processes can
maximise the chances of determining correctly what ought to be done (in
light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry to present time). They are
significant enough to leave the possibility open that better alternatives might
exist, thus providing the motivation to explore whether such alternatives do
exist.
The problematic aspects of democracy are the following: First, citizens
can only focus on a limited number of issues at a time, which means that gov-
ernments are not subject to direct democratic oversight with respect to all
other issues, often even over the long run. This means that decisions about
most issues may not reflect the outcome that the majority of citizens would
have reached through open and vigorous inquiry (§3.3a). Second, electorates
have practically no option but to choose between imperfect manifestos. This
means that elected governments can have a mandate to pursue policies that
open and vigorous inquiry has led the majority of citizens to regard as wrong
(§3.3b). Third, and last, citizens are ceteris paribus more likely than not to
adopt inadequate epistemic attitudes, which makes it di cult or impossi-
ble for electorates to inquire into political questions openly and vigorously
(§3.3c).
Note that I will primarily focus on the elective model of democracy, in
which voters elect representatives into o ce. Some of the problems discussed
as a requirement that constitutional amendments be supported by a supermajority rather
than a simple majority; see section (§I.1d).
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below would be less pronounced under the Athenian model, in which repre-
sentatives are randomly selected from the citizenry, or the direct model, in
which all decisions are made through direct ballot initiatives. There is no
space to discuss these here but, by way of brief comment, I hold that the
problems analysed below would remain significant even under these alterna-
tives, especially if they were to be implemented on a large scale.
(3.3a) The first problematic aspect of democracy is that citizens cannot
a↵ord the time to focus on political issues, let alone inquire vigorously into
them, except with respect to a limited number of issues at a time.
The idea behind tenet (T2) is that democracy will maximise the chances
of determining correctly what ought to be done (in light of the progress of
open and vigorous inquiry to present time) because it empowers citizens
to vote for policy proposals that electoral majorities have endorsed after
such inquiry. Put di↵erently, the electorate is expected to formulate an
agenda through a commendable intellectual process—call it the intellectually
respectable agenda—and then to impose it on the government.
There are two ways in which the electorate can impose an intellectually
respectable agenda on the government. The first is through formal political
means, such as elections, referenda, and direct ballot initiatives. The sec-
ond is through informal political means that exert political pressure on the
government, such as protests, petitions, and lobbying.
Let us examine first whether formal means are e↵ective in advancing an
intellectually respectable agenda:
For our purposes, I will assume that (a) elected governments will only
break their manifesto pledges in order to avoid catastrophic events, like
a financial crash, and that (b) they may otherwise adjust their manifesto
pledges to account for new political realities, but only slightly so, without
betraying the spirit of the original pledges. These assumptions mean that
electoral majorities can trust that the policies they voted for will generally
be implemented; dropping these assumptions can only be to the democrat’s
disadvantage.
It is safe to assume that citizens can a↵ord the time to focus on only N
issues at a time, where N is rarely more than a dozen, usually less. Let us
also suppose that governments must address M issues at a time, where M
is much larger than N.
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One immediate problem is that di↵erent citizens can be focused on dif-
ferent issues. Consequently, citizens may never be focused on any single
issue in su cient numbers to even make it possible for them to collectively
inquire openly and vigorously on the matter. For example, suppose that
the M issues currently facing society are 3 ⇥ N in number. And suppose
that M is wholly constituted of three mutually exclusive subsets M1, M2,
and M3, each being N in size. Also suppose that a third of the electorate is
focused on M1, another on M2, and another on M3. This means that a third
of the citizens will be able to inquire openly and vigorously on M1 if they so
wish, but the remaining two thirds will not. As a result, the electorate (as
a collective whole) will never draw conclusions about M1 that are the result
of open and vigorous inquiry, as no majority within it will ever be able to
focus on that subset, let alone inquire openly and vigorously into it. The
same holds for M2 and M3.
In reality, some issues do attract more than half the electorate’s atten-
tion, so the above example is extreme. But the point is that not all issues at
stake in an election do so. In such cases, the conclusions drawn by electoral
majorities may not reflect the conclusions that the electorate would have
drawn had it inquired openly and vigorously on the matter—and the man-
dates that democratic governments will be handed by electoral majorities
may not either.
In response, a democrat like Fuerstein could argue that electorates need
not be concerned with each and every policy issue facing the government.
Most policy issues can normally be delegated to elected representatives,
who may in turn delegate them to civil servants and experts. Rather, the
epistemic role of the electorate lies in overseeing the work of the government
and then intervening to rectify mistakes in current policy.55
On this view, the media and the rest of civil society will put forward
proposals on how to improve current policies and then bring those proposals
to the attention of the broader public. Other parts of the civil society
that oppose those proposals will then put forward reasons against them,
and through sustained debate citizens will eventually make an informed
judgment about what ought to be done. Subsequently, citizens will seek to
elect a government that promises to implement the policies recommended by
that judgement, or in a system like Switzerland’s seek to trigger a referendum
55For Fuerstein’s position, see section (§3.1a).
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on whether those policies should be adopted.
Even so, the point remains that citizens will only be able to focus on N
issues at a time, while the number of policies that admit improvement at
any one time may be greater than N. Consequently, the point remains that
the conclusions drawn by electoral majorities may not reflect the conclusions
that the electorate would have drawn had it inquired openly and vigorously
on the relevant issues.
We must not be complacent here. The fact that electorates are unable
to inquire openly and vigorously into most policy issues means that they
cannot exercise e↵ective oversight over the government. As a result, most
issues are potentially vulnerable to the ideological fixations of policy makers,
and indeed sometimes policy is shaped by ideology rather than vigorous
inquiry. Even if we grant that the electorate will eventually manage to
inquire openly and vigorously into the most prominent issues over the long
run, such as climate change, it is not safe to assume the same of other very
important issues that do not figure su ciently prominently in voters’ minds
to force serious public debate.56 In any case, the ability of a system to
eventually make correct decisions over the long run presents no reason to
stop questioning its epistemic e cacy, as other systems might do so faster.
Let us now examine whether informal means, like protests, petitions,
and lobbying, fare better in advancing an intellectually respectable agenda:
To be clear, informal activities have a deliberative function, as they help
draw attention to issues that the majority of citizens would normally ig-
nore.57 This is epistemically desirable, as it can lead electorates to inquire
vigorously into those issues and then improve their agenda. But informal
activities have a pressure function as well, as they generally seek to leave gov-
ernments with no politically viable option but to yield to their demands.58
The problem with informal activities is that for many of those participat-
ing in them, the pressure function is more important than the deliberative
function. That is, the primary objective of many participants is to achieve
56There is no space to review those problems here. By way of brief examples, we can note
how policies to break the poverty cycle are often shaped not by serious macroeconomic or
moral debate but rather simply by how many low-income citizens turn out to vote (see, e.g.,
Hill and Leighley, “The Policy Consequences of Class Bias”), or how educational policies
are often driven by ideology rather than evidence-based inquiry (see, e.g., Alexander,
Children, their World, their Education).
57For our earlier discussion on this, see p. 49.
58See, e.g., Christiano, The Rule of the Many, pp. 248-250.
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their political goals; contributing to public deliberation and persuading the
majority of citizens of the justice of their goals is merely one means of
achieving those goals. Indeed, participants often pursue their goals solely
by exerting political pressure on the government and without involving the
public at all. This pressure takes various forms, such as threats of industrial
action or threats to stop political donations.
When governments yield to political pressure from informal activities, it
is possible that (a) the electorate has already endorsed the relevant policy
changes after inquiring into the matter openly and vigorously, or that (b) it
would have endorsed them, had it inquired so. Informal activities are to that
extent epistemically beneficial. But it is also possible that (g) the electorate
has already rejected the changes after inquiring into the matter openly and
vigorously, or that (d) it would have rejected them, had it inquired so.
Informal activities are to that extent epistemically damaging.
Notably, it is impossible to know how often case (b) obtains or how often
case (d) obtains, precisely because the electorate cannot a↵ord the time to
focus except on a limited number of issues.
Meanwhile, case (g) o↵ers no guarantee that the electorate will vote the
current government out in the next election, as the government may have
calculated that the said policy changes will not figure prominently on the
electorate’s concerns. This way, the government secures the electoral sup-
port of the special interests it serves, all while avoiding electoral punishment
for implementing bad policies.
Now, some democrats argue that the political pressure exerted by in-
formal activities is epistemically necessary. They note that politics requires
citizens to arrive at a compromise on how to advance their competing inter-
ests. The communication obstacles to hammering such compromises on an
electoral level are potentially insurmountable and, hence, informal political
activities are a practical mechanism to achieve them. The idea is that some
groups will pressure the government in one direction, others in another, thus
ultimately leading to a balance of interests. On this view, informal political
activities constitute a form of “alternative governance” that enables society
to realise the “benefits of cooperation among member citizens”.59
On the basis of this view, one could argue that informal activities are not
problematic, even when cases (g) and (d) obtain. But this response would
59Cohen and Rogers, “Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance”, p. 245f.
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be inadequate. There is no denying the need to balance competing interests
in politics. But we cannot overlook the fact that cases (g) and (d) demarcate
policies that open and vigorous inquiry recommends against doing, or the
fact that, ideally, a compromise of interests would have been hammered
out on an electoral level. In that regard, the “alternative governance” that
informal political means provide is merely a necessary evil, justified by virtue
of the electorate’s inability to determine what policy proposals are best
(because it cannot a↵ord the time this task requires). It is a reason to doubt
the epistemic e cacy of democratic decision-making processes, not celebrate
it. Democracy with “alternative governance” is preferable to democracy
without it, then, only insofar as there are no better alternatives. The better
alternatives could even rely on some form of “alternative governance” as
well; the latter does not necessitate a democratic framework.
In conclusion, the fact that citizens can only focus on N issues at a time
means that most decisions in democracies are not subject to democratic
oversight and, hence, may not reflect the outcome that the majority of
citizens would have reached through open and vigorous inquiry. Indeed,
they may not reflect the outcome reached by the minority of citizens who
have inquired openly and vigorously on a given question. This should put
the epistemic usefulness of tenet (T2) in doubt.
(3.3b) The second problematic aspect that should make us doubt whether
democracy can maximise the chances of determining correctly what ought
to be done (in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry to present
time) is that electorates have practically no option but to choose between
imperfect manifestos.
Let us suppose that by some stroke of luck the electorate has formu-
lated an intellectually respectable agenda—every policy in that agenda is
supported by judgements made through open and vigorous inquiry. The
problem is that the electorate is almost always left with no practical option
but to make coarse-grained choices between di↵erent manifestos, none of
which is likely to fit perfectly with an intellectually respectable agenda.
For example, suppose that voters have inquired vigorously into the mat-
ter and concluded in favour of correct policies P1 and P2, as well as that
they recognise P1 to be more important than P2. Additionally suppose that
there are only two parties running in an election, that the first party sup-
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ports P1 but is against P2, that the second party supports P2 but is against
P1, and that there are no other issues at stake in the upcoming election.
The electorate will then vote for the first party, as it is the least bad op-
tion. This demonstrates how (elective) democracy is a flawed mechanism
for translating the findings of open and vigorous inquiry into policy.60
Worse, elected governments often see it, or at least claim to see it, as
their moral obligation to honour their manifesto pledges. This means that
governments risk persevering with manifesto policies that open and vigorous
inquiry recommends against, but that the government considers to be part
of its duties towards the electorate.
Also, note that setting up a new political party that would pledge to
implement both P1 and P2 could be a solution in our simplistic example. In
real life, however, where there are more policies at stake and citizens’ moti-
vations are not as clear, a new political party would not only be unrealistic
in most circumstances, but also potentially an (epistemically) bad idea, as
the vote might split in such a way that a party favouring worse policies than
the current frontrunner could win the election. An attempt to implement
all the conclusions of open and vigorous inquiry could result in a worse state
of a↵airs.
In conclusion, the inability of democracy to translate all the recommen-
dations of open and vigorous inquiry into policy should put the epistemic
usefulness of tenet (T2) in doubt, at least with respect to elective democracy.
(3.3c) The third problematic aspect that should make us doubt whether
democracy can maximise the chances of determining correctly what ought
to be done (in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry to present
time) is that citizens are ceteris paribus more likely than not to adopt inad-
equate epistemic attitudes, which are incompatible with the requisite terms
of participation in open and vigorous inquiry.
Recall that citizens cannot inquire openly and vigorously into a given
question unless certain conditions are satisfied: Fuerstein defends liberal
democracy partly because it enables experts, activists, and other citizens to
argue extensively for or against di↵erent policy proposals, and subsequently
60To be sure, direct ballot initiatives and referenda are not vulnerable to the problem
of imperfect manifestos, as they give citizens direct authority over government policy. As
noted earlier, there is no space to discuss direct democracy here. Su ce to say that it
would remain vulnerable to the other criticisms analysed in (§3.3a) and (§3.3c).
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to elect governments that will implement the proposals that survive public
scrutiny.61 In e↵ect, his defence is partly grounded on the assumption that
citizens will be responsive to valid criticism. In a similar vein, Misak stresses
that moral inquirers are properly aiming at truth only when they take the
experiences of others seriously, and when they are responsive to new argu-
ments and new evidence.62 Likewise, Longino’s epistemological framework,
which is the basis of Peter’s defence of liberal democracy, stipulates that
being responsive to criticisms from diverse points of view is necessary to
maximise the epistemic benefits that an inquiry may yield.63
The question, then, is whether the ways citizens interact during political
discourse, and whether the ways they subsequently respond to each other’s
arguments, satisfy the conditions that are necessary for open and vigorous
inquiry to materialise.
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to investigate (I) what
conditions, if any, a↵ect people’s ability to inquire openly and vigorously;
and then to investigate (II) what conditions people find themselves in when
they shape their political views. An evaluation of the primary research that
has been conducted on these questions would be outside the scope of this
thesis. Instead, I will focus on secondary sources that review the findings of
such research.
Beginning with question (I), research has so far shown that the ability
of laymen to inquire openly and vigorously into a question they have no
expertise on is strongly a↵ected by the following factors:
Firstly, (F1) the greater the ideological homogeneity of a group prior
to deliberation, the more likely (ceteris paribus) it is to move towards a
stronger majority in favour of the beliefs initially held by the majority prior
to deliberation. This is irrespective of whether the initial beliefs were correct
or not. Specifically, those who were in the majority prior to deliberation are
correspondingly more likely to adopt more extreme versions of the beliefs
they initially held prior to deliberation, or at least to increase their credence
in their initial beliefs, while those who were in the minority are correspond-
ingly more likely to adopt some version of the views of the majority (rather
than maintain their initial dissent). Even a slight majority in favour of one
61See section (§3.1a).
62See section (§3.2a).
63See section (§3.2b).
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view prior to deliberation makes these shifts slightly more likely than not,
ceteris paribus. Clearly, such instances of deliberation are unlikely to satisfy
the conditions for open and vigorous inquiry.
On the other hand, (F2) a group that was in perfect ideological balance
prior to deliberation is (more) likely (than not, ceteris paribus) to move
towards a mutually agreed compromise that incorporates elements of all the
participants’ initial views. This is irrespective of whether the compromise is
objectively better or worse than some of the participants’ initial views. Such
instances of deliberation, then, satisfy the conditions for open and vigorous
inquiry only to a limited extent, since the compromise will not necessarily be
responsive to the merits and drawbacks of the participants’ initial views.64
In addition, (F3) if some members within a group are perceived by the
other members as being experts on the question at hand, then the group
is (more) likely (than not, ceteris paribus) to move towards the perceived
experts’ views. Similar shifts are also likely to occur towards the views held
by members who are perceived to be of “high-status”, such as members with
prestigious occupations, higher income, higher education, and so on. And
these shifts are likely to happen irrespective of whether the perceived experts
are actually experts or whether the relevant views are actually correct or not.
Such instances of deliberation, then, also satisfy the conditions for open and
vigorous inquiry only to a limited extent, since the group’s conclusions will
not necessarily be responsive to the merits and drawbacks of the perceived
experts’ views.65
Note here that the impact of education on the quality of a deliberative
outcome is mixed. While there is clear evidence that the more educated
have (epistemically) better views than the less educated on a host of issues,
there is also evidence that people’s understanding of what counts as morally
right is strongly shaped by their personal interests. This means that despite
the advantages of education, the more educated are at risk of holding views
that unjustly promote their personal interests. And since education is cor-
related with social class, this means that a deliberative process dominated
by the more educated can unjustly undermine the interests of the less edu-
64For a literature review on findings (F1) and (F2), see Mendelberg, “The Deliberative
Citizen”, pp. 157-161; or Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble?”, pp. 74 n. 8, 90-93.
65For a literature review on finding (F3), see Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen”,
pp. 165-167; or Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble?”, pp. 111-113.
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cated.66 In any case, the experiments that provide evidence for the findings
discussed in this subsection were generally conducted with comparatively
well-educated subjects, such as undergraduates.67 This indicates that a
higher level of education is not su cient to render these findings negligible.
Moving on to the most intriguing finding, (F4) groups that are placed
under the authority of a leader who (a) instructs them to weigh the merits
and drawbacks of di↵erent views in a balanced manner, and who (b) actively
intervenes during deliberation to press any relevant objections against the
views that members defend, are more likely than groups without such a
leader to arrive at a conclusion that weighs the merits and drawbacks of
di↵erent views correctly. In other words, the former groups are more likely
to inquire openly and vigorously into the matter.68 This is because groups
without such leaders are significantly more likely to focus on the evidence
and premises they have in common, rather than on the crucial “unshared”
information that is necessary to improve their views.69
Furthermore, (F5) the more deeply that the members of a group held
their beliefs prior to deliberation, the more likely (than not, ceteris paribus)
they are to maintain their initial beliefs, or even to adopt more extreme
versions of their initial beliefs, irrespective of the validity of the criticisms
aired during deliberation. Conversely, (F6) the less deeply that they held
them, the more amenable they are to rational persuasion. While the lat-
ter instances of deliberation are (to that extent) compatible with open and
vigorous inquiry, the former are not, since the independent merits and draw-
backs of the arguments put forward are (to that extent) irrelevant.70
Moreover, (F7) the more strongly the members of a group view them-
selves as being divided by fundamentally incompatible identities, be it on a
national, political, socio-economic, or other level, then the more likely (than
not, ceteris paribus) they are to dismiss the views of those with a di↵erent
66See Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen”, pp. 165-168. We already discussed this
worry, of course, in Estlund’s demographic objection; see section (§1.4a).
67See, e.g., Larson et al., “Leadership Style and the Discussion of Information”, p. 486;
or Abrams et al. “Knowing What to Think”, pp. 101, 106.
68For finding (F4), see Larson et al., “Leadership Style and the Discussion of Informa-
tion”, pp. 486-494; or Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization”, pp. 193-194. Note that
the style of leadership and the competence of the group leader can have a material e↵ect
on group performance. We will return to this next chapter; see p. 134.
69For a literature review on this finding, see Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen”,
p. 175.
70For a literature review on findings (F5) and (F6), see ibid., pp. 160-161.
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identity. Such instances of deliberation are clearly incompatible with open
and vigorous inquiry.
Lastly, (F8) the more strongly the members of a group view themselves
as sharing a common identity, the more likely (than not, ceteris paribus)
they are to take each other’s views seriously. This is not necessarily good,
however, as a strong sense of shared identity can be indicative of high ide-
ological homogeneity amongst group members, in which case this finding is
similar to (F1). On the other hand, when there is a shared identity with no
homogeneity, members will be correspondingly more likely to seek a com-
promise, in which case this finding is similar to (F2).71
Note here that group members may be divided by di↵erent identities
without necessarily perceiving them as mutually incompatible. Indeed, since
people have multiple identities on a national, political, socio-economic, and
other levels, it is possible that they may share an identity that unites them
more than their other identities divide them, depending on the question at
hand.
This completes a brief overview of the conditions that a↵ect people’s
ability to inquire openly and vigorously.72 To repeat, it is not our task to
evaluate the validity of these findings. Although most of them are congru-
ent with elementary intuition, laboratory studies come with methodological
limitations and may well be overturned by future research. In a normative
context, we are concerned with what ought to be done in light of the facts,
whatever the facts may be.73 This means that the above findings ought, at
the very least, to be taken seriously. And this provides the motivation to
explore what ought to be done, in case they are true.
So, let us now turn to question (II), namely to the conditions that citizens
find themselves in when they shape their political views. There are several
points that should undermine one’s faith in the ability of lay citizens to
engage in open and vigorous inquiry:
Firstly, citizens do hold beliefs deeply on many political-moral or broader
policy issues, and indeed they tend to do so on the most significant of those
issues. Namely, they often find themselves in conditions that are more sim-
71For a literature review on findings (F7) and (F8), see Mendelberg, “The Deliberative
Citizen”, pp. 171-172; or Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization”, pp. 180-181.
72For a brief summary of the reasons behind these phenomena, see Mendelberg, “The
Deliberative Citizen”, pp. 159-161, 169.
73I owe this point to Brennan, “The Right to a Competent Electorate”, p. 722.
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ilar to (F5) rather than (F6).
Secondly, political discourse is scarcely held under the authority of a
moderator or a leader who presses all sides to weigh the merits and draw-
backs of all views. Quite the contrary, freedom of speech ensures that view-
points are presented and defended in the manner that each citizen sees fit,
without the least requirement of even mentioning, let alone addressing, what
criticisms may be raised against them. In other words, conditions similar to
(F4) are rare in democracy.
Thirdly, citizens are at a material risk of misidentifying the relevant ex-
perts. This cannot only happen when citizens are biased in favour of a
certain view, but also when citizens are genuinely committed to revising
their beliefs in the face of valid criticism. Similarly, citizens do place greater
faith in the views of those with high societal status than those of lower sta-
tus. Empirical research has clearly demonstrated such biases within juries,74
and common sense dictates that this happens across society more broadly,
although possibly to a lesser extent. For these reasons, there is a signifi-
cant risk that the epistemic pitfalls highlighted in (F3) will obtain during
democratic discourse.
It is worth emphasising the point about experts. The greatest risk of
misidentifying the experts comes from bias, as this renders people more likely
to consider as better or “real” experts those who already profess their own
viewpoints. Even if we grant that citizens will eventually overcome most of
their biases over the long run, or at least that next generations will, change
might come too late for those who su↵ered under past mistakes. In addition,
some voter biases show no sign of abating across time or generations, most
notably with regards to economics.75
Regardless, bias is not necessary to misidentify the relevant experts.
Laymen who are genuinely committed to open and vigorous inquiry may
also do so simply because they are not experts to begin with, so they are
ill-equipped to judge who the experts are.
For example, lay citizens who are concerned about the state of public
healthcare may inquire into the matter by examining the views of patients,
doctors, and nurses. But this would not necessarily constitute an epistemi-
cally productive approach. While the views of doctors, nurses, and patients,
74See, e.g., Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen”, p. 165.
75For an incisive account on this topic, see Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter.
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are certainly valuable, one should probably place greater emphasis on the
views of healthcare consultants and bioethicists instead, since the appropri-
ateness of a healthcare service’s design is primarily contingent on factors that
are less visible from the frontline, like its operational cost or its e↵ectiveness
at meeting medical targets.
To take another example, suppose that some citizens are concerned about
the public debt and they inquire into the matter by examining the views of
qualified economists. But the views of an economist who is an expert on asset
management should probably be accorded little weight on this issue, while
the views of macroeconomists specialising in addressing public debt should
probably be accorded much greater weight. And yet many well-meaning
laymen don’t make such distinctions in their reasoning.
Note that I am not presupposing that every policy issue will admit exper-
tise. It is possible that some may not. But even then, the problem could be
that citizens may defer in their judgement to bogus experts, whereas a more
critical approach to their pronouncements would have been epistemically
more appropriate.
Moving on, fourthly, citizens are sometimes divided by antagonistic iden-
tities to a greater degree than they are united through other identities they
share in common. Indeed, when such divides obtain, they generally manifest
on the most significant political-moral issues. This means that democratic
discourse on key issues can sometimes resemble the conditions of (F7), and
this is epistemically undesirable.
I do not mean to exaggerate this point. As mentioned earlier, we can
agree with Estlund that people are genuinely concerned about justice and
other social problems.76 To that extent, they are likely to see one another as
good citizens and patriots, and this can help them engage with one another
openly and vigorously. But it is important to note that concern for the com-
mon good does not necessarily lead to tolerance. Concern for the common
good is often expressed negatively, through words that convey a sense of
victimhood and despair. Empirical research shows that the use of language
in public discourse is key in moulding identities in ways that facilitate or
impede epistemically productive discourse.77 In that regard, when concern
for the common good is expressed negatively, people can (and sometimes do)
76See p. 51.
77See, e.g., Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen”, pp. 170-172.
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entrench themselves behind identities that divide them from others, such as
political identities, rather than identities that unite them to others, such as
civic identities. And in those cases political discourse will likely be epistem-
ically unproductive. Pace Estlund, people’s concern for the common good
cannot shoulder the full justificatory weight of epistemic democracy.
Fifth, and last, citizens tend to expose themselves selectively to what
they already agree with, and this phenomenon is observed irrespective of
educational level. Selective exposure is a strong (though, of course, not
absolute) predictor behind whom one befriends, what media sources one
follows, which politicians and public figures one trusts, whom one perceives
as the better or “real” experts, or whom one debates politics with.78 Thus,
to the extent that selective exposure obtains, the democratic body politic
does not deliberate as a collective whole. Rather, deliberation takes place
across distinct, ideologically homogeneous groupings, with their preferences
simply being aggregated through voting. To that extent, therefore, the
conditions of political discourse in democracies are more similar to those of
(F1) than (F2), and this is epistemically undesirable.
The last point is perhaps the most significant because it works synergisti-
cally with the other four. For example, to the extent that selective exposure
fragments political discourse into homogeneous groupings, these groupings
are correspondingly likely to strengthen their credence in their own beliefs
(this is due to F1), which can foster a stronger sense of in-group identity.
And if this in-group identity is perceived as being in fundamental opposition
to out-groups, it can lead to further entrenchment of prior beliefs (due to
F7).
It is important to stress the probabilistic nature of the above points. The
claim is not that political discourse in democracies is exclusively limited to
ideologically homogeneous groupings, or that people always place greater
faith in experts who already profess their own viewpoints, and so on. The
claim is rather that such outcomes are more likely than not, at least to
some degree. This means that citizens’ deliberative behaviour will span a
spectrum, with a small minority exemplifying the aforementioned shortcom-
ings across all issues, others exemplifying those shortcomings with respect
78For a literature review on these findings, see Huckfeldt and Sprague, Citizens, Politics,
and Social Communication, pp. 125-126. See also Mutz and Martin, “Facilitating Commu-
nication Across Lines of Political Di↵erence”, pp. 100-102, 108; or Sunstein, “Deliberative
Trouble?”, pp. 100-101.
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to some issues only, others demonstrating only some of those shortcomings
with respect to some issues only, and so on. Overall, however, democratic
political discourse will exhibit these shortcomings to a greater degree than
it will satisfy the conditions for open and vigorous inquiry.
Similarly, the claim is not that whoever fails to satisfy the conditions
for open and vigorous inquiry will necessarily reach totally wrong conclu-
sions about the matter. Rather, a few will reach totally wrong conclusions,
others will reach conclusions that are wrong in some respects and right in
others, and so on. A small minority might even reach better conclusions
than those who adhered to the conditions of open and vigorous inquiry.
Overall, however, those who did not adhere to these conditions will reach
worse conclusions than those who did.
In conclusion, laymen are more likely than not, ceteris paribus, to adopt
inadequate epistemic attitudes during democratic political discourse, which
are incompatible with the requisite terms of participation in open and vigor-
ous inquiry. It follows that electorates are to that extent unlikely to arrive at
conclusions that are congruent with what open and vigorous inquiry would
recommend. This should put the epistemic usefulness of tenet (T2) in doubt.
Before closing, two remarks are in order:
First, the preceding analysis does not provide any grounds to doubt the
epistemic usefulness of tenet (T1), namely the usefulness of allowing all
citizens to participate during open and vigorous inquiry. Irrespective of the
problems highlighted above, the case remains that di↵erent bits of political
knowledge can be dispersed across di↵erent parts of the electorate. This
means that the contributions of each citizen are potentially (epistemically)
valuable, even when the citizens making them are not themselves inquiring
into the matter in an open and vigorous manner.79 It is only the epistemic
usefulness of tenet (T2), namely the usefulness of empowering each and every
citizen to determine what ought to be done in light of the current progress
of open and vigorous inquiry, that is properly put into question.
Second, it should be noted that some of the aforementioned shortcomings
79To clarify, there is a distinction to be made between the process of open and vigorous
inquiry, which admits contributions from all citizens but also stipulates that arguments
be revised in light of criticism, and individual citizens inquiring openly and vigorously
themselves. One may be a participant in the process of open and vigorous inquiry without
managing to engage with all the criticisms raised during inquiry, or even without managing
to revise his views in light of those criticisms. This distinction follows from conditions
(T1.g) and (T1.d).
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could probably be mitigated through clever institutional design. One could
argue, for instance, that the media ought to be strictly regulated in a way
that, say, requires op-ed contributors to mention what objections may be
raised against their points. The aim of such regulations would be to decrease
citizens’ freedom to expose themselves selectively to what they already agree
with, and encourage them instead to balance di↵erent viewpoints. Or, to
give another example, one could argue that a properly functioning democ-
racy should provide citizens with a civic education that teaches them how
to deliberate openly and vigorously.
One should not underestimate the di culty of reforming a society’s cul-
ture, including its political culture, from the top down. Such measures would
face a non-negligible risk of failure and to that extent should not be touted
as a panacea. In any case, even if such measures succeeded in making citi-
zens overall more likely than not to inquire openly and vigorously into the
matter (and this is a generous assumption), that would be no reason to stop
questioning the epistemic e cacy of democracy, as other systems might be
able to leverage the benefits of similar reforms even better. Also, democracy
would remain vulnerable to the problems discussed earlier, notably the fact
that citizens can only focus on a limited number of issues at a time.
Taking stock
I noted that intellectual processes consist of two stages, a stage of inquiry
during which evidence and reasons are exchanged, and a stage of verdict
delivery during which the members of an intellectual community determine
what appears to be epistemically the most meritorious position given the
inquiry so far.
In light of this distinction, I explained that Fuerstein, Misak, and Peter,
consider open and vigorous inquiry to be the best method of inquiry into
political matters, as it allows each and every citizen to pursue new lines
of investigation and criticise established ideas, both of which are necessary
for revising and improving on current orthodoxy. I also explained that they
consider democratic processes, namely a democratic stage of verdict delivery,
to constitute the best method of determining correctly what ought to be done
(in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry to present time).
While I accept that open and vigorous inquiry is the best method of
inquiry, I have pointed out certain aspects of democracy that should make
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us doubt whether democratic decision-making processes can maximise the
chances of determining correctly what ought to be done given the inquiry.
Specifically, I pointed out that citizens cannot a↵ord the time to focus on,
let alone inquire into, political issues except for a limited few at a time;
that citizens are ceteris paribus more likely than not to adopt inadequate
epistemic attitudes during political discourse, which makes it di cult or
unlikely for electorates to inquire openly and vigorously into the matter;
and, finally, that electorates have practically no option but to choose between
imperfect manifestos, which can render some of the electorate’s conclusions
irrelevant, even if they were reached through open and vigorous inquiry.
The above shortcomings of democracy are significant enough to leave
the possibility open that better alternatives might exist. And this takes
us back to the question posed last chapter: insofar as moral authority and
legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best
balance between the qualified demands of the competence principle and any
qualified demands in favour of political equality, we should explore whether
there do exist better alternatives to democracy. This will consume us next.
Chapter 4
Liberal trusteeship: the core argument
In what follows, I endeavour to develop the core elements of an epistemic
theory that reserves moral authority and legitimacy for a non-democratic,
rather than a democratic, political system. I propose to call this system
liberal trusteeship.
It will help to recapitulate some earlier points:
To begin, I accept that non-egalitarian systems are prima facie unjust on
the grounds that they would violate the qualified acceptability requirement,
which states that authority and legitimacy ought to be justifiable in terms
acceptable to all qualified points of view. As Estlund points out, any cri-
teria that determine how political power ought to be distributed unequally
amongst citizens, be it on the basis of di↵erences in political wisdom or
otherwise, will necessarily court qualified disagreement. In addition, quali-
fied viewpoints can object that rulers in non-egalitarian systems could have
“latent biases” that might lead them to undermine the interests of some
citizens, or otherwise to make decisions incompetently.1
Nevertheless, I argued that authority and legitimacy ought to be addi-
tionally conditional on Brennan’s competence principle, which states that it
is prima facie unjust to subject someone to the decisions of an incompetent
deliberative body, or to decisions made incompetently.2 On account of that,
I agreed with Brennan that democracy violates the competence principle
and is prima facie unjust too, by virtue of vesting incompetent citizens with
political power. Indeed, I agreed that a violation of the competence principle
1For the qualified acceptability requirement, see section (§1.1). For Estlund’s rejec-
tion of non-egalitarianism, see (§1.2a) and (§1.4a). For our definition of “authority” and
“legitimacy”, see (§I.1b).
2Where “competence” broadly denotes a capacity to draw logically valid conclusions
about a given question, in light of the available information and within the time frame
demanded by a given task; see p. 56. For the competence principle, see p. 55. For my
defence of the competence principle, see section (§2.3a).
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ultimately amounts to a violation of the qualified acceptability requirement,
since the former is something that reasonable people can believe in.
Therefore, insofar as both democracy and non-egalitarian systems are
prima facie unjust, moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for
the least unjust system, or the one that strikes the best balance between the
qualified demands of the competence principle and any qualified demands
in favour of political equality. This means that democracy might not neces-
sarily be preferable over any and all non-egalitarian systems, as some might
exercise political power su ciently more competently than democracy to
justify some degree of political inequality.
Next, I noted that democracy would still be preferable if it were nec-
essary for the competent, or at least the maximally competent, exercise
of political power, as in that case it would always strike the best balance
between competence and equality.
I explained that democrats like Fuerstein, Misak, and Peter, take this
route. They e↵ectively argue that, for some political-moral3 or broader
policy question, the probability of drawing correct conclusions about what
ought to be done4 can be maximised only through an intellectual process
that includes, firstly:
(T1) A stage of open and vigorous inquiry that (T1.a) admits deliber-
ative contributions of all kinds, including persistent dissent and sus-
tained criticism of established ideas; (T1.b) imposes no restriction on
what premises participants may employ or what conclusions they may
draw for themselves; (T1.g) requires that arguments that do not stand
to scrutiny be revised or discarded; (T1.d) allows each and every citizen
to participate, irrespective of whether they succeed at revising their
beliefs in response to valid criticism; and that (T1.e) grants liberal
protections to all participants so that such deliberative contributions
can be made without fear of retribution.
and, secondly:
3Recall that political morality (partly) consists of the moral prescriptions that designate
what is either rightful or obligatory for the State to do; see p. 7.
4Or, in Peter’s pluralist interpretation, of drawing conclusions that the majority would
have endorsed had it inquired into the merits and drawbacks of di↵erent proposals in
epistemically the best manner available; see section (§3.2b). For simplicity, I will omit this
qualification below. Also, the “ought” here does not regard only what political morality
requires, but also what it permits; see p. 103 n. 53.
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(T2) A democratic stage of verdict delivery, during which every par-
ticipant in the stage of inquiry—that is, every citizen—will have his
views weighed equally when determining what position appears to be
epistemically the most meritorious given the inquiry so far. Deviations
from this equality in decision-making power are admissible only if they
have been, and continue to be, sanctioned by democratic processes.5
The rights and powers granted to citizens under tenets (T1) and (T2) de-
marcate a liberal democratic framework and this leads Fuerstein, Misak, and
Peter, to argue that democracy is necessary for the maximally competent
exercise of political power.
While I accept that open and vigorous inquiry is the best method of
inquiry into political matters, I have pointed out certain shortcomings of
democracy, from the way citizens interact with one another to the way po-
litical priorities are decided, that should make us doubt whether democracy
can maximise the chances of determining correctly what ought to be done
(in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry to present time).6
Therefore, insofar as the epistemic superiority of democracy should not
be taken for granted, we ought to explore whether there exist any non-
egalitarian alternatives that would capitalise on open and vigorous inquiry
su ciently better, such that they would strike a better overall balance be-
tween competence and equality.
This brings us to liberal trusteeship. The overarching aim of this and
the next chapter will be to show how liberal trusteeship would be likely to
exercise power su ciently more competently than democracy, such that its
deviation from political equality would be justified. It is important to stress
that liberal trusteeship need not be perfect—it simply needs to perform, on
average, su ciently better than democracy. To that e↵ect, I will focus both
on how liberal trusteeship would be less vulnerable to the shortcomings of
democracy, as well as on how any new worries about its epistemic potential
can be mitigated.
My defence of liberal trusteeship will start from a preliminary model,
which will be revised into an intermediate model by the end of this chapter,
5Recall that democratic processes may admit small degrees of political inequality, such
as a requirement that constitutional amendments be supported by a supermajority rather
than a simple majority; see section (§I.1d).
6See section (§3.3).
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and into a final blueprint by the end of next chapter.
Section (§4.1) develops the preliminary model. My starting assumption
is that someone who has extensively inquired into a certain subject, and who
has spent considerable time debating with her peers the merits and draw-
backs of di↵erent views on that subject, will be more likely than the average
person to have an epistemically privileged perspective on that subject. I
propose to call people who have undergone such a process, irrespective of
what specific beliefs they may have formed through that process, trustees in
their relevant field of specialisation.
In the light of this, I propose that the power to draft laws in each policy
area be granted exclusively to the relevant specialist (unelected) trustees,
while the power to enact these into law (or reject them) be granted exclu-
sively to a democratically elected parliament. On the preliminary model,
then, the body politic and its representatives in parliament will be tasked
with scrutinising and approving the proposals put forward by trustees. In
the remainder of the section, I examine how this institutional arrange-
ment di↵ers from democracy, what epistemic advantages it would have over
democracy, as well as how “trustees” di↵er from “experts”.
Section (§4.2) examines who ought to be empowered to set the qualifying
criteria for selecting trustees. I argue that this power ought to lie with
jury courts, which in e↵ect will provide an additional egalitarian check on
trustees. Specifically, I argue that jury courts ought to adjudicate whether
or not the changes proposed by plainti↵s should be incorporated into the
criteria currently used in a given field of specialisation. Any citizen will be
able to act as a plainti↵ in such cases.
Lastly, section (§4.3) revisits the preliminary model’s clear separation of
the power to draft laws from the power to enact laws, and argues for an
exception in the case of ethics. Ethics is often considered an area in which
no one can ever acquire epistemically privileged views, no matter how hard
she inquires into the matter. This threatens to undermine the rationale
underpinning trusteeship. In response, I argue that insofar as there is no
argument proving or disproving beyond qualified doubt whether systematic
inquiry can enable oneself to acquire epistemically privileged views on ethics,
then, in the context of epistemic theorising, political systems ought to be
designed in a way that accommodates (to some degree) the implications of
both arguments. To that e↵ect, I argue that there ought to exist trustees on
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moral matters, but also that parliament ought to be empowered, under cer-
tain conditions, to override their proposals and pass its own laws regulating
moral matters.
Next chapter, I will examine how liberal trusteeship can be revised to
mitigate the risk that trustees could be corrupt or biased (§5.1), as well as
how its deviation from political equality is, on balance, acceptable (§5.2).
Note that “government” and “parliament” will refer to the legislative
function of government unless stated otherwise. While the question of who
will lead the executive, or who will be responsible for the implementation of
laws and policies, is very important, it is tangential to our discussion. One
possible solution would be to vest the executive power with trustees, and
then task parliament and an independent judiciary to oversee their work.
This question need not detain us further.
4.1 The preliminary model
This section develops the case for the preliminary model of liberal trustee-
ship. As stated above, this model stipulates that the power to draft laws
be clearly separated from the power to enact those drafts into law, with
trustees being vested the former power and parliament the latter.
To that e↵ect, this section states the guiding principle that should un-
derpin any future criteria for selecting trustees, and clarifies the di↵erence
between “experts” and “trustees” (§4.1a). On account of that guiding prin-
ciple, it proceeds to lay the foundations of liberal trusteeship by justifying
the need for a parliament (§4.1b) and examining how trusteeship is sub-
stantially less vulnerable to the shortcomings of democracy discussed last
chapter. In particular, it examines how trusteeship is more likely to deter-
mine correctly what ought to be done in light of the current progress of
open and vigorous inquiry, when trustees and parliament are considered in
isolation (§4.1c) and when parliament’s accountability towards the citizenry
is taken into account (§4.1d). Lastly, it clarifies how the preliminary model
di↵ers from modern democratic institutional design (§4.1e).
(4.1a) The guiding principle that should underpin any future criteria for
selecting trustees is the following:
(B1) If someone (B1.a) has arrived at her beliefs f on some topic F
through a rigorous process that involved weighing the merits and draw-
126 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
backs of f against sustained and diverse criticism in favour of not-f
alternatives, and if (B1.b) she continues to systematically engage with
new criticisms and retains or revises her beliefs about F in response to
what she considers on balance to be the most meritorious criticisms,
then she is ceteris paribus more likely to acquire an epistemically privi-
leged perspective on F than someone who has not subjected his beliefs
to the same scrutiny.
In essence, conditions (B1.a) and (B1.b) demarcate what open and vigor-
ous inquiry into F requires of those who participate in it. They place no
restrictions on who should be able to participate, or on what premises and
conclusions are acceptable. Crucially, they require that people persistently
inquire into the merits and drawbacks of diverse viewpoints before conclud-
ing in favour of a certain position, and that they continue to inquire so ad
infinitum. As Misak would have put it, they require that people inquire as
fruitfully as possible into F such that their beliefs would not be overturned
by “recalcitrant experience and argument”.7
Thus, principle (B1) e↵ectively states that those who inquire openly and
vigorously into a given matter are more likely to acquire an epistemically
privileged perspective on that matter than those who don’t. It is similar
to tenet (T1), but while (T1) is invoked in the context of political systems,
principle (B1) is invoked in the context of individuals. As with (T1), I will
assume (B1) to be true.8
To clarify, epistemically privileged perspective refers to the degree of cor-
rectness of one’s beliefs. (Or, in a pluralist context, it refers to the degree
that one’s beliefs have been the result of methodologically the best and most
thorough inquiry possible. For simplicity, I will omit this qualification be-
low.) For example, someone who believes that Madrid is in Portugal has
a more epistemically privileged perspective than one who believes it is in
Botswana.
In the light of this, I propose to call trustees on F those who have in-
quired, and continue to inquire, into F by adhering to the conditions delin-
eated in (B1). And I will call those who do not adhere to those conditions,
7See p. 94.
8As noted earlier, this is a reasonable assumption, as empirical research confirms that
open and vigorous inquiry is necessary to maximise epistemic value. See, e.g., Winquist
and Larson, “Information Pooling: When It Impacts Group Decision Making”.
4. THE CORE ARGUMENT 127
or at least who adhere to those conditions to a significantly smaller degree
by comparison, as laymen with respect to F. These terms are chosen because
trustees can be entrusted with delivering a judgement about F that is more
likely to be right, or at least likely to be less mistaken, than the judgements
of laymen.
It is important to stress the probabilistic nature of (B1). I do not claim
that trustees are guaranteed to acquire an epistemically privileged perspec-
tive relative to laymen. Some trustees are bound to be unresponsive to
criticism, either out of bias or persistent failure to think critically, in which
case they may continue to hold false beliefs despite evidence to the contrary
and despite nominally adhering to the letter of (B1). Nor do I claim that
one cannot arrive at better views about some topic F through a process
other than open and vigorous inquiry. For example, one could manage to
draw the right conclusions about F through intuition and without inquiring
vigorously into the matter, because he has been lucky not to make a mistake
or because he is very intelligent.
Rather, my claim is that, over a large set of people and over time, a ma-
jority of those who investigate an F question by adhering to the conditions
of open and vigorous inquiry will succeed in acquiring an epistemically priv-
ileged perspective on F relative to laymen. That is, a majority will arrive at
beliefs that are either correct or less mistaken than those of laymen. Mean-
while, a minority will fail to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective
on F and its views will be equal or worse to those of laymen.
On a strong interpretation of (B1), the above will almost always be the
case. This is due to the same mechanism that is also at play in Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem.9 That is, insofar as individual trustees are on average likely
to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective, then a majority of trustees
will be virtually guaranteed to do so. On a weak interpretation of (B1),
we can allow that a majority of trustees will rarely, but not exceedingly
rarely, fail to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective and, hence, its
views will be equal or worse to those of laymen. I will proceed with the
weak interpretation in mind; switching to the strong one will only be to the
democrat’s detriment.
Now, I should stress that (B1) is only a guiding principle that must un-
derpin any criteria for selecting trustees. The di cult task lies in specifying
9To recall the theorem, see p. 13.
128 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
the di↵erent criteria that need to be employed in each di↵erent field of spe-
cialisation in order to fulfil this principle. This task will invariably court
qualified disagreement and, in order to (partially) shield liberal trusteeship
from that disagreement, I shall delegate this task to an egalitarian institu-
tion: jury courts.10 Still, a guiding principle like (B1) is of utmost impor-
tance, as it demarcates the boundaries of what criteria are admissible, much
like the way rights theory demarcates the boundaries of what legal rights
are admissible.
And the most crucial guidance that (B1) provides is that the criteria
for selecting trustees ought to be procedural. Trustees ought not be selected
on the basis of what beliefs they hold, let alone what demographics they
belong to, but on the basis of having systematically engaged with multiple
and diverse viewpoints in their field of specialisation.
An example can serve to illustrate some plausible procedural criteria
that could be used to select trustees on, say, matters of fiscal policy. One
plausible criterion could be to qualify every academic economist who has
spent over ten years researching and debating that question with his peers.
Another could be to qualify every economist who has spent over ten years
working on that question at the research departments of the Bank of England
and HM Treasury. Another could be to qualify people who have not devoted
their formal careers on that question, but who have nevertheless systemati-
cally engaged with that question at a high level, such as publishing papers
in reputable peer-reviewed journals for over ten years. Another could be to
qualify people without a research background but with valuable practical
experience, such as business consultants with over ten years of experience
advising multinationals on how government fiscal policy could impact their
operations. Another could be to qualify whomever demonstrates excellent
knowledge of di↵erent macroeconomic theories and complex modelling tech-
niques (in the manner of Brennan’s “competence exams”, such tests could
mitigate controversy about their evaluation standards by being based on a
transparent curriculum11). Or, more plausibly, a combination of such crite-
ria could be used. They could stipulate ten years of experience, or twenty,
or five. Or, they could emphasise civil service experience over academic and
business experience. These are the kind of details that juries will be called
10See section (§4.2b).
11To recall this point, see p. 62
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to adjudicate on.
Still, the point is that (i) people who have not invested significant time
dealing with issues of fiscal policy ought not to qualify as trustees on that
area. This restriction should possibly even apply to people who have sys-
tematically engaged with closely related questions, such as economists who
specialise in anti-trust regulation. Also, (ii) the criteria for qualifying some-
one as a trustee on fiscal policy ought not be sensitive to the specific beliefs
of aspiring candidates, such as whether one is a Keynesian or a monetarist.
Before we close, it is worth clarifying the di↵erence between trustees and
experts:
Expertise demarcates a stronger epistemic concept than my definition
of trustees. Alvin Goldman, for instance, defines experts on some domain
F as those who hold significantly more true beliefs about that domain than
they hold false beliefs. That is, it is not su cient for experts to know
more than laymen; they must know so much as to be very likely to be
right. As he puts it, being an expert is not “simply a matter of [epistemic]
superiority to most of the community. Some non-comparative threshold of
[epistemic] attainment must be reached, though there is great vagueness in
setting this threshold”. In addition, experts must have the “know-how”, i.e.,
must know why something is right and how this information can be used
to give correct answers to new questions, lest experts were indistinguishable
from idiot savants.12
The key issue with experts, then, is who counts as one, how can he be
publicly recognised as such, how can we know when experts are wrong so
as not to defer to their authority, and whom should we trust when they
disagree between them. Much ink has been shed over these questions,13 but
fortunately they do not bear on our discussion.
This is because my definition of trustees demarcates a weaker epistemic
concept than expertise. Whereas experts are defined as those who know so
much as to be very likely to be right, trustees are defined as those who are
merely more likely to have an epistemically privileged perspective relative to
laymen, by virtue of having inquired openly and vigorously into the matter.
This di↵erentiates trustees and experts in the following respects.
12Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”, pp. 91-92. For a similar defi-
nition, see Archard, “Why Moral Philosophers Are Not Moral Experts”, p. 120.
13See, e.g., Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”; or Walton, Appeal to
Expert Opinion; or Hardwig, “Epistemic Dependence”.
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Firstly, trustees do not need to be very likely to be right. Unlike experts,
their epistemic privilege is comparative and may simply amount to holding
less mistaken beliefs than laymen. Of course, the hope is that trustees
will know (and know-how) as much as experts, but this is not intrinsic to
the definition of trustees. Meanwhile, experts ought, by definition, to hold
significantly more true beliefs than false ones.
To take a simple example, suppose that a shaman in a pre-historic com-
munity inquired into the various methods available at his time for healing
asthma, and he concluded that amputating asthmatics and o↵ering their
limb to the gods is the best method for healing asthma. The shaman in this
case qualifies as a trustee on healing asthmatics but is clearly not a medical
expert (though he may have been regarded as such).
Secondly, in order to identify someone as an expert, it is necessary to
determine what is objectively true or false, so as to test whether the expert
holds significantly more true beliefs than false ones. By contrast, my defi-
nition of trustees sidesteps any qualified controversy that is bound to arise
about what is objectively true or not. Rather, it relies on the more mod-
est claim that open and vigorous inquiry makes one more likely to attain
epistemically privileged beliefs, whatever these may be.
Thirdly, inquiring vigorously into a matter might not be necessary to
qualify someone as an expert, whereas it is intrinsic to the definition of
trustees. For example, medical students do not need to inquire into the
e cacy of homeopathy before qualifying as general practitioners. Being
told by their professors that there is no scientific evidence for homeopathy
is su cient to make them experts. By contrast, in order to qualify as a
trustee on general medicine, one could potentially have to review any existing
evidence on the ine cacy of homeopathy and inquire into any arguments
in defence of homeopathy, in case a significant number of her peers took
homeopathy seriously.
A requirement to inquire into ideas that have no scientific basis may
sound absurd, but the procedural nature of this requirement is necessary
to (partially) shield liberal trusteeship from qualified disagreement about
what is objectively right or wrong—it simply eschews the question. Of
course, in practice compromises will have to be made, as aspiring trustees
cannot possibly a↵ord the time resources to inquire vigorously into every
single objection that is raised within their field of specialisation. But this
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does not pose a fatal objection to trusteeship, since we saw that similar
and immensely greater compromises need to be made by citizens during
democratic debate anyway.14
This completes our discussion on trustees. We can now turn to the
justification of the preliminary model.
(4.1b) I have argued that trustees on F are more likely than laymen to have
an epistemically privileged perspective on F, and that they can be entrusted
with delivering a judgement about F that is more likely to be right, or at
least to be less mistaken, than the judgements of laymen.
On account of that, one could conclude that the chances of making cor-
rect decisions about F would be maximised if trustees were vested with full
legislative powers in their respective fields, i.e., with powers to draft pro-
posals and directly enact them into law, such that their political authority
would only be limited by citizens’ liberal rights. To be sure, sometimes
trustees would make worse decisions than the decisions laymen would have
made, in which case it would have been better to let lay citizens decide
democratically. Yet overall, and over time, one could conclude that vesting
trustees with full legislative powers would be best.
However, there are two major problems with vesting full legislative pow-
ers in trustees:
The first problem is that trustees will rarely exhibit the kind of epistemic
prowess that would warrant granting them full legislative powers. As noted
earlier,15 the knowledge necessary to exercise political power competently is
so complex that, to the extent it is available, it is fragmented and dispersed
across smaller or larger parts of the citizenry. No one is ever likely to become
an absolute authority in F, as no one can dedicate the time necessary to in-
quire vigorously into each and every aspect of F. Conversely, laymen are not
isolated from reality and can potentially hold views that are epistemically
valuable. This means that while trustees will be more dedicated partici-
pants in open and vigorous inquiry, by virtue of adhering to principle (B1)
to a much greater extent than laymen, some laymen may also make valuable
contributions to inquiry. Hence, if trustees on F were granted full legislative
powers within their fields, then there is a risk that useful information about
14See section (§3.3a).
15See p. 89.
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F held by laymen would be ignored or dismissed.
The second problem with full legislative powers is that they are decid-
edly inegalitarian. Thus, the kind of qualified demands in favour of political
equality discussed earlier16 would become correspondingly more pressing,
to the point that any epistemic advantages that trusteeship may exhibit
over democracy will likely be insu cient to outweigh them, especially in
light of the limitations of trustees just mentioned. For instance, the qual-
ified worry highlighted by Estlund’s demographic objection, namely that
unelected rulers may have “latent biases” that can handicap their ability to
govern competently and justly, would become especially pronounced.
Therefore, full legislative powers for trustees ought to be rejected. On
the other hand, of course, I have already argued that democracy is a highly
problematic method for determining what ought to be done in light of the
progress of open and vigorous inquiry,17 so a rejection of full legislative
powers for trustees should not lead us blindly to democracy.
And this brings us to the preliminary model of liberal trusteeship. I
propose that the power to draft laws in each policy area F be exclusively
vested with trustees specialising in that area, while the power to enact them
into law (or reject them) be exclusively vested with a democratically elected
parliament. In e↵ect, I propose that trustees be given the legislative ini-
tiative in their fields of specialisation, and that parliament be tasked with
scrutinising and approving their work.
This is a preliminary model only and it will be revised as we progress. We
can see, however, that it already diminishes the force of any qualified objec-
tions in favour of political equality; although (unelected) trustees are granted
distinctly inegalitarian powers, democratic consent is ultimately necessary
to enact their proposals into law. The requirement for democratic consent
also means that laymen’s views cannot be ignored or dismissed under this
model, so it is better placed to capitalise on them. The challenge ahead will
be to show that the said qualified objections are diminished enough, and
that liberal trusteeship’s epistemic benefits are great enough, such that it
will strike a better balance between competence and equality than democ-
racy does.
To that e↵ect, we can begin by examining the key epistemic advantages
16See sections (§1.2) and (§1.4a).
17See section (§3.3).
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of the preliminary model.
(4.1c) In what follows, I examine how the preliminary model is more likely
than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of
the progress of open and vigorous inquiry, when trustees and parliament are
considered in isolation, ignoring any impact that citizens can have on the
political process.
The cornerstone of my defence of liberal trusteeship is the following
assumption:
(B2) An attempt to determine correctly what ought to be done18 in light
of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into F is ceteris paribus
more likely to succeed, and ceteris paribus more likely to do so at an
earlier point in time, when (B2.a) those empowered to determine what
ought to be done are actively pushed to inquire into F as openly and
vigorously as possible; and when (B2.b) the inquiry has emphasized
good arguments over bad ones.
This assumption is congruent with elementary intuition and is supported by
empirical research. As noted earlier, our task is not to evaluate the validity
of such research; laboratory studies come with methodological limitations
and may well be overturned in the future. In a normative context, we are
concerned with what ought to be done in light of the facts, whatever the
facts may be. This is why I retain (B2) as an assumption. But insofar as
it is corroborated by non-obsolete empirical research, we ought to explore
what it entails.
So, let us examine the research that corroborates (B2). Recall that the
ability of a group of laymen to inquire openly and vigorously into a given
question is strongly a↵ected, amongst other things, by whether the group
is pushed to consider all viewpoints in a balanced manner. Specifically,
groups that are placed under the authority of a leader who (a) instructs
them to weigh the merits and drawbacks of di↵erent views in a balanced
manner, and who (b) actively intervenes during deliberation to press any
relevant objections against the views that members defend, are more likely
18Or, in a pluralist context, to arrive at conclusions that the majority would have
endorsed had it inquired into the matter in epistemically the best manner available. For
simplicity, I will omit this qualification below. Also, the “ought” here does not regard
only what political morality requires, but also what it permits; see p. 103 n. 53.
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than groups without such a leader to arrive at a conclusion that weighs the
merits and drawbacks of di↵erent views correctly. This is finding (F4) from
our earlier analysis on group deliberative behaviour.19
Going beyond our earlier analysis, it is worth stressing that the style
of leadership matters. On one study, for instance, Larson et al. tested a
directive and a participative style.20
Directive leaders were trained to project themselves as authoritative fig-
ures, by (i) stating at the very beginning of deliberation which position they
thought was best; and by (ii) actively intervening during deliberation to
press against members currently having the floor any relevant objections
that may be raised to their viewpoints, or that have already been raised by
other members.
Participative leaders were trained to project themselves as equals to the
other members, by (i) stating which position they thought was best only
after every other member has done so; and by (ii) actively intervening during
deliberation to solicit fellow group members to press any relevant objections
against the viewpoints defended by the member currently having the floor.
That is, participative leaders did not press the objections themselves, but
solicited other members to press what they deemed relevant.
In both cases, group members were free to draw their own conclusions
and decisions were made by a majority vote. Directive leaders who held
correct beliefs prior to deliberation were found to lead the best performing
groups, with correct decisions being made by 88% of the groups. Participa-
tive leaders were found to lead the second best performing groups, with no
statistically significant di↵erence between groups whose leaders held correct
or incorrect beliefs, with correct decisions being made by 63% of the groups.
And directive leaders who held incorrect beliefs prior to deliberation led the
worst performing groups, and the only groups that were moderately more
likely to decide wrongly, with correct decisions being made by 44% of the
groups.
Note that directive leaders were found to press objections that contra-
dicted their own viewpoint slightly more often than they pressed objections
that supported it, so the di↵erence in results cannot be explained by direc-
tive leaders manipulating the deliberation to their favour. Rather, it was
19See p. 113.
20Larson et al., “Leadership Style and the Discussion of Information”, p. 487.
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the leadership style alone that led groups to give greater emphasis to the
ideas fielded by directive leaders, for better or worse.21 Also, note that this
study did not test how groups without a leader would have performed in the
same task. However, there is consistent evidence that leaderless groups are
likely to perform worse than groups with participative leaders,22 but also
likely to perform better than hierarchical groups with incompetent leaders
who conduct themselves authoritatively.23
The aforementioned evidence on the e↵ect of directive and participative
styles of leadership on group performance is in line with similar studies.24
In essence, the evidence corroborates assumption (B2), namely the idea that
groups are more likely (if not significantly more likely) to determine correctly
what ought to be done if (B2.a) their members are actively pushed to inquire
as openly and vigorously as possible, and if (B2.b) their line of inquiry
emphasises good arguments over bad ones. The fact that group performance
is maximised under directive leaders with correct beliefs demonstrates this.
And this brings us back to liberal trusteeship.
In light of the above findings, the primary benefit of the preliminary
model is that trustees will assume a leadership role that is equivalent to
that of directive leaders who hold correct beliefs.
For one, condition (B2.b) will be fulfilled by virtue of vesting trustees
with the power to draft laws and introduce them to parliament. Although
trustees on F will not necessarily hold correct beliefs, we saw that they are
individually likely to hold epistemically privileged views on F, i.e., views that
are either correct or at least less mistaken than those of laymen, and that
the majority of trustees will be very likely to do so. Consequently, consid-
21Larson et al., ibid., pp. 491-493.
22See, e.g., Sunstein, “The Law of Group Polarization”, pp. 193-194; or Maier and
Solem, “The Contribution of a Discussion Leader to the Quality of Group Thinking”.
Note that the authors do not explicitly employ the term “participative leader”.
23For a review, see Anderson and Brown, “The Functions and Dysfunctions of Hier-
archy”, pp. 61-62. Curiously, it appears that no research has been conducted on how
leaderless groups will perform relative to groups with incompetent “directive leaders”.
This has been confirmed to me by Prof Larson. The cited review does not focus on incom-
petent “directive leaders”, but on all types of incompetent leaders who conduct themselves
authoritatively—these were not specifically trained to press objections like directive lead-
ers. It is likely that groups with incompetent “directive leaders” will perform less badly
than hierarchical groups with incompetent authoritative (non-directive) leaders. In any
case, we can assume that leaderless groups will still perform better than groups with
incompetent “directive leaders”.
24For a review, see Larson et al., “Leadership Style and the Discussion of Information”,
pp. 493-494.
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ering that most parliamentarians will be laymen with respect to F, granting
trustees the exclusive power to introduce bills will ensure that parliamentary
debate is very likely to emphasise good arguments over bad ones.
In order to fulfil condition (B2.a), it is necessary that (i) parliamentary
debate weighs the merits and drawbacks of multiple and diverse views—as
many as possible—before concluding in favour of or against the proposals
put forward by trustees, as well as that (ii) trustees actively intervene dur-
ing debate to ensure this. Liberal trusteeship is well placed to meet these
requirements too, especially if trustees were legally required to defend their
views before parliament. Those who will be in the majority sponsoring a
bill can be legally required to defend it against any objections that parlia-
mentarians and dissenting trustees may raise, and dissenting trustees and
parliamentarians can also be legally required to expound on their reasons
for opposing that bill. This would ensure that the merits and drawbacks of
di↵erent viewpoints are thoroughly weighed.
Assumption (B2) aside, another benefit of the preliminary model is that
the views of the citizenry’s lay representatives cannot be ignored or dis-
missed. Trustees will have to persuade parliament of their original propos-
als, or otherwise seek a compromise that is acceptable to parliament. A
failure to persuade parliament of their original proposals may indicate bias,
incompetence, or political expediency on parliament’s part, in which case
a compromise will not be epistemically optimal. But it may also indicate
that the original proposals did not stand to scrutiny, especially in light of in-
formation held by the citizenry’s lay representatives and which the trustees
originally ignored or underrated. In that case, a compromise will be epis-
temically desirable. Indeed, trustees may even realise their errors and revise
their views in response.25
To mention another benefit, liberal trusteeship could potentially reduce
the likelihood that bad decisions will be made on the rare occasions when
the majority of trustees puts forward worse proposals than parliament would
have considered on its own. We saw that directive leaders with incorrect be-
25Note that the risks of bias and incompetence apply even under an irreducible plu-
ralism of values, as parliamentarians may fail to inquire into the matter in epistemically
the best manner available. Similarly, trustees can underrate the information held by
parliamentarians by proposing to balance certain incommensurable values in a way that
parliamentarians do not endorse after having inquired into the matter in epistemically the
best manner available.
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liefs are likely to cause a group to perform worse than a leaderless group.26
On that basis, one would think that when trustees put forward worse propos-
als than parliamentarians would have considered on their own, then liberal
trusteeship will be likely to make worse decisions than parliament under
democracy would have made. And this is a likely outcome. On the other
hand, considering that dissenting trustees will be arguing against their peers’
bills, it is possible that parliament will be less likely to be swayed by the
bills’ sponsors than it would have been under a sole directive leader. This
needs to be empirically tested, but it is worth bearing in mind.
Now, one could argue that liberal trusteeship is not necessary to reap the
above benefits. Democracies could be reformed, so that specialised policy-
makers in the mould of trustees are empowered to draft laws and then defend
them (or argue against them) before parliament. And once parliament has
deliberated in the manner of conditions (B2.a) and (B2.b), it could be al-
lowed to either enact the said proposals or directly adopt its own. On this
view, there is no need to vest law-drafting powers exclusively with trustees,
as similar results can be obtained without them.
This is where the remaining factors that a↵ect group deliberative be-
haviour come into play. Recall that the ability of a group to inquire openly
and vigorously into the matter is negatively a↵ected when there is high ideo-
logical homogeneity amongst group members; when group members misiden-
tify the relevant experts or otherwise place greater faith in the views of those
with high societal status; when they selectively expose themselves to sources
and social circles that already agree with them; when they perceive them-
selves to be divided by fundamentally incompatible identities; or when they
hold certain beliefs too deeply to revise them in light of valid criticism.27
These are serious epistemic handicaps; they might not be visible in lab-
oratory studies that focus on largely uncontroversial tasks, but they do ob-
tain in the circumstances of politics. And when they obtain, the ability of
parliamentarians to inquire openly and vigorously will be, to that extent,
diminished. Parliamentarians may be too biased to revise their views in
light of valid criticism, or may perceive each other to be divided by funda-
mentally incompatible identities, or a party’s parliamentary group may be
too ideologically homogeneous to contemplate a compromise with trustees
26See p. 135, n. 23.
27See section (§3.3c).
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and other parties, and so on. So, while the directive leadership provided
by trustees (or policy-makers in the mould of trustees) has the potential
to furnish the political process with the benefits of conditions (B2.a) and
(B2.b), these are less likely to obtain in democracy.
By contrast, the political dynamic changes when the power to draft laws
is exclusively vested in trustees. Parliament has much less room to discount
its constitutional duty to engage openly and vigorously with trustees, let
alone to selectively expose itself to the “real” experts it favours.28 Just
as trustees will have to take parliamentarians’ views seriously and con-
sider a compromise that is acceptable to them, parliament too will have
to take trustees’ views seriously and consider a compromise that is accept-
able to them. To be sure, parliament could vehemently reject all trustee
proposals and bring government to a standstill. But this risk should not be
exaggerated—and it is not damnatory for trusteeship either. Insofar as the
majority of trustees is very likely to hold epistemically privileged views on
a given matter, a refusal by trustees to put forward a compromise that is
acceptable to parliament will likely mean that the status quo is preferable
to parliament’s goals.
The question, then, is whether the epistemic advantages of liberal trustee-
ship are su ciently great (notwithstanding the damage incurred when trustees
have worse beliefs than laymen) to justify its deviation from political equal-
ity. It is too early to judge this but, to repeat, my goal as we progress will
be to arrive at a model of liberal trusteeship that will make this conclusion
harder to resist.
Before we close, it is important to stress the probabilistic nature of my
argument. Sometimes democracy would have made better decisions than
trusteeship. Or, pace assumption (B2), deliberators might sometimes need
to start from severely wrong beliefs in order to uncover all their errors and
maximise epistemic potential over the long run, whereas those who started
with moderately good beliefs might never realise all their errors and, hence,
might never make as good decisions over the long run (although, whether the
consequences of initially making horribly wrong decisions are worth bear-
28The risk of decision-makers isolating themselves and selectively listening to their
favourite experts is also emphasised by Ober, who argues that the Athenian model of
democracy is well placed to mitigate it; see his Democracy and Knowledge, pp. 95, 158.
As noted earlier, there is no room to investigate his theory, but I hold that its advertised
benefits would not materialise on a large scale.
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ing is a valid question in itself). My point, rather, is that, overall, liberal
trusteeship is very likely to introduce better bills than parliament would
have considered on its own, and trusteeship is to that extent likely to enact
better laws than democracy would have enacted.
This completes our discussion on the epistemic virtues of the preliminary
model, insofar as trustees and parliament are considered in isolation. Next,
we can bring the citizenry into the picture.
(4.1d) In what follows, I examine whether the epistemic case for liberal
trusteeship becomes less plausible if we take into consideration the political
dynamics that accompany universal su↵rage.
The ability of citizens to determine the composition of parliament en-
genders three principal risks:
The first risk is that parliamentarians could (as they often do in democ-
racy) place political expediency over and above the interests of political
morality. They could vote along party lines, or they could reject good pro-
posals put forward by trustees simply because enacting them would under-
mine their party’s or their personal re-election prospects, and so on.
The second risk is that parliamentarians could persevere with bad poli-
cies, simply because these were included in their manifesto pledges. As
discussed earlier, parliamentarians sometimes see it, or claim to see it, as
their moral obligation to honour their manifesto pledges, and this is epis-
temically damaging when the said pledges are wrong.29 (Indeed, this risk
is intertwined with the first, since parliamentarians could stick with their
manifesto pledges in order to appear truthful and principled towards voters,
so as to increase their popularity.)
The third, and more important, risk is that citizens could be biased, in
which case they could vote for candidates who are also biased and unwilling
to engage openly and vigorously with trustees, let alone revise their views in
light of valid criticism. This risk is especially relevant given our earlier analy-
sis of group deliberative behaviour. To repeat, citizens sometimes hold their
beliefs too deeply to revise them, especially with respect to the most signif-
icant political-moral issues; they are at a material risk of misidentifying the
relevant experts or otherwise placing greater faith in the views of those with
high societal status; they sometimes perceive themselves as being divided
29See section (§3.3b).
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by incompatible identities; or they selectively expose themselves to sources
and social circles they already agree with. All of these conditions, I have
argued, make citizens more likely than not to adopt inadequate epistemic
attitudes.30 And citizens a✏icted by such attitudes will be correspondingly
more likely to become biased and vote for biased candidates.
In light of the above risks, one could worry that the epistemic case for lib-
eral trusteeship becomes less plausible. This is because when these risks ob-
tain, the ability of parliament to engage openly and vigorously with trustees
decreases. As a result, liberal trusteeship becomes correspondingly less likely
to take advantage of the benefits provided by the directive leadership of
trustees.
While this worry is valid, it is unlikely that the impact of these risks will
be su ciently great to render the deliberative benefits provided by trustees
inadequate (such that the overall epistemic e cacy of liberal trusteeship
would never be su ciently great to justify a deviation from political equal-
ity). This is for the following reasons.
First of all, we saw that most decisions in democracy are not subject
to democratic oversight, as citizens can only focus on a limited number of
issues at a time.31 This will remain the case in liberal trusteeship. But
whereas this is problematic for democracy, as it leaves most policy issues
potentially vulnerable to the ideological fixations of the current government,
it is advantageous for liberal trusteeship, because it significantly reduces the
aforementioned risks. Insofar as an issue does not attract citizens’ attention,
citizens will be correspondingly less likely to hold strong views on that issue,
and hence less likely to knowingly vote for candidates with strong biases on
that issue. Or, at least they will be correspondingly less likely to make
electoral decisions on the basis of any strong views they might hold on that
issue, and hence less likely to purposefully vote for candidates with strong
biases on that issue. Thereby, there will also be less incentive for politicians
to persevere with bad manifesto pledges irrespective of what criticisms may
be raised again them, and less incentive to leverage those issues for partisan
and political gain.
In that regard, our earlier analysis on how trustees and parliamentarians
are likely to interact with one another in isolation, which ignored any impact
30See section (§3.3c).
31See section (§3.3a).
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that citizens may have on the political process, is not utopian or irrelevant.
Quite the contrary, it is an analysis that applies to most policy issues, at
least to some degree. There will exist some issues with regards to which
citizens’ views will constitute an electoral irrelevance, in which case our ear-
lier analysis will apply fully. And with regards to most other issues citizens’
views will have only a limited impact on parliamentarians’ motivations and
thinking, in which case our earlier analysis will apply to correspondingly
smaller or greater degrees.
Second, turning to policy issues that the citizenry will be focused on, the
mere existence of trustee committees will provide citizens with credible and
easily identifiable information about who are the (likely) experts on a given
matter. This will likely decrease the risk that citizens who are earnestly
willing to inquire openly and vigorously will misidentify the relevant “ex-
perts”, or that they will unjustifiably place greater faith in individuals of
high societal status who are otherwise ill-equipped to determine what ought
to be done.
Third, free media will ensure that public debate will reap some of the
benefits of deliberation between trustees and parliament. In democracy,
high-quality arguments—by which I mean arguments reflecting an epistem-
ically privileged perspective—are sometimes (if not oftentimes) distorted
or lost amidst the confusion of low-quality arguments made by politicians,
activists, and other actors, who earnestly believe they have inquired su -
ciently into the matter or who otherwise seek to deceive and shape public
perceptions to their favour. To be sure, it is possible for someone to navigate
this confusion and manage to inquire openly and vigorously. But aside the
time and e↵ort required for this, people’s general tendency to selectively ex-
pose themselves to sources they already agree with makes this all the more
di cult.
Citizens in trusteeship will still be able to expose themselves selectively
to what they already agree with. But this handicap will likely a✏ict fewer
citizens and to a lesser degree. This is because political reporting will be
in great part focused on the deliberative proceedings between trustees and
parliament. This will directly, and in a very clear manner, expose citizens
to the high-quality arguments put forward by trustees sponsoring a bill and
those dissenting against it, so it will be correspondingly more di cult for
high-quality arguments to be distorted or lost amidst the confusion of low-
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quality arguments. (In any case, this risk could be further mitigated through
institutional design.32 For example, the media could be regulated so that
all political reports contain a balanced summary of parliamentary debate,
in addition to the reporter’s personal view. As noted earlier, such reforms
could also be enacted in democracy, so they would not benefit trusteeship
exclusively.)
Crucially, insofar as citizens will have less room to expose themselves se-
lectively to their preferred side of the argument, they will also be less likely
to become a✏icted by the other handicaps that a↵ect group deliberative be-
haviour. For example, as noted earlier,33 selective exposure exacerbates the
risk that political discourse will take place within homogeneous groupings,
which would make these groupings correspondingly more likely to strengthen
their credence in their prior beliefs, which could in turn foster a stronger
sense of in-group identity, which could then lead to further entrenchment of
prior beliefs. By diminishing the risk of selective exposure, one diminishes
the other risks as well.
Fourth, and last, the political landscape might look distinctly di↵erent
from today’s. The left-right divide will surely continue to exist, but its im-
portance could well be diminished. New major political parties could emerge
that would campaign on a platform to scrutinise trustees and help them im-
prove their proposals, whatever these proposals might be. Although the
angle from which these proposals would be scrutinised might well fall within
the left-right spectrum, voters supporting such parties would in principle
commit themselves to compromise and open and vigorous inquiry. To that
extent, the new political landscape could diminish the risk that parliamen-
tarians will be biased or that they will persist with bad manifesto policies.
This is only a hypothesis at this stage, but it is worth bearing in mind.
In conclusion, it is highly unlikely that the impact of citizens in political
life will be su ciently negative to ensure beyond qualified doubt that liberal
trusteeship could not possibly yield su ciently great epistemic benefits to
justify a deviation from political equality. Quite the contrary, it is likely that
citizens will be less confused, less biased, and less militant in trusteeship than
they are in democracy.
32And it ought to be. But this discussion is for another time.
33See p. 117.
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(4.1e) In this last subsection, I wish to clarify the non-egalitarian and in-
stitutional nature of the preliminary model.
The preliminary model relies on a division of cognitive labour between
trustees and parliamentarians. Trustee committees specialising in F will be
exclusively vested with the power to draft laws about F, and then parliament
will be exclusively vested with the power to reject those drafts or enact them
into law.
On account of this, a democrat could note that modern democracies rely
on a sophisticated division of cognitive labour too, one between parliamen-
tarians, specialist parliamentary committees, and professional civil servants
whose specialist knowledge and skills rival the best that trustees could at-
tain. Insofar as the institutional structures of trusteeship and democracy
are so similar, the democrat could then question whether liberal trusteeship
would have any practical advantages that could enable it to outperform
democracy.
But the similarities should not be allowed to obscure the di↵erences.
First of all, the civil service bureaucracy is not a core constitutional feature
of democracy; democracies are at liberty to abolish it. Trustee committees
are an integral part of liberal trusteeship. Second, unlike trustee committees,
the members of specialist parliamentary committees charged with drafting
most legislation in democracy need not be (and generally aren’t) special-
ists in that area; the members are parliamentarians, that is to say, laymen.
Similarly, unlike trustees, civil servants in democracy need not have sys-
tematically inquired vigorously into diverse views on the matter (and they
often have not, especially in democracies where the civil service is politically
neutral and meritocratic in name only34). The same holds for the advisors
that politicians can choose to selectively expose themselves to. Third, and
most significantly, parliament in democracy has the prerogative to ignore
and override the advice of the civil service. The political dynamic in the
preliminary model precludes that.
To be sure, I already mentioned how a democrat could retreat from re-
ality and reserve authority and legitimacy instead for a “reformed” model
of democracy only, one in which specialist policy-makers in the mould of
trustees would be empowered to draft laws and then parliament would be
34For evidence of politicised bureaucracies see, e.g., Rouban, “The Politicisation of the
Civil Service”, or Meyer-Sahling, “Civil Service Reform in Post-Communist Europe”.
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legally obliged to inquire vigorously into those drafts, before enacting them
or opting to directly adopt its own laws. But I already argued how this
reformed model would still be likely to perform worse than liberal trustee-
ship.35
The question, then, is whether the preliminary model of liberal trustee-
ship contains su cient non-egalitarian elements to qualify as non-democratic
overall. Recall that democracy is a political system in which almost all of
political power is ultimately subordinate to the will of the majority. While
certain limits on the will of the majority are (morally) justified, as they
demarcate the legal conditions that are necessary for a system to be demo-
cratic, there are only so many limits that can be imposed before a system
ceases to be democratic.36
On account of that definition, I submit that the power of trustees—who
will be unelected—clearly exceeds the kind of non-egalitarian powers that are
compatible with democracy. This is because trustees will have full control of
the legislative agenda and no law will change without their approval. Their
powers will not be ultimately subordinate to the body politic, as parliament
will have no legal means to control what bills trustees may choose to put
forward.
(4.1f) To summarise, I propose that (unelected) trustees on F be exclusively
vested with the power to draft laws on F and that parliament be exclusively
vested with the power to either reject those drafts or enact them into law.
This is only a preliminary model of liberal trusteeship that does not account
for the risks that trustees will be biased or corrupt (§5.1), that does not
examine how the qualifying criteria for trustees ought to be selected (§4.2),
and that does not examine whether the clear separation of power between
trustees and parliament is always justified (§4.3). As we come to examine
these questions, I will propose some changes to the preliminary model.
In addition, it should be noted that our discussion ignored a series of in-
stitutional design issues. For example, it did not examine under what terms
trustees from di↵erent committees ought to cooperate when a given pol-
icy question lies in the intersection of their di↵erent fields of specialisation;
it did not examine how parliament would cope with the flood of propos-
35See section (§4.1c), p. 137 onwards.
36See section (§I.1d).
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als submitted for consideration from each di↵erent committee; how many
members it is practical for a committee to have in case too many citizens
qualify as trustees on a given field; how many trustee committees can one
be a member of; or how many o cially recognised fields of specialisation
(and thus how many di↵erent committees) ought to exist in the first place.
There is no space to delve into these matters here but, by way of brief com-
ment, I hold that they merely present a social engineering challenge, not an
insurmountable obstacle that can overturn the case for liberal trusteeship.
Nonetheless, the above should not distract us from the core epistemic
virtues of the preliminary model. Insofar as trustees will be more likely than
laymen to hold epistemically privileged views, then government in trustee-
ship will be less vulnerable to the epistemic shortcomings of democracy. The
rest of the thesis will largely turn on the antecedent of this conditional.
4.2 The selection of qualifying criteria
The aim of this section will be to examine who ought to be vested with the
power to set the criteria for qualifying someone as a trustee.
Recall that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the polit-
ical system that strikes the best balance between the qualified demands of
the competence principle and any qualified demands in favour of political
equality. On account of this, my defence of liberal trusteeship is grounded
on the idea that trustees will furnish the political process with su ciently
great epistemic benefits, such that a deviation from political equality can be
justified.
This means that my defence is partly contingent on the ability of liberal
trusteeship to employ su ciently good qualifying criteria to select su -
ciently competent trustees, such that the promised su ciently great epis-
temic benefits will materialise. Earlier, I did examine the guiding prin-
ciple that should underpin any good criteria for selecting trustees. This
was principle (B1), which e↵ectively states that someone should qualify as
a trustee on F if she has inquired, and continues to inquire, significantly
more openly and significantly more vigorously into F than the average lay
person—irrespective of what conclusions she may have drawn on the mat-
ter.37
But this immediately raises the question of who will be responsible for
37See section (§4.1a).
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specifying all the di↵erent criteria that need to be employed in each di↵erent
field of specialisation in order to fulfil principle (B1). One major worry
here is that there can exist reasonable disagreement about what criteria
are best or necessary to qualify someone as a trustee on F. Indeed, even
if this disagreement could somehow be resolved today, it could re-emerge
in the future, as current criteria might need to be updated in response to
new experience and evidence. If this disagreement cannot be addressed in
terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, then the objectionableness
of vesting trustees with non-egalitarian powers will become correspondingly
more pronounced. By extension, it will be correspondingly more di cult
to establish whether liberal trusteeship can yield su ciently great epistemic
benefits to justify a deviation from political equality.
In what follows, I argue that neither trustees nor parliament should be
granted the power to set any of the qualifying criteria (§4.2a). Rather, I
argue that this power, or more accurately the power to approve or reject
proposed changes to current qualifying criteria, ought to lie with jury courts
(§4.2b).
Note that my analysis below does not account for the risk that good
selection criteria might fail to ensure that trustees will have inquired openly
and vigorously into the matter. Trustees might fail to do so when they
are biased and unwilling to revise their views, be it consciously or subcon-
sciously, or even when they are corrupt and merely pretending to engage
vigorously into the matter. To repeat, I address this issue next chapter.38
(4.2a) Let us examine first whether parliament or trustees on F should be
empowered to set the qualifying criteria for selecting trustees on F.
Beginning from trustees, there is a case to be made for granting them
that power. Trustees are more likely than laymen to have an epistemically
privileged perspective on their field of specialisation, so it is possible that
they will know better how the current selection process can be improved or
what criteria need to be updated to reflect new developments in their fields.
But this option ought to be rejected. The first problem is that trustees
could become sclerotic. Insofar as they would not be subject to external
oversight, they could fail to scrutinise their current practices su ciently
vigorously. As a result, even if we accept that the majority of current
38See section (§5.1).
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trustees will hold epistemically privileged views about their field’s current
needs, they could end up holding inadequate views about their field’s future
challenges. The second problem is that the majority of trustees is very
likely, but not guaranteed, to have an epistemically privileged perspective on
their fields. As noted earlier, this means that the majority of trustees will
rarely, but rarely nonetheless, hold worse beliefs than laymen.39 When that
happens, there is a risk that trustees will want to alter the qualifying criteria
in a way that could bias the selection process in favour of those beliefs, in
which case it would become correspondingly more likely that these beliefs
will be perpetuated in future trustee committees.
Notably, well-intentioned errors are not the only factors that may give
rise to these problems. It is also possible that trustees could deliberately
attempt to entrench a particular ideology, in full knowledge that this is in
violation of principle (B1).
Now, there is also the option of vesting the criteria-setting power in
parliament instead. But this is an even more problematic proposition, prin-
cipally because parliament will also be at a risk of misusing that power to
favour a particular ideology. It could do so out of bias, or in order to serve
political and partisan interests. In e↵ect, it could use this power to control
the composition of trustee committees, thereby undermining the whole point
of liberal trusteeship. This option, therefore, ought to be rejected too.
(4.2b) Another option would be to vest the criteria-setting power with the
courts or, more accurately, to empower the courts to adjudicate whether the
qualifying criteria currently used should be changed in the way proposed by
plainti↵s. This power could be granted either to judges or to juries.
Note that all citizens should be able to act as plainti↵s, as this option
would otherwise court qualified disagreement about the criteria that should
determine who will be or will not be allowed to act as a plainti↵. This would
then merely push the question of who should decide the relevant criteria one
level further.
The option to vest judges with this power would remain, epistemically
speaking, problematic. On the one hand, suppose that the appointment of
judges would have to be confirmed by parliament, by trustees, or by some
combination thereof. In that case, there is a material risk that confirmation
39See p. 127.
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hearings could become politicised, with parliamentarians and trustees vying
to appoint candidates that share their views, biases, or political goals. On
the other hand, the risk of politicised hearings could be diminished if judges
were to be confirmed by juries or citizen assemblies. But this would not
diminish the risk that judges could be biased and could attempt to favour a
particular ideology. Hence, while this option is probably preferable to vest-
ing the criteria-setting power to trustees and parliamentarians, it is worth
examining whether there exist better alternatives.
This leaves us with granting the criteria-adjudicating power to juries. In
current judicial practice, juries are generally required to reach their verdicts
unanimously or by supermajority. In this context, my proposal is that juries
exercise their criteria-adjudicating powers by simple majority.
Juries have certain features that will not only mitigate the risks of bias
and undue favouritism towards a particular ideology, but also ensure that,
over time, decisions will be of su ciently high standard:
First, the vetting process for selecting jurors ensures that juries will
likely be more impartial and less biased than parliamentarians, trustees, and
possibly even judges (especially when judges are appointed after politicised
confirmation hearings).
As noted earlier, the vetting process in current judicial practice is quite
basic; it focuses on the juror’s criminal record and on whether they have any
personal connections to those involved in the trial.40 And this is the limit
we have to work with. The epistemic case for liberal trusteeship cannot rely
on a more stringent vetting process, such as one that tests whether jurors
are biased with respect to the question at hand. This is because any such
process would have to rely on specific claims about what is objectively right
or wrong, and would thus court qualified disagreement.41
Nevertheless, even if jurors ought not be tested for specific biases, it
would remain acceptable to disqualify jurors on the basis of their personal
connections to the case at hand. In this context, “personal connections” can
constitute any public action that candidate jurors might have taken prior
to the trial in favour of or against the revisions proposed by plainti↵s. For
example, if someone is a member of a lobbying group that campaigns for
the kind of changes that jurors will be called to adjudicate on, then he can
40See, e.g., Crown Prosecution Service, “Jury Vetting: Challenging Jurors”.
41Recall that epistemic theories ought not be grounded on such claims; see p. 12.
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be disqualified from serving on that case.
To be sure, such measures cannot ensure that jurors will have no biases
whatsoever, but they will protect against such biases to a much greater de-
gree than the option of empowering parliamentarians, trustees, and judges,
to set the qualifying criteria.
Second, the probability that jurors will be less biased than parliamen-
tarians, trustees, and possibly even judges, is further increased by the fact
that they are selected at random. Random selection will all but ensure that
juries will be a microcosm of the citizenry. Some jurors will be motivated
to deliver verdicts along ideological lines, even if they do not o cially be-
long to a political party, the same way that some citizens are motivated to
vote along ideological lines during an election. But other jurors will be less
motivated to do so, the same way that independent voters are willing to
swing behind any party that puts forward (what appears to them as) the
best agenda.
Third, jurors serve on one case at a time and usually on only one case over
a lifetime, so they will have no incentive to act out of political expediency.
Unlike parliamentarians, jurors will not need to campaign for re-election
in the near future. Unlike trustees, jurors are not at risk of losing their
trustee qualification in case the qualifying criteria are revised in undesirable
ways. And unlike judges, there is no risk that jurors will have been appointed
through politicised confirmation hearings, so there is no risk that they might
owe allegiance to specific interests.
Fourth, the fact that juries serve on one case at a time additionally
renders them likely to inquire more vigorously into the case, at least in com-
parison to parliamentarians and trustees. Trustees will already be tasked
with drafting legislative proposals, and parliament will already be tasked
with evaluating these proposals. If they were empowered to set the quali-
fying criteria, there is a risk that the political process would be overloaded.
This risk is avoided with juries.
Fifth, the fact that juries will not be allowed to set criteria, but will
be rather limited to adjudicating whether the specific revisions proposed by
plainti↵s ought to be accepted or not, reduces the epistemic burden that
jurors must shoulder. This is a positive, as jurors will generally be laymen
with respect to the case at hand. If juries (or citizen assemblies in the mould
of juries) were empowered to directly set criteria, then there would be a
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correspondingly higher risk that they could fail to inquire as vigorously into
the matter as they will be able with the much narrower task of adjudicating
on proposed revisions.
Sixth, and last, juries will be likely to make good decisions, by virtue of
being pushed during trial to weigh the merits and drawbacks of the argu-
ments put forward by plainti↵s and defendants.
Recall that the ability of a group to inquire openly and vigorously into
the matter is strongly a↵ected, amongst other things, by whether the group
is actively pushed to weigh all viewpoints in a balanced manner.42 Also,
recall the distinction between “directive” and “participative” leaders. Di-
rective leaders actively intervene to press any relevant objections against
the views defended by group members during inquiry. Participative leaders
actively intervene to solicit other members within a group to press (what
these members deem as) relevant objections against the views defended by
group members currently having the floor. Lastly, recall that (i) group per-
formance is maximised under directive leaders who hold correct beliefs prior
to deliberation; that (ii) groups placed under participative leaders achieve
the second best performance, irrespective of whether their leaders held cor-
rect or incorrect beliefs; and that (iii) groups placed under directive leaders
who hold incorrect beliefs prior to deliberation perform worst, and are the
only ones moderately more likely to decide wrongly than correctly.43
Ideally, one would want to place juries under a directive leader who holds
correct beliefs. And since those who know best how the criteria for selecting
trustees on F should change are probably those who are already trustees
on F, it is tempting to think that trustees on F should be empowered to
direct any jury deliberation on the matter. (To clarify, juries would be free
to overrule the advice of trustees, for otherwise trustees would control what
revisions can be made. I have already argued against this.) But while I have
defended the value of enabling trustees to assume a directive leadership role
in a parliamentary context, this is not desirable here.
This is because the views of current trustees can have a magnifying ef-
fect on whether future trustees will continue to hold epistemically privileged
views or not. As noted earlier,44 if trustees on F hold worse beliefs than
42See finding (F4), p. 113.
43See p. 134.
44See p. 147.
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laymen, and the criteria are altered in a way that could bias the selection
process in favour of those beliefs, then it is correspondingly more likely that
these beliefs will be perpetuated in future trustee committees. E↵ectively,
this acts as a negative feedback into the whole process of selecting trustees.
And if too many of these negative feedback events take place—which, statis-
tically speaking, is bound to happen over the long run—then future trustees
will be unable to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective relative to
laymen, or at least unable to acquire one as often as my defence of liberal
trusteeship presupposes.
For this reason, and in light of finding (iii) above, trustees on F ought
not be granted a directive leadership role during trials. On the occasions
when trustees will hold worse beliefs than jurors, the jury can be led to make
worse decisions than it would have made otherwise, and the negative e↵ect
of these bad decisions can become magnified over time.
It should be noted, however, that the adversarial nature of trials will en-
sure that juries will benefit from a participative leadership of sorts. Plainti↵s
and defendants, who could include trustees and other citizens, will be sum-
moned to defend their position on why the criteria ought or ought not change
a certain way, and this will e↵ectively push jurors to weigh the merits and
drawbacks of each side’s arguments in an open and vigorous manner. The
views of trustees on the matter will not be ignored.
This completes my analysis of the advantageous features of juries. The
question remains, then, whether juries will adjudicate su ciently well, such
that the qualifying criteria will be su ciently good to select su ciently
competent trustees (so that liberal trusteeship can yield su ciently great
epistemic benefits to justify a deviation from political equality).
There is no particular reason to think not. To be sure, there is great
vagueness about what criteria are best or correct. But, as noted earlier,45
principle (B1) is of utmost importance as it demarcates the boundaries of
what criteria are admissible, much like the way rights theory demarcates the
boundaries of what legal rights are admissible. Crucially, it stipulates that
(a) the criteria for selecting trustees ought to be procedural, namely they
ought not be sensitive to the specific beliefs of aspiring candidates; and that
(b) trustees ought to have dedicated significant time inquiring openly and
vigorously into their fields of specialisation.
45See p. 128.
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While it is nigh on impossible to determine the best criterion that will
fulfil these conditions for each di↵erent field, they are simple enough to
expect juries to adjudicate su ciently well on what criteria are the better
ones. No proof can be o↵ered that they would, at least not at this point, and
if it were shown that they would not, then the case for liberal trusteeship
could collapse.
But, to repeat, the above conditions are simple enough. They do not
require jurors to know what is right and wrong, or best and worst. They
merely require jurors to identify what steps one would need to take in order
to inquire openly and vigorously into F. Strictly speaking, this is a very
simple task: candidate trustees would have to engage with each and every
single objection raised against their beliefs. For example, suppose that a
climate scientist argues that carbon emissions need to be cut, and that
someone counters that there is no need for this because Martians will come to
the rescue. Strictly speaking, someone would have, amongst other things, to
engage with this objection and inquire into its merits and drawbacks before
qualifying as a trustee on climate science, such as writing papers debunking
any evidence cited in support of expected Martian assistance.
Of course, candidate trustees cannot possibly a↵ord the time to inquire
into each and every objection, so juries will have to adjudicate on what com-
promises will have to be made. The law could even help juries in their work,
by stipulating that candidate trustees inquire into any objections taken seri-
ously by, say, more than 3% of the population. These questions are outside
our current scope. My point is that the criteria-adjudicating task is not so
complex as to doubt whether jurors can perform su ciently well in it.
Before closing, it is worth stressing the probabilistic nature of my argu-
ment. The democrat could easily point to worst-case scenarios where the
citizenry will be so biased about a given issue, such that jurors, who will
reflect those biases, will consistently decide to change the criteria in wrong
or undesirable ways. In such scenarios, trustees will be unlikely to hold
epistemically privileged views relative to laymen. But the likelihood of such
scenarios should not be exaggerated. In most cases, biases subside under the
weight of open and vigorous inquiry. So, where the general population might
be moderately biased and inadequately informed about a given matter, the
inquiry that takes place inside jury courts will likely, ceteris paribus, enable
jurors to perform their adjudicating duties su ciently competently (such
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that liberal trusteeship will be likely to yield su ciently greater benefits
than those democracy would have yielded by comparison).
We should also draw attention to an implication of my argument. In-
sofar as jury courts will be vested with criteria-adjudicating powers, it fol-
lows that liberal trusteeship will vary across di↵erent political communities.
Some communities will come up with better qualifying criteria than others,
and this will a↵ect the epistemic e cacy of trusteeship across di↵erent com-
munities. But this is not damnatory for liberal trusteeship, as our central
concern is with ensuring that, given a certain community, liberal trusteeship
will perform better than democracy would have performed. Comparisons
across di↵erent communities do not bear on the justification of trusteeship.
(4.2c) In conclusion, no one should have the power to determine the quali-
fying criteria for selecting trustees. Rather, jury courts ought to be vested
with the power to adjudicate whether or not current criteria should be re-
vised in the ways proposed by plainti↵s.
Note that my analysis ignored a series of institutional design issues, such
as how many levels of litigation ought to exist, what size should the jury be in
each level, or how fast juries ought to deliver their decisions. While there is
no space to address these matters here, by way of brief comment, I hold that
they merely present a social engineering challenge, not an insurmountable
obstacle to my argument.
Finally, note that although juries will e↵ectively act as an egalitarian
check on trustees, liberal trusteeship will continue to contain the kind of
non-egalitarian elements that render it non-democratic overall. Specifically,
unelected trustees will continue to have full control of the legislative agenda,
as juries will not control what trustees will believe or what bills they will
introduce to parliament.
4.3 The case for a parliamentary prerogative on ethics
The aim of this section will be to revise the preliminary model, by granting
parliament the prerogative, under certain conditions, to override trustees on
moral issues and directly pass its own laws regulating moral matters.
The preliminary model’s clear separation of the power to draft laws from
the power to enact them is fundamentally grounded on the idea that trustees
are likely to hold epistemically privileged views, by virtue of inquiring signif-
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icantly more openly and vigorously into the matter than laymen. This leaves
the preliminary model vulnerable to the following line of attack. One could
argue that no one can acquire an epistemically privileged perspective in cer-
tain fields of specialisation, no matter how openly and vigorously he inquires
into those fields. Or, that no one can acquire a su ciently privileged per-
spective to justify the kind of powers granted to trustees in the preliminary
model. Or, at least that open and vigorous inquiry is far from su cient to
furnish oneself with such a perspective, such that we can never know which
trustees will hold epistemically privileged views and which won’t. One could
then object that there is no epistemic case for having trustees in those fields
of specialisation.
In what follows, I concede that this line of attack becomes especially
pressing when applied to ethics, as it threatens to undermine the rationale
for having any trustees altogether (§4.3a). In response, I note that inso-
far as there is no argument proving or disproving beyond qualified doubt
whether open and vigorous inquiry can furnish oneself with an epistemically
privileged moral perspective, then, in the context of epistemic theorising,
political systems ought to be designed in a way that accommodates (to
some degree) the implications of both arguments. To that e↵ect, I propose
that parliament be granted, under certain conditions, the prerogative to
override trustees on moral matters and directly pass its own laws regulat-
ing moral matters (§4.3b). Lastly, I discuss the possibility that parliament
could misuse this prerogative to render trustees irrelevant (§4.3c), as well as
why there ought not to exist any similar prerogatives for trustees to override
parliament on technical questions (§4.3d).
To clarify, recall our distinction between political morality and non-
political morality. The former consists of what is obligatory and rightful
for the State and for citizens in their political lives, while the latter consists
of all other moral prescriptions. Also, recall that political morality may
bear on ordinarily non-moral questions, due to moral creep. For instance, if
political morality determines capitalism to be unjust without qualification,
then the State morally ought to adjust its macroeconomic policies, even
if macroeconomic theory shows that capitalism is preferable on purely eco-
nomic terms.46 Below, “ethics” and “morality” will refer to moral principles
only, be it political or non-political ones, and not to what moral duties may
46See section (§I.1c).
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arise from those principles in ordinarily non-moral contexts.
(4.3a) The aforementioned line of attack becomes especially pressing when
applied to ethics. For one, reasonable people, and indeed reasonable people
who have inquired vigorously into the matter, subscribe to the idea that
morality does not admit expertise. While expertise demarcates a stronger
concept than the “epistemically privileged perspective” of trustees, many of
the reasons raised against moral expertise can readily be adapted against
the idea of an “epistemically privileged moral perspective”.47
To mention a few, the possibility of moral expertise (or the possibility of
correctly identifying the moral experts) has variously been attacked on the
grounds that there exists pervasive disagreement amongst laymen and moral
theorists alike about what is right;48 that there is no moral knowledge, or
at least that moral statements are subjective and relative;49 or that pur-
ported moral experts cannot possess special knowledge since they ground
their views on the same intuitions as laymen.50 It is not our task to examine
the soundness of such arguments. What matters is that they are reasonable
to hold. It is also clear that they can be adapted against the idea of an
“epistemically privileged moral perspective”.
Worse, considering that there is moral creep in many, if not most, (ordi-
narily non-moral) policy questions, then the attack against moral expertise
threatens to unravel the case for liberal trusteeship altogether. Insofar as
there is a moral dimension in most policy areas, and insofar as morality does
not admit epistemically privileged perspectives, one could object that there
ought not to exist any trustees at all. This is because without an epistemi-
cally privileged perspective on the moral dimension of some question F, it is
impossible to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective on what ought
to be done about F altogether.
For example, suppose that the solution to climate change requires the
imposition of strict carbon emission limits, which will result in a number
of industrial workers becoming unemployed and struggling financially. This
shows that a strategy for tackling climate change must address the moral
question of how much financial pain is permissible to inflict on the living
47To recall the di↵erence between experts and trustees, see p. 129.
48See, e.g., McGrath, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise”, pp. 91-99.
49For a review, see Gowans, “Moral Relativism”.
50See, e.g., Archard, “Why Moral Philosophers Are Not Moral Experts”, pp. 123-125.
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in order to spare the unborn from the consequences of climate change. If
trustees are unable to answer the latter question su ciently better than
laymen, then one could argue the case for having trustees on climate science
is put under strain.
Now, the fact that qualified viewpoints can doubt the existence of moral
expertise should not distract us from the fact that it is also qualified to assert
the contrary, namely the existence of moral expertise. Recent defences of
moral expertise have placed particular emphasis on the ability of moral the-
orists to dedicate copious amounts of time thinking about moral questions,
to immerse themselves in the subtleties of moral concepts and arguments,
and to examine the relevant facts whilst striving to o↵er coherent defences
of their views in the face of criticism. On this view, moral theorists are
more likely than laymen to develop nuanced moral views, despite the fact
that they base their views on the same intuitions or evidence as laymen.51
In e↵ect, this view emphasises the benefits of (what we have called) open
and vigorous inquiry.
The question of moral expertise, therefore, is similar to any other ques-
tion, in the sense that it is subject to the problem of disagreement. In that
respect, it is tempting to treat it no di↵erently than other questions. That
is, I could argue that there ought to exist trustees on moral matters, and
that any qualified objections against them will be balanced out by qualified
demands in favour of competent governance.
I concede, however, that the case for moral expertise (or the case for
an epistemically privileged moral perspective) is weaker than the case for
expertise in, say, physics. Or, at least, I concede that qualified opposition
to the former idea is significantly more severe than qualified opposition to
the latter.
In that regard, I concede that, no matter how great an epistemically
privileged perspective one can acquire about ethics through open and vigor-
ous inquiry, qualified doubts about one’s potential to do so will be too great
to be balanced out by any qualified viewpoints that assert the existence of
epistemically privileged moral perspectives. As such, these qualified doubts
will be too great to justify the kind of non-egalitarian powers granted to
trustees under the preliminary model, i.e., too great to grant trustees the
51See, e.g., Singer, “Moral Experts”; or Driver, “Moral Expertise: Judgment, Practice,
and Analysis”.
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exclusive power to introduce legislation on how moral matters ought to be
regulated. Next, I examine where this leaves us.
(4.3b) Recall that epistemic theories seek to ground authority and legiti-
macy on a political system’s e↵ectiveness at implementing political morality,
whatever political morality might consist in. Also, recall that in order to re-
main neutral between di↵erent conceptions of political morality, they cannot
rely on any specific claims about what political morality consists in, unless
these are acceptable to all qualified points of view.52
Insofar as the conclusions of an epistemic account hinge on a question
that is subject to qualified disagreement, the account must either assume one
side of the disagreement to be correct or, preferably, it must strike a compro-
mise that is acceptable to both sides, or at least that is reasonable given the
fact of disagreement. Put di↵erently, in the context of epistemic theorising,
political systems ought to be designed in a way that accommodates, to some
degree, the implications of both sides. This is, after all, what underlies my
defence of the preliminary model. The idea is that it would strike such a
compromise between qualified viewpoints that favour competent governance
and qualified viewpoints that favour political equality.
In the last subsection, I conceded that qualified opposition to the idea of
moral expertise (or the idea of an epistemically privileged moral perspective)
is too severe to vest trustees on ethics with the kind of exclusive law-drafting
powers provided by the preliminary model. Still, this should not distract
us from the fact that the assertion of moral expertise (or the assertion of
an epistemically privileged moral perspective) constitutes a qualified view-
point too. This means that a complete dismissal of the epistemic case for
having trustees on ethics will be subject to correspondingly severe qualified
opposition too.
As a compromise, I propose that there ought to exist trustees on moral
matters, to be selected on the basis of criteria adjudicated by jury courts,
and that they retain the initiative to introduce legislation regulating moral
matters. But I also propose that parliament be granted the prerogative to
override trustees and directly pass its own laws regulating a specific moral
question, under the conditions that:
(C1) Parliament has considered and rejected the proposals put forward
52See p. 12.
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by trustees on that specific question several times, be it in original or
amended form.
and that:
(C2) Jury courts approve a request by parliament to exercise that pre-
rogative, on a case-by-case basis.
For example, suppose that the current maximum prison sentence before the
possibility of parole is 40 years, that trustees specialising in criminal justice
want it reduced to 20, and that parliament wants it increased to 60. Under
the preliminary model, parliament would be empowered to veto any bills
introduced by trustees, but not to override trustees and directly increase
sentences to 60 years. On the compromise proposed here, parliament will
not only be empowered to veto trustee proposals, but will also acquire the
prerogative to override trustees and increase sentences to 60 years, if it has
examined and rejected the proposals favoured by trustees, say, three times;
and if it has received approval to do so by a jury court.
Condition (C1) renders liberal trusteeship essentially democratic with
respect to moral matters, as it vests the citizenry with ultimate control over
this policy area. (It is, in this sense, similar to the “reformed” model of
democracy discussed earlier, in which parliament would always be empow-
ered to override trustees.53)
Condition (C2) is proposed in order to mitigate the pathologies of par-
liamentary politics discussed earlier. Recall that juries are likely to be less
biased than parliamentarians, and that they are less likely to make deci-
sions on the basis of political expediency.54 This increases the likelihood
that their decisions will correspond to what is properly supported by open
and vigorous inquiry.
To be sure, moral questions are steeped in controversy, and this will a↵ect
the quality of jury deliberation. Earlier, I argued that juries can be relied
upon to adjudicate su ciently competently on how the criteria for selecting
trustees ought to change, partly on the grounds that this task is relatively
simple. This will not be the case for ethical questions. Jurors cannot be
relied upon to adjudicate su ciently competently on ethical questions, in the
53See p. 137.
54See p. 148.
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sense that they will be su ciently good at identifying the moral experts (if
there are any) or the moral truth (if there is any). Insofar as moral questions
are steeped in controversy, jurors will not be less likely than parliamentarians
to hold their beliefs too deeply to revise them in light of valid criticism. To
that extent, the likelihood that jury decisions will reflect the latest progress
of open and vigorous inquiry will not increase, relatively to parliament’s
decisions.
However, precisely because moral questions are steeped in controversy,
they are ripe for political manipulation. Recall that the use of language
in public discourse is key in moulding identities in ways that facilitate or
impede epistemically productive discourse.55 Insofar as a question is subject
to controversy and severe disagreement, it is more susceptible to language
that polarises public debate and divides citizens along ideological lines, than
it is to language that unites citizens.
The first problem with this is that politicians may seek to leverage that
divide, indeed cultivate it, for political or partisan goals. I do not deny that
politicians may advocate their views in earnest, or that they may do so after
having inquired openly and vigorously into the matter. But the dynamics of
controversial questions are such, that they increase the likelihood that par-
liamentarians who hold moderate views may publicly adopt more extreme
positions purely for the sake of political expediency. They may want to gain
further electoral advantage, or to prevent an electoral defeat in the face of
aggressive campaign tactics from opponents. It is such cases that concern
me here, as they reduce the likelihood that decisions on ethics will reflect
the latest progress of open and vigorous inquiry.
The second problem is that it becomes correspondingly more likely that
citizens will become biased and purposefully vote for biased candidates,
thereby decreasing the likelihood that parliamentary debate will meet the
standards of open and vigorous inquiry.
Now, jurors are drawn at random from the general population, so they
will reflect the biases of the general population. Nonetheless, to repeat, ju-
rors are subjected to a vetting process and they are significantly less likely to
act out of political expediency. This makes them somewhat less vulnerable
to the risks of political expediency and bias, notwithstanding the contro-
versial nature of ethical questions. Hence, the political process can benefit,
55See p. 116.
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epistemically speaking, if their approval is required before parliament can
exercise its prerogative to override trustees on moral matters.56
As an aside, note that in order for parliament to have any meaningful
powers to override trustees, it must additionally be empowered to demand
that trustees submit their proposals on a certain moral question for par-
liamentary consideration by a certain deadline, lest trustees opt to exercise
de facto control of the legislative agenda on moral matters by refusing to
submit any proposals at all. Likewise, parliament should also be empow-
ered to directly debate its own proposals, should trustees fail to meet such
a deadline.
Also, it is important to bear in mind that liberal trusteeship, like lib-
eral democracy, will function under a constitution that provides a series of
liberal protections to its citizens. This means that parliament will remain
subject to judicial oversight over the constitutionality of any laws regulat-
ing moral matters. The parliamentary prerogative to override trustees does
not render liberal trusteeship any more susceptible to illiberal regulation of
moral matters than liberal democracies are. (For the sake of argument, I
am assuming, following current judicial practice, that constitutional courts
would be constituted of judges, not juries.)
The question remains, then, whether the above proposal is an acceptable
or reasonable compromise between the views that deny and those that as-
sert the possibility of moral expertise (or the possibility of an epistemically
privileged moral perspective). It appears so.
From the perspective of those that deny them, the requirement to inquire
into the proposals put forward by trustees on moral matters is problematic,
as it places trustees on a directive leadership position,57 thus granting them
greater epistemic influence during parliamentary debate than deemed appro-
priate. But it is tempered by parliament’s prerogative to ultimately override
those trustees. The requirement to seek permission by a jury court is also
problematic, as it limits parliamentary powers for no good reason, but it is
56In passing, one might ask at this point why should there be a parliament in the
first place, and not delegate all parliamentary powers under trusteeship to jury courts
instead. The primary problem with this proposal is that jury courts cannot construct a
long-term, high-level political strategy. Jurors serve on one case at a time, while political
strategizing requires a degree of continuity in public service. There is also the question of
representation. Despite the many faults of democratic elections, they constitute a better
mechanism for expressing and setting collective goals than juries.
57To recall our discussion on directive leaders, see p. 134.
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tempered by the fact that juries are an egalitarian institution.
From the perspective of those who assert the possibility of moral ex-
pertise, the parliamentary prerogative to override trustees is problematic,
but it is tempered by the fact that parliamentary debate will still be likely
to reap some of the benefits that the directive leadership of trustees can
provide. The stipulation that jury courts grant permission to parliament is
also positive, as it provides an additional level of inquiry into the reasons
for which trustees oppose parliament’s proposals.
To clarify, I do not claim that whoever asserts the possibility of moral
expertise (or of an epistemically privileged moral perspective) is necessarily
committed to the competence principle, or necessarily supportive of liberal
trusteeship. Rather, my point is that insofar as it is qualified to demand that
government exercises its powers competently, and insofar as it is qualified
to assert the possibility of moral expertise, then the above compromise is
acceptable, in light of the fact that there is also severe qualified opposition
to the idea of moral expertise.
To summarise, I propose that the preliminary model be revised, so that
parliament be granted the prerogative, under conditions (C1) and (C2), to
override trustees on moral matters and directly pass its own legislation on
how to regulate these matters. Next, we can examine the dangers of this.
(4.3c) In what follows, I discuss the possibility that parliament will misuse
its prerogative to render trustees irrelevant.
I have argued that qualified opposition to the idea of moral expertise (or
to the idea of an epistemically privileged moral perspective) is severe enough
to warrant granting parliament a prerogative to override trustees on ethics.
But I still have not addressed the objection from moral creep. To repeat,
one could argue that insofar as there is moral creep in many, if not most,
(ordinarily non-moral) policy questions, then it is impossible to determine
what ought to be done without addressing the moral component of those
(ordinarily non-moral) questions. Hence, on account of this, he could argue
that parliamentary prerogatives to override trustees ought to be extended
for all policy questions, not be limited to ethics only.
On a first level, the objection from moral creep is easy to address. Insofar
as there is a moral component in most policy areas, and insofar as there
is a technical component, then each component can be treated di↵erently.
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Parliament can retain a prerogative on the moral component, and trustees
specialising in the technical component can retain the exclusive power to
draft legislation on what ought to be done, within the moral limits stipulated
by the law.
To return to our earlier example, suppose that trustees specialising in
climate science determine that carbon emissions need to be cut drastically in
order to stop the rise of sea levels and the proliferation of natural disasters.
This is the technical component of climate policy. However, also suppose
that any emission cuts will result in a number of industrial workers becom-
ing unemployed. Therefore, in order to determine whether emission cuts
are on balance appropriate, it is necessary to address the moral question of
how much financial pain can be inflicted on the living in order to prevent
the consequences of climate change. This is the moral component of climate
policy. Trustees specialising in the technical component do not need to de-
termine an answer to the questions immanent in the moral component. All
they need is a determination of the moral limits within which they ought to
operate. So, suppose that parliament debates with trustees specialising in
the moral component of climate policy about what consequences are permis-
sible, and that they determine that one million unemployed is an acceptable
consequence, but not more. Trustees specialising in the technical component
would then be (legally) obliged not to put forward any proposals for tackling
climate change that would result in more than a million unemployed, even
if these proposals are less drastic than the ones they originally envisioned.
On a second level, however, the objection from moral creep highlights
the di culty of determining the (legally recognised) boundary between the
moral and technical component of a given policy area.
It is clear that the power to set this boundary ought not be vested
exclusively in trustees or another non-egalitarian authority, as that would
presuppose that these authorities possess expertise about what considera-
tions are morally relevant or irrelevant. This would trigger severe qualified
opposition from those who deny the possibility of moral expertise (or of an
epistemically privileged moral perspective). Thus, the boundary between
the moral and technical component ought to be determined through the
same process that all other moral questions will be handled; or, more accu-
rately, the boundary will be directly demarcated by whatever laws regulate
moral matters.
4. THE CORE ARGUMENT 163
And insofar as parliament will have a prerogative, under conditions (C1)
and (C2), to enact its own laws regulating moral matters, the boundary can
potentially be whatever parliament determines it to be. To be sure, parlia-
ment will remain subject to judicial oversight over the constitutionality of
its laws, so its powers will not be limitless. Beyond that, however, the legally
recognised boundary of morality under liberal trusteeship will ultimately be
as fluid as it is under liberal democracy.
For example, suppose that trustees on healthcare determine that stem
cell research is necessary to enable scientists to find a cure for dementia.
If parliament is against stem cell research on the moral basis of upholding
the right to life of the unborn, and if it fulfils (C1) and (C2), it can then
pass legislation outlawing stem cell research, e↵ectively shifting the (legally
recognised) boundary of morality into an area that was previously regarded
(in the eyes of the law) as belonging properly to the technical component of
medical research.
Now, when parliament opts to override trustees on moral matters, this
can be epistemically beneficial. Suppose that those who deny the possibil-
ity of moral expertise (or of an epistemically privileged moral perspective)
are right; in that case, parliament’s views on morality will be as equally
privileged as those of trustees, so there was no reason to have had trustees
on ethics to begin with. Even from the perspective of those who assert the
possibility of moral expertise, parliament might still be right to override
trustees, as it might have held better views on the matter.
But there are risks too. The fluidity of the (legally recognised) boundary
of morality creates the possibility that parliament will misuse its prerogative
to expand the boundary beyond what is (metaethically) moral and into what
properly belongs to the technical component of policy, thereby influencing or
even determining what precise policies will be adopted in instances it ought
not have been able to. It could do so (a) out of moral incompetence, but
also (b) out of intent to overstep its institutional role and determine what
ought to be done in the technical component of policy. Either way, when
that happens, the political role of trustees is diminished.
For example, suppose that the trustees specialising in the technical com-
ponent of fiscal policy determine correctly that raising taxes is the most ef-
fective way (macroeconomically speaking) to fund the current budget deficit.
This could be because lower taxes would not generate enough economic ac-
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tivity to o↵set the lost tax revenue, let alone fund the budget deficit. Also,
suppose that trustees specialising in the moral component of fiscal policy
(that is, in distributive justice) consider the tax plan morally permissible,
and that they are right. A morally incompetent parliament could erro-
neously consider higher taxes to be morally reprehensible, and thus seek to
exercise its prerogative on ethics to outlaw any further increases in taxes.
Meanwhile, another parliament could accept the moral permissibility of rais-
ing taxes but erroneously think that lowering taxes is the better fiscal option,
notwithstanding the view of trustees on the matter—this parliament would
be incompetent with respect to the technical, not moral, component of fis-
cal policy. According to the way liberal trusteeship is intended to work, the
latter parliament would be entitled to reject any trustee proposals for rais-
ing taxes, but not to enact its own legislation lowering taxes. Yet, it could
seek to overstep its institutional role by exercising its prerogative on ethics
to legislate a bogus (even by its own lights) moral requirement that taxes
be lowered. In both cases, liberal trusteeship would fail to capitalise on
the epistemically privileged perspective of trustees, and would make instead
decisions that democracies would have made anyway.
To make matters worse, there is a possibility that parliament might
misuse its prerogative on ethics not occasionally, but systematically so. This
gives rise to two worries:
The first worry is that insofar as trustees can be systematically over-
ridden, and insofar as liberal trusteeship can systematically fail to perform
better than democracy, a deviation from political equality cannot ultimately
be justified. In that regard, trusteeship ought to be rejected.
In response, I would note that whenever parliament wrongly exercises
its prerogative to override trustees on a specific issue, and as a result liberal
trusteeship fails to outperform democracy, it does so precisely because it
reverts temporarily to political equality. So, while liberal trusteeship fails
to outperform democracy in that specific issue, it also does not deviate from
political equality with respect to that issue. The balance between compe-
tence and equality remains the same as in democracy. By the same token,
if parliament misuses its prerogative systematically, then liberal trusteeship
will be essentially democratic, and systematically so. One cannot appeal
to its non-egalitarian elements to attack its failure to perform better than
democracy.
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The second worry is that, insofar as trustees can be systematically over-
ridden, liberal trusteeship is in practice irrelevant, even if it strikes in theory
a better balance between competence and equality than democracy does.
Put di↵erently, liberal trusteeship will be non-egalitarian only to the extent
that the democratic body politic will permit it to be.
There is some truth to this. It is not logically impossible that a body
politic could be so incompetent, both with respect to the moral and technical
component of policy, such that its representatives in parliament would sys-
tematically misuse their prerogative to override trustees. However, I have
already argued that citizens are unlikely to be so biased, to the point of
rendering the epistemic case for trusteeship implausible. If anything, the
electorate is likely to be less so under trusteeship.58 In addition, we must
not exaggerate the risk that parliament will invoke bogus moral pretexts in
order to overstep its institutional role. For most people, moral beliefs create
a sense of duty. One must be utterly convinced that trustees specialising in
the technical component are dead wrong in order to justify in his mind a
moral duty to present a bogus pretext (i.e., lie about his moral principles)
to override those trustees.
For these reasons, parliament will be unlikely to systematically ignore
and override trustees. It would be amiss to describe liberal trusteeship as
pointless or irrelevant, or non-egalitarian government by democratic permis-
sion only. Its non-egalitarian nature is likely to play a central role in the
political process.
(4.3d) Before we close, it is worth asking whether trustees ought to enjoy
similar prerogatives vis-a`-vis the technical component of policy. That is,
whether they ought to be empowered to override parliament under certain
conditions and directly enact their proposals into law.
There is a case to be made for this. Earlier, I argued that the case
for moral expertise (or the case for an epistemically privileged moral per-
spective) is weaker than the case for expertise in, say, physics. Conversely,
it could be argued that the case for expertise in technical areas is strong
enough to warrant granting trustees the prerogative to override parliament.
Or, more plausibly, that the case for expertise in some technical areas, such
as civil engineering and climate science, is strong enough to warrant such
58See section (§4.1d).
166 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
prerogatives; this strategy would concede that the case for expertise in other
areas, such as economics and psychology, is not strong enough to warrant
such prerogatives.
But the problem with this proposal is that it raises the question of which
technical areas present su cient grounds to grant trustees the prerogative
to override parliament, and which ones do not. Presumably, the least ob-
jectionable option would be for jury courts to make that distinction, for
the reasons examined earlier. However, unlike the task of determining what
qualifying criteria ought to be employed for selecting trustees, the task of
distinguishing between technical areas that warrant a trustee prerogative to
override parliament and those that don’t is much harder.
It requires fine-grained knowledge of what is right and wrong, or true and
false. The complexity of the task means that juries could decide correctly
and empower trustees to override parliament in the areas where this is epis-
temically warranted, but also that they could decide wrongly and empower
trustees where this isn’t. As a consequence, qualified viewpoints could worry
that the epistemic damage done by false positives will not be outweighed
by the benefits of true positives. And since there is no way of establishing
whether this worry is true or not, it is also impossible to determine whether
liberal trusteeship would yield su ciently great epistemic benefits to justify
trustee prerogatives—that is, a complete deviation from political equality.
In any case, trustees could always introduce bills to grant themselves
full political authority over a given matter. If their case appears meritorious
enough to parliament, they will gain such powers, in the same manner that
institutions like the Bank of England are vested with full political authority
over certain areas of policy.
(4.3e) In conclusion, qualified opposition to the idea of moral expertise (or
to the idea of an epistemically privileged moral perspective) is too severe
to warrant granting trustees on ethics an exclusive power to introduce bills
regulating moral matters. As a compromise, I proposed to revise the pre-
liminary model with respect to ethics, such that parliament will acquire the
prerogative to override trustees and directly enact its own laws regulating
moral matters, under the conditions that it has considered and rejected the
proposals put forward by trustees several times, and that it has received
approval to do so by a jury court.
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Note that there are a series of interesting questions bearing on all of
this, such as whether the trustees specialising in the moral component of
a policy question should include, amongst others, those who specialise in
the technical component of that question, in the manner that doctors are
usually members of bioethics committees. We can set these aside here.
Conclusion: The intermediate model
The epistemic case for liberal trusteeship turns on whether it will yield,
on balance, su ciently great epistemic benefits to justify its deviation from
political equality.
This chapter has taken some of the steps that are necessary to estab-
lish the epistemic superiority of liberal trusteeship. For one, I have argued
that insofar as trustees will be more likely than laymen to hold epistemi-
cally privileged views about their fields of specialisation, then government in
trusteeship will be less vulnerable to the epistemic shortcomings of democ-
racy. Whether trustees will actually hold epistemically privileged views will
depend on (a) whether they are selected through good qualifying criteria,
and on (b) whether trusteeship can guard against the risk that trustees
might be biased or corrupted. The latter question is left for next chapter.
With regards to the former, I have argued that the qualifying criteria will
in all likelihood be su ciently good, insofar as they are determined by jury
courts. Or, more accurately, insofar as jury courts are empowered to ad-
judicate whether the criteria currently used should incorporate the changes
proposed by plainti↵s.
This chapter has also taken some steps towards ensuring that the devi-
ation of liberal trusteeship from political equality is acceptable. Firstly, in
order to mitigate any qualified objections against the non-egalitarian nature
of trusteeship, I proposed that parliament be vested with a prerogative to
override trustees on ethics and directly pass its own laws regulating moral
matters, under the conditions that it has considered and rejected the pro-
posals put forward by those trustees several times, and that it has received
approval to do so by a jury court. Secondly, the criteria-adjudicating powers
of jury courts will not only serve the epistemic function mentioned above,
but will also serve as an additional egalitarian check on trustees.
This brings us to the intermediate model of liberal trusteeship. Like the
preliminary model, it stipulates that any citizen can become a trustee on
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some policy area F, so long as she meets the relevant qualifying criteria set
by jury courts. It also stipulates that trustees on F be exclusively vested
with the power to draft laws about F, and that a democratically elected
parliament be exclusively vested with the power to enact those laws, or
reject them. Unlike the preliminary model, the intermediate model makes
an exception in the case of ethics, granting parliament the prerogative to
override trustees on ethics under the conditions described above.
Chapter 5
Liberal trusteeship: further considerations
The overarching aim of this and the last chapter is to show that liberal
trusteeship would be likely to exercise power su ciently more competently
than democracy, such that its deviation from political equality would be
justified.1 The intermediate model of liberal trusteeship developed in the last
chapter took some steps towards making this conclusion harder to resist.2
This chapter will seek to take the remaining steps.
Section (§5.1) investigates the risk that trustees will fail to acquire an
epistemically privileged perspective within their field of specialisation due
to systematic bias or corruption. In order to minimise this risk, I argue
that parliamentarians, even a minority of them, ought to be empowered
to sponsor members of demographic groups that are currently underrepre-
sented in a given trustee committee to go through the qualifying process
for that committee, so that trustees can be drawn from all backgrounds. In
addition, I argue that jury courts ought to be empowered to approve limited
adjustments to the composition of trustee committees, such that the biases
of trustees will be no di↵erent than the biases of the citizenry at large.
Section (§5.2) recounts the principal elements of liberal trusteeship and
argues that, on balance, it is hard to resist the conclusion that liberal trustee-
ship would indeed be likely to exercise power su ciently more competently
than democracy to justify the kind of deviation from political equality that
has been defended.
1For the reasons behind this aim, see last chapter’s introduction. Also, recall that
“competence” broadly denotes a capacity to draw logically valid conclusions about a given
question, in light of the available information and within the time frame demanded by a
given task; see p. 56.
2For a summary, see last chapter’s conclusion.
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5.1 Safeguards against trustee bias and corruption
The aim of this section will be to revise the intermediate model of liberal
trusteeship, in order to guard against the risk that trustees may become
biased or corrupt.
Recall that my defence of liberal trusteeship is partly contingent on
whether trustees will be su ciently competent on their field of speciali-
sation, such that liberal trusteeship can capitalise on their knowledge (in
order to exercise power su ciently more competently to justify its deviation
from political equality). Also, recall that someone ought to qualify as a
trustee on F if she has inquired, and continues to inquire, significantly more
openly and significantly more vigorously into F than the average lay person.
This stipulation follows from principle (B1) discussed last chapter, and is in-
tended to ensure that trustees on F will be more likely than laymen to hold
epistemically privileged views about F.3 Lastly, recall that whether trustees
will actually hold epistemically privileged views will depend on (a) whether
they are selected through good qualifying criteria, and on (b) whether the
political system can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or
corrupt.
Last chapter, I endeavoured to address risk (a).4 I did note, however,
that no matter how good the qualifying criteria might be, trustees might
still fail to inquire openly and vigorously into the matter. They could be
biased and unwilling to revise their views in light of valid criticism, be it con-
sciously or subconsciously, or they could be corrupt and merely pretending
to engage vigorously into the matter. When that happens, the likelihood
that trustees will be su ciently competent decreases, and the defence of
liberal trusteeship is put under strain.
In what follows, I seek to address this. To begin, I pinpoint the principal
causes that may lead trustees to become biased or corrupt (§5.1a), and then
propose some measures to safeguard against those causes or their negative
consequences (§5.1b). Lastly, I argue that some residual risks of bias and
corruption will always remain, but that they do not pose a fatal problem for
liberal trusteeship (§5.1c).
(5.1a) In order to identify the principal causes that may lead trustees to
3See section (§4.1a).
4See section (§4.2b).
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become biased or corrupt, it will help to recall two institutional features of
liberal trusteeship. On the one hand, I argued that trustees on non-moral
questions ought to be exclusively vested with the power to draft laws about
what ought to be done in their field of specialisation.5 I also argued that
even trustees on moral matters ought to retain the privilege of introducing
bills to parliament before the latter can override them and directly pass its
own legislation.6 On the other hand, I argued that the selection of trustees
ought to rely on procedural criteria, namely on criteria that are not sensitive
to the specific beliefs of aspiring candidates.7
In the light of these design aspects, we can point to three principal
dangers that might lead trustees to become biased or corrupt. Firstly:
(D1) The non-democratic powers and institutional privileges vested in
trustees could corrupt them and render them dismissive of lay citizens’
views, and perhaps even of lay citizens’ interests.
The first danger, then, is that trustees will fail to take into account any
valuable information held by laymen, or that they will evolve into an elite
that unjustly undermines laymen’s interests.
The second danger is related to an earlier objection I raised against
Brennan’s “restricted electorate”. Recall that I rejected his proposal partly
on the grounds that some of the most incompetent citizens also tend to
be amongst the most determined in furthering their political objectives,
and that they could be expected to put in the e↵ort necessary to pass the
State’s “competence exams” in order to become enfranchised. I had called
such citizens militant incompetents.8 This problem arises from the fact that
competence exams cannot test whether someone holds correct beliefs, but
merely that he knows what the o cial curriculum recognises as the correct
answer.
A similar danger applies to liberal trusteeship. Insofar as the qualifying
criteria for selecting trustees will be procedural, and will not test whether
or not candidate trustees hold correct beliefs, they will not disqualify can-
didates who are militant incompetents. Or, to put this in terms compatible
5See section (§4.1a).
6See section (§4.3b).
7See section (§4.2b).
8See section (§2.2a).
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with a pluralist epistemology, the selection process will not disqualify can-
didates who are too biased to respond to valid criticism. In that regard:
(D2) Militant incompetents could seek to infiltrate trustee committees
by attempting en masse to meet the procedural criteria for selecting
trustees and, thus, qualify as trustees on a given issue.
For example, climate sceptics could mobilise and seek to infiltrate the trustee
committee charged with drafting legislation on how to tackle climate change.
If they manage to meet the relevant qualifying criteria, it is possible that
climate sceptics could become overrepresented in that committee, and this
would most likely undermine the epistemic e cacy of liberal trusteeship.
To be sure, in order to qualify as a trustee, candidates will have to
expose themselves to diverse viewpoints and provide evidence that they
have vigorously inquired into any relevant criticisms (irrespective of whether
they were willing to heed those criticisms). In most cases, biases can be
expected to subside under the weight of such inquiry. In the case of militant
incompetents, however, this might hold true to a much lesser extent.
Moving on, the third danger is that:
(D3) The qualifying criteria for selecting trustees, despite their proce-
dural nature, might inadvertently favour candidates who share certain
biases about their field of specialisation, or even broader biases corre-
lated with their demographic background.
Note that “demographic background” here is used broadly to denote any
type of social factor that might explain statistical di↵erences in people’s
beliefs, such as socio-economic, religious, political, cultural, or ethnic back-
grounds.
For example, suppose that the e↵ects of climate change can be simulated
by three models, A, B, and C, and that the latter model is considered un-
orthodox and is espoused by only a slim minority of scientists. Also, suppose
that the qualifying criteria for selecting trustees on climate policy require
candidate trustees to inquire into the merits and drawbacks of A and B only,
because the jury courts charged with adjudicating on the matter decided so.9
9Bear in mind, professional scientists specialising in climate change need not be trustees
on climate policy (although they will likely be at an advantage when attempting to become
trustees, as they will know the technical aspect of climate policy well). Also, the views of
scientists on the matter create no legal obligation for jury courts to endorse them. But it
is plausible and reasonable that jury courts would have favoured A and B in this case.
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This means that someone could qualify as a trustee on climate policy with-
out having inquired into model C at all. There is a risk, then, that trustees
could systematically underrate C, even though that model could be better
than A and B.
Or, suppose that one of the criteria for selecting trustees on fiscal policy
requires candidates to spend ten years as economists in the Bank of England.
As a result, candidates might then be disproportionately influenced by the
economic theories that are dominant amongst economists in the Bank of
England, thereby making it di cult for them to judge the alternatives on
their independent merits.
Similarly, consider trustee committees specialising in criminal justice re-
form. The candidates who are willing to become trustees on that area might
share certain socio-economic characteristics that can a↵ect their judgement
on the matter. For example, they might be more likely to come from left-
leaning political circles or to be more empathetic towards the di culties that
criminals faced in their upbringing. This can lead them to place greater em-
phasis on the mitigating circumstances of a crime, and thus to introduce
bills on criminal justice reform that stipulate unduly lenient sentences.
The problem with danger (D3), then, is that the qualifying process for
selecting trustees might be implicitly sensitive to the specific beliefs of can-
didates, notwithstanding the procedural nature of the qualifying criteria.
This is because citizens who lack certain biases could either remain unin-
terested in becoming trustees, or could fail if they try, or could eventually
acquire these biases in the process. And since nothing guarantees that the
said biases will reflect true or correct beliefs, there is a risk that trustees will
fail to hold an epistemically privileged perspective on their field of special-
isation (or fail to hold a su ciently privileged one to justify the deviation
from political equality).
To clarify, I do not claim that the above risks are very likely to obtain.
If anything, they ought not be exaggerated. My point, rather, is similar to
the point I made when discussing moral expertise in the last chapter.10 I
concede that qualified viewpoints can worry about dangers (D1)-(D3) and
the e↵ect they can have on the ability of trustees to hold epistemically
privileged views about their fields of specialisation. As a result, I concede
that it becomes correspondingly more di cult to judge whether such worries
10Cf. p. 156.
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can be balanced out by qualified viewpoints that emphasise the epistemic
benefits of trusteeship and, as such, that it becomes correspondingly easier
to resist the conclusion that liberal trusteeship would yield su ciently great
epistemic benefits to justify its deviation from political equality. For this
reason, the case for liberal trusteeship will benefit if we can introduce some
safeguards against (D1)-(D3).
Before we examine what safeguards may be proposed, it is worth noting
that dangers (D1) and (D3) are intertwined with the risks highlighted in Es-
tlund’s demographic objection. Recall that Estlund levels his demographic
objection specifically against plural voting, namely the idea that the edu-
cated should be given more votes than the uneducated.11 But his objection’s
main points can also be levelled against the idea of vesting trustees with the
kind of non-democratic powers that I propose.
Estlund’s first point was that access to education is often correlated with
certain socio-economic factors. Even if the educated want to be impartial,
qualified viewpoints can worry that these factors could skew their views to
the detriment of the socio-economic groups underrepresented in education.
Similarly, one could argue that the candidates who are able and willing
to go though the trustee selection process will also be drawn from specific
demographic backgrounds.
Estlund’s second point was that, even if socio-economic factors were cor-
rected by, say, granting members of underrepresented groups free access to
education, one could still reasonably object that education instils into peo-
ple certain “empirically latent” biases. That is, the educated could remain
in favour of certain ideas and certain demographics, even if they originally
came from underrepresented groups. For example, trained economists might
exhibit a tendency to support free trade due to its e↵ects on the global
economy, all while failing to appreciate the adverse e↵ects that it has on the
working classes of advanced economies. They could do so even if they came
from a working class background themselves. Similarly, one could worry
that trustees will also acquire such “latent” biases over time.
Estlund’s third, and last, point was that, even if such “latent” biases
cannot be empirically proven, considering that the educated can claim not
to be biased when asked, one could reasonably object against plural voting
on conjectural grounds—the mere worry that the educated might harbour
11See p. 33.
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“latent” biases constitutes a qualified reason, according to Estlund, to reject
plural voting. Similarly, one could object to trusteeship on the conjectural
grounds that trustees might harbour such biases too.
In e↵ect, therefore, the demographic objection highlights the dangers
stated in (D1) and (D3). We can now examine what institutional safeguards
can mitigate the aforementioned worries.
(5.1b) In what follows, I propose two modifications that are aimed at pro-
tecting liberal trusteeship from the e↵ects of trustee bias and corruption, by
ensuring that the biases of trustees will be no di↵erent than the biases of
the citizenry at large. This way, any qualified worries about the biases of
trustees cannot be employed to attack the non-egalitarian nature of liberal
trusteeship.
The first modification specifically aims to draw trustees from diverse de-
mographic backgrounds, in order to mitigate the worry that trustees will be
biased in favour of a particular demographic group or a particular demo-
graphic group’s viewpoint:
(M1) Parliamentary minorities ought to be empowered to sponsor mem-
bers of demographic groups that are currently underrepresented in a
given trustee committee to go through the relevant selection process
for that committee.
To repeat, “demographic background” for our purposes broadly denotes all
types of social factors that might explain statistical di↵erences in people’s
beliefs. Also, note that the power to sponsor underrepresented groups ought
to lie with parliamentary minorities, not majorities, lest majorities underrate
or dismiss the importance of drawing trustees from minority backgrounds.
With regards to the dangers discussed earlier, modification (M1) will help
guard against (D1), namely the risk that trustees will become corrupt and
dismissive of laymen’s views. This is because it would increase the likelihood
that trustee committees will be representative of the whole citizenry, thereby
making it correspondingly less likely that trustees will become a✏icted by
elitist attitudes. Note, though, that the risk will not be totally eliminated,
as trustees who originally came from underrepresented groups could still be
corrupted by their newly acquired powers and privileges.
Modification (M1) will also help guard against (D3), namely the risk that
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the qualifying criteria for selecting trustees might inadvertently favour can-
didates with certain demographic biases. Where certain candidates would
have failed to become trustees because they lacked certain biases or did
not come from certain backgrounds, the State’s organised e↵ort to broaden
demographic representation in trustee committees will likely prevent the
selection process from favouring the biases (or interests) of a particular
demographic group. Again, though, this measure will not eliminate (D3)
completely, as trustees could potentially converge to some common biases
over time.
To take our earlier example on criminal justice reform, suppose that the
trustees currently specialising in this policy area come from socio-economic
backgrounds that make them more empathetic towards criminals than the
average lay person. A group of parliamentarians could then worry that
this homogeneity can negatively a↵ect trustees’ judgement, and for this
reason order the civil service to examine whether this empathetic attitude
is correlated with certain demographic factors. If there is a correlation,
then parliamentarians could ask the civil service to sponsor members of
underrepresented groups to go through the qualifying process for becoming
trustees on criminal justice reform.
If the sponsored candidates manage to qualify as trustees, it is possible
that (i) they will also become empathetic towards criminals. This is not nec-
essarily bad, epistemically speaking. Insofar as trustees on criminal justice
reform inquire significantly more vigorously than laymen into the matter,
then an empathetic attitude may indeed be the correct one. But, (ii) it
is not necessarily good either, as the selection process might inadvertently
favour an empathetic approach to criminal justice. On the other hand, (iii)
candidates who originally came from underrepresented groups could qualify
as trustees without developing an empathetic attitude. Again, this is not
necessarily good, as it is possible that the candidates who came from un-
derrepresented groups should have developed such an attitude but were too
biased to do so. And (iv) it is not necessarily bad, as it is possible that
earlier trustee cohorts should not have had an empathetic attitude to begin
with. Or, (v) it is possible that there is no definitively correct attitude to be
had about criminal justice, so the trustees who came from underrepresented
groups will help shed a di↵erent perspective on the matter.
Either way, the kind of sponsorship programmes allowed by (M1) will
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decrease the probability that the qualifying process for selecting trustees will
favour the biases (or interests) of a particular demographic group. To be
sure, it does not necessarily enable candidates from di↵erent demographic
groups to overcome any of their biases. But this is not the point here; this
task befalls on the open and vigorous inquiry that is supposed to take place
throughout the qualifying process for selecting trustees.12 Our concern here
is with what to do when trustees fail to respond correctly to the criticisms
raised during inquiry, or at least when they fail to engage with all relevant
criticisms on the matter. Modification (M1) is intended to address the worry
that trustees could disproportionately reflect certain demographic biases,
and it goes some way towards ensuring that.
It is important to stress here that any State support for members of
underrepresented groups to join the ranks of trustees does not guarantee
that these members will manage to do so. The qualifying criteria for joining
a trustee committee will remain in place, and aspiring trustees could still
fail to meet them despite government support. The kind of sponsorship
programmes allowed by (M1) do not undermine the idea that trustees ought
to go through a rigorous selection process that will likely enable them to
acquire an epistemically privileged perspective.
For example, suppose that the qualification criteria for becoming a trustee
on climate policy require that trustees demonstrate an understanding of the
climate science currently taught in universities. Also, suppose that a par-
liamentary minority of climate sceptics wishes to increase the number of
trustees who come from climate sceptic circles, and requests that climate
sceptics be sponsored to go through the relevant qualifying process. This
will not guarantee that the candidates who were originally sceptical about
climate change will manage to qualify as trustees on climate policy without
demonstrating an understanding of the climate science currently taught in
universities. It does mean, however, that if they successfully do so, then they
can join the trustee committee on climate policy and advocate a sceptical
position.13
Moving on, the second modification goes beyond the “passive” nature of
12See sections (§4.1a) and (§4.2b).
13By then, of course, competent candidates will have hopefully realised that their orig-
inal scepticism was empirically unsubstantiated. Meanwhile, incompetent candidates will
have likely failed to demonstrate an understanding of climate science anyway, so most (if
not all) of them will have failed to qualify as trustees.
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(M1), which attempts to control biases through the demographic pool that
candidate trustees will be drawn from. Instead, it “actively” attempts to
control biases by allowing limited adjustments to the composition of trustee
committees:
(M2) Parliamentary minorities ought to be empowered to petition, and
jury courts to approve, the imposition of ideological quotas on what
may be openly advocated in a given trustee committee.
When “ideological quotas” are imposed on a committee, then the proportion
of trustees who openly advocate a certain view ought not be greater than
the proportion of citizens who hold that same view. For example, suppose
that a quota is imposed for climate scepticism and that no more than 3%
of the population are climate sceptics. Then, no more than 3% of trustees
on climate policy may openly advocate and support policy proposals that
reflect a sceptical position.
Modification (M2) is concerned only with what will be “openly advo-
cated” because trustees could always hold the views targeted by quotas
in private. This possibility does not present a fatal problem, however, as
trustees will be disqualified if they support any proposals that reflect the
targeted views. But it is certainly undesirable, least of all because those
who earnestly believe in something might be better equipped to defend it
against criticism. In any case, similar problems of duplicity apply to parlia-
mentarians in democracy, so one cannot make much of this point to attack
liberal trusteeship.
In e↵ect, modification (M2) allows that not all trustees who have met
the qualifying criteria of their field of specialisation will be entitled to join
a trustee committee. It introduces an exception to the principle that the
selection of trustees ought to be procedural, i.e., that it ought not be sensi-
tive to candidates’ specific beliefs, and it allows that the specific beliefs of
candidates can sometimes be taken into account.14
As a result, (M2) can help guard against danger (D2), namely the risk
that militant incompetents could infiltrate trustee committees, as it enables
14Recall that we have set aside the question of how many members ought a trustee
committee to have, in case there are too many citizens that meet the relevant criteria. If
there are too many citizens, then one possible solution would be select trustees for active
service through lot. In that case, (M2) allows that not all of those citizens would be
eligible to serve.
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the political system to control what positions may be openly advocated
in trustee committees. If certain ideas are suspected of being advocated
by militant incompetents, then a quota can be imposed upon them. This
will immediately alter the composition of trustee committees, such that the
targeted ideas will be advocated only to the extent that they are endorsed
by the citizenry at large.
Similarly, (M2) can also be used to guard against danger (D1), namely
the risk that trustees will become corrupt and dismissive of laymen’s views.
This is because the political process can impose quotas on the ideas advo-
cated by trustees suspected of being corrupt, thereby limiting the potential
damage that their ideas may cause. And it can be used to guard against
(D3), namely the risk that the selection process might inadvertently favour
candidates with certain demographic biases, as the political process can
impose quotas on the ideas advocated by trustees suspected of reflecting
particular demographic biases.
Now, I propose that the imposition of quotas ought to be approved by
jury courts for the same reasons as earlier,15 when we discussed parliament’s
prerogative to override trustees on ethics. The task of determining correctly
whether trustees hold a given viewpoint due to bias or well-substantiated
belief will be steeped in controversy. Jurors cannot be relied upon to be
totally impartial on the matter. However, precisely because this task will
be steeped in controversy, it will be ripe for political manipulation. Politi-
cians may genuinely be biased on the matter, or may seek to leverage the
controversy for political or partisan gain.
In this respect, we saw that jurors have two epistemic advantages. Firstly,
they are subjected to a vetting process, which makes the average juror likely
to be less biased on the matter than the average parliamentarian. And sec-
ondly, they are significantly less likely than parliamentarians to act out of
political expediency. Hence, the political process can benefit, epistemically
speaking, if the approval of jury courts is required for the imposition of
quotas, as juries will provide an additional level of inquiry into the reasons
for which trustees and other citizens oppose the relevant quotas, as well as
the reasons for which parliamentarians and other citizens are petitioning to
have them imposed.
Note that, as with (M1), the power to petition quotas ought to lie with
15See section (§4.3b).
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parliamentary minorities, not majorities, lest majorities abuse their position
to favour trustees who share their biases. Similarly, note that the require-
ment for trustees to meet the qualifying criteria of their field of specialisa-
tion will continue to apply; someone would not be able to become a trustee
purely for the sake of fulfilling an ideological quota. Quotas will rather act
as maximum limits to the representation of certain ideas on a given trustee
committee. In addition, note that any quotas will presumably have to ex-
pire automatically after a limited period of time, after which new quotas will
have to be considered. Otherwise, there is a risk that certain views will be
permanently discriminated against, irrespective of whether those who hold
them are biased or not.
Finally, before we close, it is worth stressing that ideological quotas are
not guaranteed to serve an epistemically productive function. There is a risk
that they may damage the epistemic e cacy of liberal trusteeship, as they
can wrongly impose restrictions on correct beliefs. This is because trustees
can hold views that are unpopular with parliament and the citizenry, but
that are correct nonetheless. In that case, jury courts may wrongly approve
the imposition of quotas on good ideas.16
To make matters worse, there is a possibility that quotas would be sys-
tematically misused to alter the composition of trustee committees in (epis-
temically) ill-conceived ways. This gives rise to two worries that are similar
to those examined last chapter:17
The first worry is that, insofar as the composition of trustee committees
can systematically be adjusted in ill-conceived ways and as a result liberal
trusteeship can fail to perform better than democracy, then its deviation
from political equality becomes correspondingly harder to justify.
In response, I would again note that whenever liberal trusteeship would
fail to outperform democracy due to the imposition of ill-conceived quotas,
it would do so precisely because of the egalitarian nature of (M2)—jurors
drawn from the citizenry, and parliamentarians representing the citizenry,
will have intervened to adjust the ideological composition of trustee commit-
tees in a way that reflects the ideological composition of the broader body
politic. While liberal trusteeship would not outperform democracy in those
16Bear in mind, we cannot determine a priori which ideas will be correct and which
ones will not, as that would require us to determine what is objectively right or wrong.
Recall that epistemic theories ought not be grounded on such claims; see p. 12.
17Cf. p. 164.
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cases, its deviation from political equality is not particularly problematic,
as it is shaped by egalitarian processes.
The second worry is that, insofar as the composition of trustee commit-
tees can be systematically adjusted to reflect the ideological composition of
the citizenry at large, then liberal trusteeship is in practice irrelevant. Put
di↵erently, it is non-egalitarian only to the extent that the democratic body
politic will permit it to be.
In response, I would again note that there is some truth to this. It
is not logically impossible that a body politic would be so incompetent,
such that parliamentarians and jurors would systematically seek to impose
ill-conceived quotas. But, again, I have already argued that citizens are
unlikely to be so biased, to the point of rendering the epistemic case for
trusteeship implausible.18 The non-egalitarian nature of liberal trusteeship
is likely to play a central role in the political process.
(5.1c) Now, my response to the first worry above does not address one of
the points echoed in Estlund’s demographic objection. The point was that
trustees might share some “latent” biases that cannot be empirically proven
and which could nevertheless damage their ability to acquire an epistemically
privileged perspective on their fields of specialisation. On this view, trustees
might harbour “latent” biases that parliamentarians and jurors will have no
way of identifying. This means that modifications (M1) and (M2) will do
little to safeguard against such biases.
An appeal to conjectural worries would be weak in this context.19 Recall
that epistemic theories seek to ground moral authority and legitimacy on a
political system’s e↵ectiveness at implementing political morality.20 Also,
recall that we are concerned with striking a balance between any qualified
demands that favour competence and any qualified demands that favour
political equality. This requires us, firstly, to make a judgement about what
system will maximise the chances of government exercising power compe-
tently and, secondly, to make a judgement about whether that level of com-
petence is su ciently great to justify a deviation from political equality.
18See section (§4.1d).
19Note that Estlund’s point was specifically levelled against plural voting, not trustee-
ship. He argued that conjectural worries about “latent” biases in the educated constitute
a qualified reason to favour democracy. The validity of this argument need not detain us
here.
20See p. 12.
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If such judgements are to make any sense, we ought to accord greater
weight to empirically-informed assumptions than pure hypotheticals. I do
recognise that qualified viewpoints can worry about the potential e↵ects of
hypothetical “latent” biases harboured by trustees, and that this provides
a reason in favour of political equality. But this should not distract from
my attempt to argue on empirically-informed grounds that democracy has
significant epistemic shortcomings and that liberal trusteeship has a series
of epistemic virtues that would allow it to capitalise on the latest progress
of open and vigorous inquiry more e↵ectively than democracy. I have also
endeavoured to defend a series of egalitarian checks and limits on the power
of trustees, from the exclusive power of parliament to enact or reject bills,
to modifications (M1) and (M2), that are likely to diminish the risks posed
by trustee bias and corruption.
In that regard, a rejection of liberal trusteeship on purely conjectural
grounds, and without o↵ering empirically-informed reasons to doubt the
epistemic e cacy of liberal trusteeship, will trigger severe opposition from
qualified viewpoints that favour competence over equality. Therefore, I sub-
mit that the latter viewpoints can outweigh any qualified reasons to favour
equality that appeal to purely conjectural worries.
(5.1d) To summarise, I have argued that the negative consequences of
trustee bias and corruption can be controlled or mitigated by two institu-
tional safeguards. First, by empowering parliamentary minorities to sponsor
members of underrepresented demographic groups to qualify as trustees on
a given area. And, second, by empowering jury courts to approve parlia-
mentary requests for the imposition of “ideological quotas” on certain ideas,
so that the proportion of trustees advocating those ideas will not be greater
than the proportion to which these ideas are held by the citizenry at large.
Despite these safeguards, I also noted that there will always exist a
residual risk that trustees will be biased or corrupt. The question, then, is
whether these risks pose a su ciently great threat to the epistemic potential
of liberal trusteeship, such that its deviation from political equality cannot
be justified. In the next section, I endeavour to argue that, on balance, the
epistemic case for trusteeship is su ciently compelling to render such risks
acceptable.
Before closing, we should note that my analysis ignored a series of in-
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stitutional design issues. For example, it did not examine what proportion
of the State budget ought to be reserved for sponsoring underrepresented
groups; how limited budget resources ought to be allocated across di↵erent
groups that di↵erent parliamentarians want sponsored; what methods are
best to sponsor such groups; whether parliamentarians should be required
to provide evidence of probable bias in trustees before requesting a quota
on a given belief; or what statistical analysis methods are best to determine
the proportion of the citizenry that endorses certain ideas, so that quotas
can be accurate. While there is no space to delve into these matters here,
by way of brief comment, I submit that they do not pose an insurmountable
problem for trusteeship.
5.2 The final blueprint and its qualified acceptability
The aim of this section will be to summarise the final blueprint of my pro-
posal and to assess whether the case for liberal trusteeship is, on balance,
more compelling than the case for democracy.
Recall that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the
least unjust system, or the one that strikes the best balance between any
qualified demands that favour competence and any qualified demands that
favour political equality.21 On account of this, recall that my defence ulti-
mately rests on whether liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power suf-
ficiently more competently than democracy, such that its deviation from
political equality can be justified.
In our discussion so far, I have endeavoured to develop an institutional
blueprint of liberal trusteeship that can make the above conclusion hard to
resist. While I have indicated at various points how it will be hard to resist,
we can now consider this question in a rounded manner. In what follows, I
recount the blueprint of liberal trusteeship defended thus far, which I call the
final blueprint, and submit that it presents a better balance between com-
petence and equality than democracy (§5.2a). In addition, I check whether
the final blueprint fulfils Estlund’s three constraints on legitimacy, which we
discussed at the beginning of this thesis (§5.2b).
(5.2a) The final blueprint essentially incorporates the modifications de-
fended in the last section into the intermediate model defended last chapter.
21For a summary, see last chapter’s introduction.
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Like the intermediate model, it stipulates that any citizen can become a
trustee on some policy area F, so long as she meets the relevant qualifying
criteria of that area. This means that trustees will not be elected into
o ce. It also stipulates that trustees specialising in non-moral questions
be exclusively vested with the power to draft laws about those questions,
and that a democratically elected parliament be exclusively vested with the
power to enact those drafts into law, or reject them.22
In addition, like the intermediate model, it makes an exception in the
case of ethics, granting parliament the prerogative to override trustees on
ethics and pass its own laws on moral matters, under the conditions that
it has considered and rejected the proposals put forward by those trustees
several times; and that it has received approval to do so by a jury court.
In e↵ect, therefore, the legally recognized boundary between the moral and
non-moral (or technical) aspect of a given policy issue can potentially be
whatever parliament determines it to be.23
Furthermore, like the intermediate model, the final blueprint stipulates
that the qualifying criteria for selecting trustees be set by jury courts. Or,
more accurately, it stipulates that jury courts be empowered to adjudicate
whether the criteria currently used should be changed in the ways proposed
by plainti↵s, who can be any citizens. It also stipulates that the criteria
ought to be procedural, i.e., they ought not be sensitive to the specific
beliefs of candidates.24
Unlike the intermediate model, the final blueprint additionally stipulates
that parliamentarians, even if they are in the minority, be empowered to
sponsor members of demographic groups currently underrepresented in a
given trustee committee to go through the relevant qualifying process of that
committee; and that jury courts be empowered to approve the imposition
of “ideological quotas” on what ideas may be openly advocated in a given
trustee committee.25
Lastly, bear in mind that all citizens will be granted a series of liberal
rights, so that they can make contributions during the open and vigorous
inquiry that takes place at the political level without the fear of retribution.26
22See section (§4.1b).
23See section (§4.2b-c).
24See section (§4.2b).
25See section (§5.1b).
26See p. 103.
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The question, then, remains whether the above institutional framework
strikes a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.
While it is nigh on impossible to give an unarguable answer to that question,
the conclusion that trusteeship does strike a better balance is hard to resist.
On the one hand, I have argued that liberal trusteeship is more likely
than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the
latest progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Briefly, this
is because trustees are individually more likely, and collectively significantly
more likely, than laymen to hold an epistemically privileged perspective in
their area of specialisation. Hence, by vesting them with the power to intro-
duce bills to parliament, the political process will likely leverage their spe-
cialist skills to a much greater degree than democracy would have been able
to.27 Also, I have argued that liberal trusteeship can additionally leverage
the knowledge held by lay citizens, as trustees will have to take parliament’s
views seriously in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise.
On the other hand, the checks and limits on the power of trustees listed
above mitigate the main qualified objections that may be raised against
non-egalitarian government. Whenever the citizenry suspects that liberal
trusteeship is lacking in a certain respect, be it in terms of the criteria for
selecting trustees, or in terms of whether trustees are biased or corrupt, there
are egalitarian processes in place to address those concerns. In addition,
parliament is granted the prerogative to override trustees on ethics, as well
as to determine the boundary of morality, thereby remedying any qualified
worries about whether there can exist any moral experts (or any trustees
with an epistemically privileged moral perspective).
In the light of this, I submit that liberal trusteeship appears to strike a
better balance between competence and equality than democracy does. In
order to deny this, the democrat would likely have to follow one of three
strategies:
Firstly, he could defend democracy on substantive grounds. For exam-
ple, he could argue that democracy is necessarily more just than liberal
trusteeship because it embodies certain communal values, like equality or
fairness. But we have seen that such defences are outside the scope of epis-
temic theorising, as they are subject to the problem of disagreement.28
27See section (§4.1c).
28See sections (§I.1a) and (§2.3b).
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Secondly, he could argue that liberal trusteeship is unlikely to exercise
power su ciently competently to justify its deviation of equality. An ar-
gument to that e↵ect remains to be developed, but it will probably have
to rely either on exaggerating the risk that trustees will fail to acquire an
epistemically privileged perspective in their field of specialisation, or on ex-
aggerating the risk that parliament and the courts will fail to exercise their
oversight powers in epistemically productive ways. An exaggeration of the
former risk would put the value of open and vigorous inquiry into question,
which would be a hefty price to pay. And an exaggeration of the latter risk
would put the value of egalitarian decision-making processes into question,
which would be self-defeating for the democrat.
Thirdly, then, the democrat could appeal to value pluralism and argue
that the notion of a “best” balance between competence and equality is
misguided, as there can be no correct way of balancing them. But an appeal
to value pluralism would constitute another attempt to defend democracy
on substantive grounds, as it would presuppose that pluralism is true despite
the fact that reasonable people disagree about this question. In any case,
while an appeal to pluralism would allow oneself to resist the conclusion that
liberal trusteeship is preferable to democracy, it would also prevent him from
asserting that democracy is preferable to liberal trusteeship. Indeed, it could
potentially prevent him from asserting that democracy is preferable to any
non-democratic regime altogether. This strategy would also come at too
high a cost.
In conclusion, I submit that the case for liberal trusteeship is on balance
more compelling than the case for democracy.
(5.2b) Before we close, it is worth checking whether liberal trusteeship
fulfils Estlund’s three “constraints on legitimacy”, which we discussed at
the beginning of the thesis.29 Recall that these constraints demarcate some
ways in which a political system’s qualified acceptability can be challenged.
The first constraint states that the distribution of political power ought
not be sensitive to di↵erences in the “normative political wisdom” of citizens,
as any criteria for evaluating such di↵erences would be subject to qualified
disagreement and would thus be rejectable. This is what Estlund termed
the “problem of invidious comparisons”.
29See section (§1.2).
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This line of criticism cannot be levelled against liberal trusteeship with
great e↵ect. To be sure, trustees will be granted the power to draft laws
and policies in their fields of specialisation on the grounds that they are
more likely to have epistemically privileged views on those fields. This is a
comparison of citizens’ wisdom of sorts. But the whole point is that such
comparisons are not only qualified to make, but are also necessary in order to
satisfy the competence principle, which stipulates that government ought to
exercise its powers competently.30 Qualified viewpoints that favour equality
will consider such comparisons problematic, but qualified viewpoints that
favour competence will consider the prohibition of such comparisons even
more problematic, as it would flatly imply that qualified considerations in
favour of equality are lexically prior to qualified considerations in favour of
competence.
The second constraint states that the legitimacy of a government ought
not be justified in a way that ultimately requires dissenters to submit and
accept government decisions as being right or correct. This is what Estlund
termed the “problem of deference”.
Liberal trusteeship fulfils this constraint, as it does not require citizens
to defer to the judgement of trustees. Quite the contrary, dissenting citizens,
be it dissenting trustees, parliamentarians, jurors, or laymen, are required
not to do so. In the interest of inquiring into political matters as openly
and as vigorously as possible, liberal trusteeship stipulates that dissenting
citizens question established ideas and scrutinise the work of trustees (and,
indeed, of parliament). In that regard, dissent in liberal trusteeship will be
an essential element of the political process.
The third constraint states that the legitimacy of a government ought
not be contingent on the rightness or correctness of each and every single
decision that it makes. This is what Estlund termed the “problem of de-
mandingness”. Again, liberal trusteeship fulfils this constraint, as it does
not require government decisions to be correct or right. Rather, it requires
that the political process maximises the chances of power being exercised
competently. Of course, the hope is that government decisions will be cor-
rect or right, but this is not necessary for legitimacy. What is necessary
is that government decisions are on average less mistaken, or more correct,
than the decisions democracy would have made.
30See section (§2.3a).
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(5.2c) This brings my defence of liberal trusteeship to an end. As the thesis
title indicates, this work is intended as a preparatory step. It sets aside a
series of questions, some of which I have already mentioned31 and some of
which I will mention in the conclusion.
31See sections (§4.1f), (§4.2c), (§4.3e) and (§5.1d).
Conclusion
I have argued that authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the least
unjust political system, or the one that strikes the best balance between the
qualified demands of the competence principle (which states that govern-
ments ought to exercise power competently) and any qualified demands in
favour of political equality. Also, I accepted that open and vigorous inquiry
is the best method of inquiry into political matters, so a system’s ability to
exercise power competently will strongly depend on its ability to capitalise
on the progress of such inquiry over time.
My defence of liberal trusteeship essentially rests on the claim that it is
su ciently more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought
to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given
topic, such that it is likely to exercise power su ciently more competently
than democracy to justify its deviation from political equality.
To that e↵ect, I began by discussing some shortcomings of democracy
that should make us question the ability of democratic governments to
capitalise upon the progress of open and vigorous inquiry. Specifically, I
pointed out that citizens cannot a↵ord the time to inquire vigorously into
political matters; that they are ceteris paribus likely to adopt inadequate
epistemic attitudes during political discourse that are incompatible with
open and vigorous inquiry; and that they are ordinarily left to make coarse-
grained choices between imperfect manifestos, which means that democrat-
ically elected governments can have a mandate to implement policies that
public debate has shown to be wrong.
Next, I proceeded to develop the case for liberal trusteeship. My pro-
posal, which I called the final blueprint, is grounded on the assumption that
if someone has inquired significantly more openly and more vigorously than
the average lay person into a given matter, then she is correspondingly more
189
190 LIBERAL TRUSTEESHIP
likely to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective into that matter rel-
ative to laymen. I called this kind of specialists trustees on the relevant areas
in which they have inquired so, and explained that they demarcate a weaker
epistemic concept than “experts”. This is because trustees need only hold
better beliefs than laymen, but not necessarily correct beliefs, whereas ex-
perts are by definition people who hold significantly more true beliefs about
a given matter than they hold false ones.
On account of this, the final blueprint stipulates that any citizen can
become a trustee on some policy area F, so long as she meets the relevant
criteria designed to test whether she has indeed inquired significantly more
openly and more vigorously into F than laymen. This means that trustees
will not be elected into o ce.
More, it stipulates that trustees specialising in non-moral questions be
exclusively vested with the power to draft laws about those questions, and
that a democratically elected parliament be exclusively vested with the
power to enact those drafts into law, or reject them. The rationale behind
this proposal is that parliament will be pushed to inquire more vigorously
into the matter than it would have done under democracy, as it will have to
deliberate with trustees sponsoring or opposing a given proposal in order to
determine whether to enact that proposal into law or not. As a result of this
inquiry, parliament will be likely to exercise power more competently than
it would have done under democracy. At the same time, liberal trusteeship
is well placed to capitalise on any valuable information held by parliamen-
tarians, as trustees will have to take their views seriously and put forward
proposals that are acceptable to them—liberal trusteeship does not create
an inordinately high risk that trustees will dismiss or underrate the views
of laymen.
Now, the final blueprint makes an exception with regards to ethics. Par-
liament is granted the prerogative to override trustees on ethics and pass its
own laws on moral matters, under the conditions that it has considered and
rejected the proposals put forward by those trustees several times; and that
it has received approval to do so by a jury court. In e↵ect, therefore, the
legally recognized boundary between the moral and non-moral (or technical)
aspect of a given policy issue can potentially be whatever parliament deter-
mines it to be. This helps diminish the force of qualified objections that
deny the possibility of moral expertise, or of an epistemically privileged
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moral perspective.
In addition, the final blueprint stipulates that the qualifying criteria for
selecting trustees be set by jury courts. Or, more accurately, it stipulates
that jury courts be empowered to adjudicate whether the criteria currently
used should be changed in the ways proposed by plainti↵s, who can be
any citizens. It also stipulates that the criteria ought to be procedural,
i.e., they ought not be sensitive to the specific beliefs of candidates. These
requirements enable liberal trusteeship to eschew the question of what, if
anything, is objectively true or false, or what criteria are objectively best or
worst.
Furthermore, the final blueprint stipulates that parliamentarians, even
if they are in the minority, be empowered to sponsor members of demo-
graphic groups currently underrepresented in a given trustee committee to
go through the relevant qualifying process of that committee; and that jury
courts be empowered to approve the imposition of “ideological quotas” on
what ideas may be openly advocated in a given trustee committee. These
two measures help address the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt,
by providing some egalitarian mechanisms to control, respectively, the de-
mographic pool from which candidate trustees are drawn from, as well as
the actual composition of trustee committees.
Lastly, the final blueprint grants liberal protections to all citizens, so
that they can make contributions during the open and vigorous inquiry that
takes place at the political level without the fear of retribution.
All things considered, I submit that liberal trusteeship strikes a better
balance between competence and equality than democracy. In order to re-
sist this conclusion, the democrat could appeal to substantive values, like
equality or fairness, and argue that democracy is preferable because it em-
bodies those values more faithfully than democracy. But I have argued that
epistemic theories cannot rely on such arguments, so this type of democratic
recourse would fall outside the scope of this thesis. Alternatively, the demo-
crat could retreat to value pluralism and claim that there is no “best” way
of balancing equality against competence; or he could question the ability
of trustees to acquire an epistemically privileged perspective in their fields
of specialisation; or even question the ability of parliament and jury courts
to use their various powers in epistemically productive ways. I have argued
that all of these options are unpalatable, as they ultimately put the value of
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open and vigorous inquiry, as well as the value of democracy, into question.
Other options might well be available, but they remain to be elaborated.
In conclusion, authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for liberal
trusteeship, as it strikes the best balance between any qualified demands that
favour competence and any qualified demands that favour political equality.
Further work
This thesis is intended as a preparatory step towards a more thorough de-
fence of liberal trusteeship, and I have already mentioned some questions of
institutional design that would need to be addressed in the future.1 In what
follows, I mention some further questions that extend beyond institutional
design.
For one, my analysis has not expanded on the “liberal” component of
liberal trusteeship. Hence, a more thorough defence will have to outline
what kinds of liberal rights are (morally) appropriate, and then discuss what
legislative processes should be tasked with specifying the legal instantiations
of those rights.
Second, a more thorough defence will have to explore whether the power
to set the qualifying criteria for selecting trustees should be left entirely to
jury courts (which is the position I have argued for), or whether some cri-
teria should be constitutionally mandated. For instance, there is perhaps
an epistemic case to be made for requiring trustees to pass “critical ability”
tests, in the manner of “logic requirements” in US Philosophy PhD pro-
grammes, at least insofar as such tests would enable the political system to
select trustees of even higher calibre.
Third, a more thorough defence will have to examine whether there is
room for liberal trusteeship to deviate a little further from political equality.
For instance, there is perhaps an epistemic case to be made for empowering
trustees in near-unanimity to override parliament. Insofar as trustees are
individually more likely than laymen to hold an epistemically privileged
perspective, then near-unanimity amongst trustees about what ought to be
done can indicate that their proposals are very likely to be correct. To
that extent, this provides a rationale for vesting trustees in near-unanimity
with the power to override parliament and directly enact their proposals
into law. Perhaps, some conditions would have to apply, such as allowing
1See sections (§4.1f), (§4.2c), (§4.3e) and (§5.1d).
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trustees in near-unanimity to override parliament only if their proposals are
not opposed by a supermajority of parliamentarians.
Fourth, a more thorough defence will need to provide further empirical
evidence in support of the assumptions made throughout the thesis, notably
regarding the epistemic benefits of enabling trustees to act as “directive lead-
ers” during parliamentary debate.2 The empirical research cited in defence
of the latter benefits has been conducted with small groups, so the case
for trusteeship would strengthen if research became available on how larger
groups are likely to perform under similar circumstances.
Fifth, moving beyond the strictly necessary, my defence of liberal trustee-
ship would benefit if it were compared against earlier attempts to justify
non-egalitarian systems. Plato’s philosopher-kings are an obvious point of
comparison. Another point of comparison can be found in J. S. Mill’s little-
known stipulation that laws be drafted by “commissioners”, not parliamen-
tarians, and that those drafts be sanctioned or rejected by parliament.3 The
key di↵erence, of course, is that Mill did not argue for that conclusion from
the perspective of epistemic theorising, as his theory relies on several sub-
stantive claims about moral rightness and liberty. Another di↵erence is that
he did not delve into the questions I raised, such as who would set the criteria
for selecting “commissioners” or what can be done to safeguard against the
risk that “commissioners” might be biased or corrupt. Yet another di↵er-
ence is that Mill’s parliament would have be elected through plural voting,
not normal democratic processes.
More recently, another point of comparison can be found in Bai Tong-
dong’s Confucian proposal to empower an “upper house” to rule by de-
cree, unless its decisions are opposed by a supermajority in a democratically
elected lower house. On his proposal, the members of the upper house would
be selected through a combination of examinations, lottery, and appoint-
ments from regional assemblies.4 The key di↵erence is that Bai’s proposal
does not delve into how the political process can guard against the risk that
members of the upper house might be biased or corrupt. It also does not
provide the kind of fine-grained division of cognitive labour across specialist
trustee committees that liberal trusteeship provides, as the members of the
2See assumption (B2), section (§4.1c).
3See, e.g., Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government”, p. 430.
4Bai, “A Confucian Version of Hybrid Regime”, pp. 65-73.
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upper house would not necessarily be specialists on the policy areas that
they would be making decisions on. As a result, the epistemic potential of
his proposal is likely lower than the potential of liberal trusteeship.
Sixth then, and last, my defence of liberal trusteeship would also benefit
if it were accompanied by an exercise in non-ideal theory that stipulated
how democracies can transition to liberal trusteeship, as well as what ought
to be done insofar as a full transition to liberal trusteeship is not presently
viable. These and other questions will need to be addressed in future work.
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